











A N
E S S A Y
CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

IN FOUR BOOKS.

WRITTEN BY
JOHN LOCKE, Esq.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOLUME THE SECOND.

A NEW EDITION CORRECTED.

*As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how
the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child:
even so thou knowest not the works of GOD, who maketh all
things.* Eccl. xi. 5.

*Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias,
quam ista effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere!*
CIC. de Nat. Deor. l. i.

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O F

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

B O O K II.

O F I D E A S.

C H A P. XXII.

Of MIXED MODES.

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 § 10. *Motion, thinking, and power, have been most modified.* § 11. *Several words seeming to signify action, signify but the effect.* § 12. *Mixed modes made also of other ideas.*

§ 1. **H**AVING treated of *simple modes* in the foregoing chapters, and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them, to shew what they are, and how we come by them; we are now, in the next place, to consider those we call MIXED MODES, such are the complex ideas

we mark by the names *obligation*, *drunkenness*, *alie*, &c.; which, consisting of several combinations of simple ideas of different kinds, I have called *mixed modes*, to distinguish them from the more simple modes, which consist only of simple ideas of the same kind. These mixed modes being also such combinations of simple ideas, as are not looked upon to be characteristical marks of any real beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent ideas, put together by the mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances.

§ 2. That the mind, in respect of its simple ideas, is wholly passive, and receives them all from the existence and operations of things, such as sensation or reflection offers them, without being able to make any one idea, experience shews us. But if we attentively consider these ideas I call *mixed modes*, we are now speaking of, we shall find their original quite different. The mind often exercises an active power in making these several combinations: for it being once furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety of complex ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in nature. And hence, I think, it is, that these ideas are called *notions*; as if they had their original, and constant existence, more in the thoughts of men, than in the reality of things; and to form such ideas, it sufficed, that the mind puts the parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the understanding, without considering whether they had any real being: though I do not deny, but several of them might be taken from observation, and the existence of several simple ideas so combined, as they are put together

in the understanding. For the man who first framed the idea of *hypocrisy*, might have either taken it at first from the observation of one, who made shew of good qualities, which he had not ; or else have framed that idea in his mind, without having any such pattern to fashion it by. For it is evident, that in the beginning of languages and societies of men, several of those complex ideas, which were consequent to the constitutions established amongst them, must needs have been in the minds of men, before they existed any-where else ; and that many names that stood for such complex ideas were in use, and so those ideas framed, before the combinations they stood for ever existed.

§ 3. Indeed, now that languages are made, and abound with words standing for such combinations, an useful way of getting these complex ideas, is by the explication of those terms that stand for them. For consisting of a company of simple ideas, combined, they may, by words standing for those simple ideas, be represented to the mind of one who understands those words, though that complex combination of simple ideas were never offered to his mind by the real existence of things. Thus a man may come to have the idea of *sacrilege* or *murder*, by enumerating to him the simple ideas which these words stand for, without ever seeing either of them committed.

§ 4. Every mixed mode, consisting of many distinct simple ideas, it seems reasonable to inquire, whence it has its unity ; and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one idea, since that combination does not always exist together in nature ? To which I answer, It is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind combining those several simple ideas together, and considering

them as one complex one, consisting of those parts: and the mark of this union, or that which is looked on generally to complete it, is one name given to that combination. For it is by their names that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct species of mixed modes, seldom allowing or considering any number of simple ideas, to make one complex one, but such collections as there be names for. Thus, though the killing of an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea, as the killing a man's father; yet, there being no name standing precisely for the one, as there is the name of *parricide* to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex idea, nor a distinct species of actions, from that of killing a young man, or any other man.

§ 5. If we should inquire a little farther, to see what it is that occasions men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct, and, as it were, settled modes, and neglect others, which, in the nature of things themselves, have as much an aptness to be combined, and make distinct ideas, we shall find the reason of it to be the end of language; which being to mark or communicate mens thoughts to one another with all the dispatch that may be, they usually make such collections of ideas into complex modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of in their way of living and conversation, leaving others, which they have but seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without names, that tie them together: they rather chusing to enumerate, when they have need, such ideas as make them up, by the particular names that stand for them, than to trouble their memories by multiplying of complex

ideas with names to them, which they seldom or never have any occasion to make use of.

§ 6. This shews us how it comes to pass, that there are in every language many particular words, which cannot be rendered by any one single word for another : for the several fashions, customs, and manners of one nation, making several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary in one, which another people have had never any occasion to make or, perhaps, so much as take notice of, names come of course to be annexed to them, to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation ; and so they become so many distinct complex ideas in their minds. Thus *εσφαρισμος* amongst the Greeks, and *proscriptio* amongst the Romans, were words which other languages had no names that exactly answered, because they stood for complex ideas, which were not in the minds of the men of other nations. Where there was no such custom, there was no notion of any such actions ; no use of such combinations of ideas, as were united, and, as it were, tied together by those terms : and therefore in other countries there were no names for them.

§ 7. Hence also we may see the reason, why languages constantly change, take up new, and lay by old terms : because change of customs and opinions bringing with it new combinations of ideas, which it is necessary frequently to think on, and talk about, new names, to avoid long descriptions, are annexed to them ; and so they become new species of complex modes. What a number of different ideas are by this means wrapped up in one short sound, and how much of our time and breath is thereby saved, any one will see, who will but take the pains to enumerate all the

ideas that either *reprieve* or *appeal* stand for ; and instead of either of those names, use a *periphrasis*, to make any one understand their meaning.

§ 8. Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large, when I come to treat of words, and their use ; yet I could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the names of *mixed modes*, which being fleeting, and transient combinations of simple ideas, which have but a short existence any-where, but in the minds of men, and there too have no longer any existence than whilst they are thought on, have not so much any-where the appearance of a constant and lasting existence, as in their names: which are therefore, in these sort of ideas, very apt to be taken for the ideas themselves. For if we should inquire where the idea of a *triumph*, or *apotheosis*, exists, it is evident they could neither of them exist altogether any-where in the things themselves, being actions that required time to their performance, and so could never all exist together : and as to the minds of men, where the ideas of these actions are supposed to be lodged, they have there too a very uncertain existence ; and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us.

§ 9. There are therefore three ways whereby we get the complex ideas of mixed modes. 1. By experience and observation of things themselves. Thus by seeing two men wrestle or fence, we get the idea of wrestling or fencing. 2. By invention, or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds : so he that first invented printing, or etching, had an idea of it in his mind, before it ever existed. 3. Which is the most usual way, by explaining the names of actions we never saw, or notions we cannot see : and by enumerating and thereby, as it were, setting

before our imaginations all those ideas which go to the making them up, and are the constituent parts of them. For having, by sensation and reflection, stored our minds with simple ideas, and by use got the names that stand for them, we can by those names represent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive ; so that it has in it no simple ideas but what he knows, and has, with us, the same name for. For all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple ideas, of which they are compounded, and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate ingredients as I may so say, are also complex ideas. Thus the mixed mode, which the word *lie* stands for, is made of these simple ideas : 1. Articulate sounds. 2. Certain ideas in the mind of the speaker. 3. Those words the signs of those ideas. 4. Those signs put together by affirmation or negation, otherwise than the ideas they stand for, are in the mind of the speaker. I think I need not go any farther in the analysis of that complex idea, we call a *lie* : what I have said is enough to shew, that it is made up of simple ideas : and it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea that goes to this complex one ; which, from what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself. The same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever ; which, however compounded and decomposed, may at last be resolved into simple ideas, which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have, or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear, that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of ideas, if we consider, what an inexhaustible stock of simple modes, number and si-

-gure alone affords us. How far then mixed modes, which admit of the various combinations of different simple ideas, and their infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily imagine. So that before we have done, we shall see, that no-body need be afraid he shall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only to simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, and their several combinations.

§ 10. It is worth our observing, which of all our simple ideas have been most modified, and had most mixed modes made out of them, with names given to them : and those have been these three ; thinking, and motion, (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action), and power, from whence these actions are conceived to flow. These simple ideas, I say, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most modified ; and out of whose modifications have been made most complex modes, with names to them. For action being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of, the ideas of them observed and laid up in the memory, and have names assigned to them ; without which, laws could be but ill-made, or vice and disorder represented. Nor could any communication be well had amongst men, without such complex ideas, with names to them : and therefore men have settled names, and supposed settled ideas, in their minds, of modes of actions distinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances ; and also of their powers

fitted for those actions, *v. g.* boldness is the power to speak or do what we intend before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name, *παρρησια*: which power or ability in man of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that idea we name *habit*: when it is forward, and ready upon every occasion to break into action, we call it *disposition*. Thus *testiness* is a disposition, or aptness, to be angry.

To conclude, let us examine any modes of action, *v. g.* *consideration* and *assent*, which are actions of the mind; *running* and *speaking*, which are actions of the body; *revenge* and *murder*, which are actions of both together, and we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas, which together make up the complex one signified by those names.

§ 11. Power being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are when they exert this power into act, are called *causes*; and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called *effects*. The efficacy whereby the new substance or idea is produced, is called, in the subject exerting that power, *action*; but in the subject wherein any simple idea is changed or produced, it is called *passion*: which efficacy, however various, and the effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing else but modifications of motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two: for whatever sort of action, besides these, produces

any effects, I confess myself to have no notion, nor idea of; and so it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehensions, and knowledge, and as much in the dark to me as five other senses, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man: and therefore many words, which seem to express some action, signify nothing of the action, or *modus operandi*, at all, but barely the effect, with some circumstances of the subject wrought on, or cause operating; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action, or manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the cause, and the thing done. And when a countryman says the cold freezes water, though the word freezing seems to import some action, yet truly it signifies nothing but the effect, *viz.* that water, that was before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

§ 12. I think I shall not need to remark here, that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men; yet other simple ideas, and their several combinations, are not excluded; much less, I think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes which have been settled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made use of in divinity, ethics, law, and politics, and several other sciences. All that is requisite to my present design, is, to shew what sort of ideas those are which I call *mixed modes*; how the mind comes by them; and that they are compositions made up of simple ideas got from sensation and reflection; which I suppose I have done.

C H A P. XXIII.

Of our COMPLEX IDEAS of Substances.

§ 1. *Ideas of substances, how made.* § 2. *Our idea of substance in general.* § 3—6. *Of the sorts of substances.* § 4. *No clear idea of substance in general.* § 5. *As clear an idea of spirit as body.* § 6. *Of the sorts of substances.* § 7. *Power, a great part of our complex ideas of substances.* § 8. *And why.* § 9. *Three sorts of ideas make our complex ones of substances.* § 10. *Powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances.* § 11. *The new secondary qualities of bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute parts.* § 12. *Our faculties of discovery suited to our state.* § 13. *Conjecture about spirits.* § 14. *Complex ideas of substances.* § 15. *Idea of spiritual substances, as clear as of bodily substances.* § 16. *No idea of abstract substance.* § 17. *The cohesion of solid parts, and impulse, the primary ideas of body.* § 18. *Thinking and motivity, the primary ideas of spirit.* § 19—21. *Spirits capable of motion.* § 22. *Idea of soul and body compared.* § 23—27. *Cohesion of solid parts in body, as hard to be conceived as thinking in a soul.* § 28, 29. *Communication of motion by impulse or by thought, equally intelligible.* § 30. *Idea of body and spirit compared.* § 31. *The notion of spirit involves no more difficulty in it, than that of body.* § 32. *We know nothing beyond our simple ideas.* § 33—35. *Idea of God.* § 36. *No ideas in our complex one of spirits, but those got from sensation or reflection.* § 37. *Recapitulation.*

§ 1. **T**HE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a greater number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also, that as certain numbers of those simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterwards to talk of, and consider as one simple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together; because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some *substratum*, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call SUBSTANCE ¹.

¹ This section, which was intended only to shew how the individuals of distinct species of substances came to be looked upon as simple ideas, and so to have simple names, *viz.* from the supposed simple *substratum* or *substance*, which was looked upon as the thing itself in which inhere, and from which resulted that complication of ideas by which it was represented to us, hath been mistaken for an account of the idea of substance in general; and as such, hath been reprehended in these words: *But how comes the general idea of substance to be framed in our minds? Is this by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas? No: 'But ' it is by a complication of many simple ideas together: ' because, not imagining how these simple ideas can sub-*
' sist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose
' some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from
' whence they do result; which therefore we call

§ 2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what sup-

'substance.' And is this all indeed that is to be said for the being of substance, that we accustom ourselves to suppose a substratum? Is that custom grounded upon true reason or not? If not, then accidents or modes must subsist of themselves; and these simple ideas need no tortoise to support them: for figures and colours, &c. would do well enough of themselves, but for some fancies men have accustomed themselves to.

To which objection of the bishop of Worcester, our author answers thus†: Herein your lordship seems to charge me with two faults: one, that I make the general idea of substance to be framed, not by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas, but by a complication of many simple ideas together: the other, as if I had said, the being of substance had no other foundation but the fancies of men.

As to the first of these, I beg leave to remind your lordship, that I say, in more places than one, and particularly book iii. chap. iii. § 6. and book i. chap. xi. § 9.; where, *ex professo*, I treat of abstraction and general ideas, that they are all made by abstracting, and therefore could not be understood to mean, that that of substance was made any other way; however, my pen might have slipped, or the negligence of expression, where I might have something else than the general idea of substance in view, might make me seem to say so.

That I was not speaking of the general idea of substance in the passage your lordship quotes, is manifest from the title of that chapter, which is, *Of the complex ideas of substances*. And the first section of it,

* In his first letter to that bishop, p. 27, &c.

port of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should

which your lordship cites for those words, you have set down.

In which words I do not observe any that deny the *general idea of substance to be made by abstraction*, nor any that say, it is made *by a complication of many simple ideas together*. But speaking in that place of the ideas of distinct substances, such as man, horse, gold, &c. I say they are made up of certain combinations of simple ideas, which combinations are looked upon, each of them, as one simple idea, though they were many; and we call it by one name of *substance*, though made up of modes, from the custom of supposing a *substratum*, wherein that combination does subsist. So that in this paragraph I only give an account of the idea of distinct substances, such as *oak, elephant, iron, &c.* how, though they are made up of distinct complications of modes, yet they are looked on as one idea. called by one name, as making distinct sorts of substances.

But that my notion of *substance in general* is quite different from these, and has no such combination of simple ideas in it, is evident from the immediate following words, where I say †: *The idea of pure substance in general, is only a supposition of we know not what support of such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us.* And these two I plainly distinguish all along; particularly where I say, *Whatever therefore be the secret and abstract nature of substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas co-existing in such, though unknown cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself.*

† Book ii. chap. 23. § 2.

be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: and if he were demanded what is it that that solidity and exten-

The other thing laid to my charge, is as if I took the being of substance to be doubtful, or rendered it so by the imperfect and ill-grounded idea I have given of it. To which I beg leave to say, that I ground not the *being*, but the *idea* of substance, on our accustoming ourselves to suppose some *substratum*; for it is of the idea alone I speak there, and not of the *being of substance*. And having every where affirmed and built upon it, that a man is a substance, I cannot be supposed to question or doubt of the being of substance, till I can question or doubt of my own being. Farther, I say †, *Sensation convinces us, that there are solid, extended substances, and reflection, that there are thinking ones*. So that I think the *being of substance* is not shaken by what I have said: and if the idea of it should be, yet (the being of things depending not on our ideas) the *being of substance* would not be at all shaken by my saying, we had but an obscure imperfect idea of it, and that that idea came from our accustoming ourselves to suppose some *substratum*; or indeed, if I should say, we had no idea of substance at all. For a great many things may be, and are granted to have a being, and be in nature, of which we have no ideas. For example, it cannot be doubted but there are distinct species of separate spirits, of which yet we have no distinct ideas at all: it cannot be questioned but spirits have ways of communicating their thoughts, and yet we have no idea of it at all.

The being then of substance being safe and secure, notwithstanding anything I have said, let us see whether

† Book ii. chap. 23. § 29.

sion inhere in, he would not be in a much better case, than the Indian before mentioned, who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked, what the elephant rested on? To which his answer was, A great tortoise: but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied, Something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases, where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children; who being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, That it is something; which in truth

the idea of it be not so too. Your lordship asks with concern, *And is this all indeed that is to be said for the being* (if your lordship please, let it be the *idea*) *of substance, 'that we accustom ourselves to suppose a ' substratum?'* Is that custom grounded upon true reason or no? I have said, that it is grounded upon this†, *That we cannot conceive how simple ideas of sensible qualities should subsist alone, and therefore we suppose them to exist in, and to be supported by some common subject; which support, we denote by the name substance* Which, I think, is a true reason, because it is the same your lordship grounds the supposition of a *substratum* on, in this very page; even on the repugnancy to our conceptions, *that modes and accidents should subsist by themselves.* So that I have the good luck to agree here with your lordship: and consequently conclude I have your approbation in this, that the *substratum* to modes or accidents, which is our idea of substance in general, is founded in this, *That we cannot conceive how modes or accidents can subsist by themselves.*

† Book ii. chap. 23. § 4.

signifies no more, when so used either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name *substance*, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of these qualities, we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist *sine re substante*, without something to support them, we call that support *substantia*; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, *standing under*, or *upholding* ².

² From this paragraph, there hath been raised an objection by the bishop of Worcester, as if our author's doctrine here concerning ideas, *had almost discarded substance out of the world*: his words in this second paragraph, being brought to prove, that he is one of the *gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, that have almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world*. To which our author replies*: This, my lord, is an accusation, which your lordship will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, because I do not understand what is almost *to discard substance out of the reasonable part of the world*. If your lordship means by it, that I deny or doubt, that there is in the world any such thing as substance, that your lordship will acquit me of, when your lordship looks again in this twenty-third chapter of the second book, which you have cited more than once; where you will find these words, § 4. *When we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, &c. though the idea we have of either of them, be but the compaction or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we use to find u-*

* In his first letter to that bishop, p. 6, &c.

§ 3. An obscure and relative idea of substance in general, being thus made, we come to have the ideas of *particular sorts of substances*, by collecting such combinations of simple ideas as are

united in the thing, called horse or stone; yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name substance; though it be certain, we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support. And again, § 5. The same thing happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c. which we considering not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, are apt to think those the actions of some other substance, which we call spirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or notion of matter, but something wherein those many simple qualities, which affect our senses, do subsist, by supposing a substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do subsist; we have as clear a notion of the nature or substance of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the substratum of those simple ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations, which we experiment in ourselves within. And again, § 6. Whatever therefore be the secret nature of substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas co-existing in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself. And I farther say in the same section, That we suppose these combinations to rest in, and to be adherent to that unknown common subject, which inheres not in any thing else. And that our complex ideas of substance, be-

by experience and observation of mens senses, taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence of that substance.

sides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist; and therefore when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such and such qualities; a body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; a spirit, a thing capable of thinking.

These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate, that the substance is supposed *always something*, besides the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable idea, though we know not what it is.

*Our idea of body, I say *, is an extended solid substance; and our idea of our souls, is of a substance that thinks. So that as long as there is any such thing as body or spirit in the world, I have done nothing towards the discarding substance out of the reasonable part of the world. Nay, as long as there is any simple idea or sensible quality left, according to my way of arguing, substance cannot be discarded, because all simple ideas, all sensible qualities, carry with them a supposition of a substratum to exist in, and of a substance where they inhere; and of this that whole chapter is so full, that I challenge any one who reads it, to think I have almost, or one jot, discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world. And of this, man, horse, sun, water, iron, diamond, &c. which I have mentioned of distinct sorts of substances, will be my witnesses as long as any such things remain in being; of which I say †, That the ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas, as are ta-*

* Book ii. chap. 23. § 22.

† Book. ii. chap. 12. § 6.

Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, water, &c.; of which substances, whether any one has any other clear idea, farther than of certain simple ideas co-existing together, I appeal

ken to represent distinct particular things, subsisting by themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea of substance is always the first and chief.

If by almost discarding substance out of the reasonable part of the world, your lordship means, that I have destroyed, and almost discarded the true idea we have of it, by calling it a *substratum*. A supposition of we know not what support of such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us, an obscure relative idea †. That without knowing what it is, it is that which supports accidents; so that of substance, we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does ‡: I must confess this, and the like I have said of our idea of substance; and should be very glad to be convinced by your lordship, or any body else, that I have spoken too meanly of it. He that would shew me a more clear and distinct idea of substance, would do me a kindness I should thank him for. But this is the best I can hitherto find, either in my own thoughts, or in the books of logicians; for their account or idea of it is, that it is *Ens*, or *res per se subsistens, et subsistans accidentibus*; which, in effect, is no more but that substance is a *being* or *thing*, or in short, *something* they know not what, or of which they have no clearer idea, than that it is something which supports accidents, or other simple ideas or modes, or an accident. So that I do not see but Burgerſdicius, Sanderson, and the whole tribe of logicians, must be reckoned with the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, who have almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world.

† Book ii. chap. 23. § 1, 2, 3.

‡ Book ii. chap. 13. § 19.

to every one's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those substances, which a smith or a jeweller commonly

But supposing, my lord, that I, or these gentlemen, logicians of note in the schools, should own, that we have a very imperfect, obscure, inadequate idea of substance, would it not be a little too hard to charge us with discarding substance out of the world? For what *almost* discarding, and *reasonable part* of the world, signifies, I must confess I do not clearly comprehend: but let *almost* and *reasonable part* signify here what they will, for I dare say your lordship meant something by them; would not your lordship think you were a little hardly dealt with, if, for acknowledging yourself to have a very imperfect and inadequate idea of God, or of several other things which in this very treatise you confess our understandings come short in, and cannot comprehend, you should be accused to be one of *these gentlemen that have almost discarded God*, or those other mysterious things, whereof you contend we have very imperfect and inadequate ideas, *out of the reasonable world*? For I suppose your lordship means by *almost discarding out of the reasonable world*, something that is blameable, for it seems not to be inserted for a commendation; and yet, I think, he deserves no blame, who owns the having imperfect, inadequate, obscure ideas, where he has no better: however, if it be inferred from thence, that either he *almost excludes* those things out of being, or out of rational discourse, if that be meant by the *reasonable world*; for the first of these will not hold, because the being of things in the world depends not on our ideas: the latter indeed is true in some degree, but is no fault; for it is certain, that where we have imperfect, inadequate, confused, obscure ideas, we cannot discourse and reason about those things

knows better than a philosopher, who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found

so well, fully, and clearly, as if we had perfect, adequate, clear, and distinct ideas.

Other objections are made against the following parts of this paragraph by that reverend prelate, *viz.* the repetition of the story of the Indian philosopher, and the talking like children about substance. To which our author replies :

Your lordship, I must own, with great reason, takes notice, that I *paralleled more than once our idea of substance with the Indian philosopher's* : he knew not what supported the tortoise, &c.

This repetition, is, I confess, a fault in exact writing : but I having acknowledged and excused it in these words in my preface ; *I am not ignorant how little I herein consult my own reputation, when I knowingly let my essay go with a fault so apt to disgust the most judicious, who are always the nicest readers* : And there farther add, *That I did not publish my essay for such great masters of knowledge as your lordship ; but fitted it to men of my own size, to whom repetitions might be sometimes useful* : it would not therefore have been beside your lordship's generosity (who were not intended to be provoked by this repetition) to have passed by such a fault as this, in one who pretends not beyond the lower rank of writers. But I see your lordship would have me exact, and without any faults ; and I wish I could be so, the better to deserve your lordship's approbation.

My saying, *That when we talk of substance, we talk like children ; who being asked a question about something which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, ' That it is something ; ' your lordship seems mightily to lay to heart in these words that*

in them; only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of substances, besides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong,

follow: *If this be the truth of the case, we must still talk like children, and I know not how it can be remedied. For if we cannot come at a rational idea of substance, we can have no principle of certainty to go upon in this debate.*

If your lordship has any better and distincter idea of substance than mine is, which I have given an account of, your lordship is not at all concerned in what I have there said. But those whose idea of substance, whether a rational or not rational idea, is like mine, something he knows not what, must in that, with me, talk like children, when they speak of something they know not what. For a philosopher that says, that which supports accidents, is something he knows not what; and a countryman that says, the foundation of the great church at Harlem is supported by something he knows not what; and a child that stands in the dark, upon his mother's muff, and says he stands upon something he knows not what, in this respect talk all three alike. But if the countryman knows, that the foundation of the church of Harlem is supported by a rock, as the houses about Bristol are; or by gravel, as the houses about London are; or by wooden piles, as the houses in Amsterdam are; it is plain, that then having a clear and distinct idea of the thing that supports the church, he does not talk of this matter as a child; nor will he of the support of accidents, when he has a clearer and more distinct idea of it, than that it is barely *something*. But as long as we think like children, in cases where our ideas are no clearer nor distincter than theirs, I agree with your lordship, that *I know not how it can be remedied*, but that we must talk like them.

and in which they subsist : and therefore, when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such or such qualities, as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of

Farther, the Bishop asks, Whether there be no difference between the bare being of a thing, and its substance by itself ? To which our author answers ‡, Yes. But what will that do to prove, that upon my principles we can come to no certainty of reason that there is any such thing as substance ? You seem by this question to conclude, that the idea of a thing that *subsists by itself*, is a clear and distinct idea of substance : but I beg leave to ask, Is the idea of the manner of substance of a thing, the idea of the thing itself ? If it be not, we may have a clear and distinct idea of the manner, and yet have none but a very obscure and confused one of the thing. For example ; I tell your lordship, that I know a thing that cannot subsist without a support, and I know another thing that does subsist without a support, and say no more of them ; can you by having the clear and distinct ideas of having a support, and not having a support, say, that you have a clear and distinct idea of the thing that I know which has, and of the thing that I know which has not a support ? If your lordship can, I beseech you to give me the clear and distinct ideas of these, which I only call by the general name, things that have or have not supports : for such there are, and such I shall give your lordship clear and distinct ideas of, when you shall please to call upon me for them ; though, I think, your lordship will scarce find them by the general and confused idea of thing, nor in the clearer and more distinct idea of having or not having a support.

To shew a blind man, that he has no clear distinct idea of scarlet, I tell him, that his notion of it,

‡ Mr Locke's third letter, p. 381.

motion; spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate, that the substance is supposed always something besides the extension, figure, solidity,

that it is a *thing* or *being*, does not prove he has any clear or distinct idea of it; but barely that he takes it to be something, he knows not what. He replies, that he knows more than that, *v. g.* he knows that it subsists, or inheres in another thing: *And is there no difference*, says he, in your lordship's words, *between the bare being of a thing, and its subsistence in another?* Yes, said I to him, a great deal, they are very different ideas. But for all that you have no clear and distinct idea of scarlet, not such a one as I have, who see and know it, and have another kind of idea of it, besides that of inherence.

Your lordship has the idea of subsisting by itself, and therefore you conclude, you have a clear and distinct idea of the thing that subsists by itself; which, methinks, is all one, as if your countryman should say, he hath an idea of a cedar of Lebanon, that it is a tree of nature, to need no prop to lean on for its support; therefore he has a clear and distinct idea of a cedar of Lebanon; which clear and distinct idea, when he comes to examine, is nothing but a general one of a tree, with which his indetermined idea of a cedar is confounded. Just so is the idea of substance; which, however called clear and distinct, is confounded with the general indetermined idea of something. But suppose that the manner of subsisting by itself, gives us a clear and distinct idea of substance, how does that prove, *That upon my principles we can come to no certainty of reason, that there is any such thing as substance in the world?* Which is the proposition to be proved.

motion, thinking, or other observable ideas, though we know not what it is.

§ 4. Hence, when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as *horse*, *stone*, &c. though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called *horse* or *stone*; yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name *substance*, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.

§ 5. The same thing happens concerning the operations of the mind, *viz.* thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c. which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, which we call *spirit*; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or notion of matter, but something wherein those many sensible qualities, which affect our senses, do subsist; by supposing a substance, wherein *thinking*, *knowing*, *doubting*, and a power of *moving*, &c. do subsist, *we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of body*; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the *substratum* to those simple ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the *substratum* to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain then, that the idea of corporeal substance in matter, is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions

as that of spiritual substance, or spirit; and therefore, from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of body: it being as rational to affirm, there is no body, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say, there is no spirit, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit.

§ 6. Whatever therefore be the secret abstract nature of substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas, co-existing in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself. It is by such combinations of simple ideas, and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of substances to ourselves; such are the ideas we have of their several species in our minds; and such only do we, by their specific names, signify to others, *v. g. man, horse, sun, water, iron*; upon hearing which words, every one, who understands the language, frames in his mind a combination of those several simple ideas, which he has usually observed, or fancied to exist together under that denomination; all which he supposes to rest in, and be, as it were, adherent to that unknown common subject, which inheres not in any thing else. Though in the mean time it be manifest, and every one, upon inquiry into his own thoughts, will find that he has no other idea of any substance, *v. g. let it be gold, horse, iron, man, vitriol, bread*, but what he has barely of those sensible qualities which he supposes to inhere, with a supposition of such a *substratum* as gives, as it were, a support to those qualities, or simple ideas,

which he has observed to exist united together. Thus the idea of the sun, what is it but an aggregate of those several simple ideas, bright, hot, roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a certain distance from us, and perhaps some other; as he who thinks and discourses of the sun, has been more or less accurate in observing those sensible qualities, ideas, or properties, which are in that thing, which he calls the *sun*?

§ 7. For he has the perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of substances, who has gathered and put together most of those simple ideas which do exist in it, among which are to be reckoned its active powers, and passive capacities; which though not simple ideas, yet in this respect, for brevity sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus the power of drawing iron, is one of the ideas of the complex one of that substance we call a *loadstone*, and a power to be so drawn, is a part of the complex one we call *iron*; which powers pass for inherent qualities in those subjects. Because every substance being as apt, by the powers we observe in it, to change some sensible qualities in other subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple ideas which we receive immediately from it, does, by those new sensible qualities, introduced into other subjects, discover to us those powers which do thereby mediately affect our senses, as regularly as its sensible qualities do it immediately; *v. g.* we immediately by our senses perceive in fire its heat and colour; which are, if rightly considered, nothing but powers in it to produce these ideas in us: we also by our senses perceive the colour and brittleness of charcoal, whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire, which it has to change the

colour and consistency of wood. By the former, fire immediately, by the latter, it mediately discovers to us these several powers, which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire, and so make them a part of the complex ideas of it. For all those powers that we take cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of some sensible qualities in those subjects on which they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible ideas; therefore it is that I have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas, which make the complex ones of the sorts of substances; though these powers, considered in themselves, are truly complex ideas. And in this looser sense I crave leave to be understood, when I name any of these potentialities amongst the simple ideas, which we recollect in our minds, when we think of particular substances. For the powers that are severally in them, are necessary to be considered, if we will have true distinct notions of the several sorts of substances.

§ 8. Nor are we to wonder that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances; since their secondary qualities are those, which in most of them serve principally to distinguish substances one from another, and commonly make a considerable part of the complex idea of the several sorts of them. For our senses failing us in the discovery of the bulk, texture, and figure of the minute parts of bodies, on which their real constitutions and differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities, as the characteristic notes and marks whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds, and distinguish them one from another. All which secondary qualities, as has been shewn, are nothing but bare

powers. For the colour and taste of opium are, as well as its soporific or anodyne virtues, mere powers depending on its primary qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different operations on different parts of our bodies.

§ 9. The ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances, are of these three sorts. 1. The ideas of the primary qualities of things, which are discovered by our senses, and are in them even when we perceive them not; such are the bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion, of the parts of bodies, which are really in them, whether we take notice of them or no. 2. The sensible secondary qualities, which depending on these, are nothing but the powers those substances have to produce several ideas in us by our senses; which ideas are not in the things themselves, otherwise than as any thing is in its cause. 3. The aptness we consider in any substance, to give or receive such alterations of primary qualities, as that the substance so altered should produce in us different ideas from what it did before; these are called active and passive powers: all which powers, as far as we have any notion or notice of them, terminate only in sensible simple ideas. For whatever alteration a loadstone has the power to make in the minute particles of iron, we should have no notion of any power it had at all to operate on iron, did not its sensible motion discover it; and I doubt not, but there are a thousand changes, that bodies we daily handle, have a power to cause in one another, which we never suspect, because they never appear in sensible effects.

§ 10. Powers therefore justly make a great part of our complex ideas of substances. He that will examine his complex idea of gold, will find several of its ideas, that make it up, to be only powers;

as the power of being melted, but of not spending itself in the fire, of being dissolved in *aqua regia*, are ideas as necessary to make up our complex idea of gold, as its colour and weight: which, if duly considered, are also nothing but different powers. For to speak truly, yellowness is not actually in gold; but is a power in gold to produce that idea in us by our eyes, when placed in a due light: and the heat, which we cannot leave out of our ideas of the sun, is no more really in the sun, than the white colour it introduces into wax. These are both equally powers in the sun, operating, by the motion and figure of its insensible parts, so on a man, as to make him have the idea of heat; and so on wax, as to make it capable to produce in a man the idea of white.

§ 11. Had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies, and the real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow colour of gold, would then disappear, and instead of it, we should see an admirable texture of parts of a certain size and figure. This microscope plainly discover to us: for what to our naked eyes produces a certain colour, is, by thus augmenting the acuteness of our senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts of a coloured object to our usual sight, produces different ideas from what it did before. Thus sand, or pounded glass, which is opaque, and white to the naked eye, is pellucid in a microscope; and a hair seen this way, loses its former colour, and is in a great measure pellucid, with a mixture of some bright sparkling colours,

such as appear from the refraction of diamonds, and other pellucid bodies. Blood to the naked eye, appears all red ; but by a good microscope, wherein its lesser parts appear, shews only some few globules of red, swimming in a pellucid liquor ; and how these red globules would appear, if glasses could be found that yet could magnify them 1000, or 10,000 times more, is uncertain.

§ 12. The infinite wise Contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our senses, faculties, and organs, to the conveniencies of life, and the business we have to do here. We are able, by our senses, to know and distinguish things ; and to examine them so far, as to apply them to our uses, and several ways to accommodate the exigencies of this life. We have insight enough into their admirable contrivances, and wonderful effects, to admire and magnify the wisdom, power, and goodness of their Author. Such a knowledge as this, which is suited to our present condition, we want not faculties to attain. But it appears not, that God intended we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate knowledge of them : that perhaps is not in the comprehension of any finite being. We are furnished with faculties, dull and weak as they are, to discover enough in the creatures, to lead us to the knowledge of the Creator, and the knowledge of our duty ; and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the conveniencies of living : these are our business in this world. But were our senses altered, and made much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward scheme of things would have quite another face to us ; and I am apt to think, would be inconsistent with our being, or at least well-being, in this part of the universe,

which we inhabit. He that considers how little our constitution is able to bear a remove into parts of this air, not much higher than that we commonly breathe in, will have reason to be satisfied, that, in this globe of earth allotted for our mansion, the all-wise Architect has suited our organs, and the bodies that are to affect them, one to another. If our sense of hearing were but 1000 times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual noise distract us! And we should, in the quietest retirement, be less able to sleep or meditate, than in the middle of a sea-fight. Nay, if that most instructive of our senses, seeing, were in any man 1000, or 10,000 times more acute than it is now by the best microscope, things, several millions of times less than the smallest object of his sight now, would then be visible to his naked eyes, and so he would come nearer the discovery of the texture and motion of the minute parts of corporal things; and in many of them, probably, get ideas of their internal constitutions: but then he would be in a quite different world from other people: nothing would appear the same to him and others: the visible ideas of every thing would be different. So that I doubt, whether he, and the rest of men, could discourse concerning the objects of sight, or have any communication about colours, their appearances being so wholly different. And perhaps such a quickness and tenderness of sight could not endure bright sun-shine, or so much as open day-light; nor take in but a very small part of any object at once, and that too only at a very near distance. And if by the help of such microscopical eyes, if I may so call them, a man could penetrate farther than ordinary into the secret composition and radical texture of bodies, he would

not make any great advantage by the change, if such an acute sight would not serve to conduct him to the market and exchange; if he could not see things he was to avoid at a convenient distance, nor distinguish things he had to do with, by those sensible qualities others do. He that was sharp-sighted enough to see the configuration of the minute particles of the spring of a clock, and observe upon what peculiar structure and impulse its elastic motion depends, would no doubt discover something very admirable: but if eyes so framed, could not view at once the hand, and the characters of the hour-plate, and thereby at a distance see what a clock it was, their owner could not be much benefited by that acuteness; which, whilst it discovered the secret contrivance of the parts of the machine, made him lose its use.

§ 13. And here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture of mine, *viz.* that since we have some reason (if there be any credit to be given to the report of things, that our philosophy cannot account for) to imagine, that spirits can assume to themselves bodies of different bulk, figure, and conformation of parts; whether one great advantage some of them have over us, may not lie in this, that they can so frame and shape to themselves organs of sensation or perception, as to suit them to their present design, and the circumstances of the object they would consider? For how much would that man exceed all others in knowledge, who had but the faculty so to alter the structure of his eyes, that one sense, as to make it capable of all the several degrees of vision, which the assistance of glasses, casually at first lit on, has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he discover, who could so fit his eyes

to all sorts of objects, as to see, when he pleased, the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood, and other juices of animals, as distinctly as he does, at other times, the shape and motion of the animals themselves? But to us, in our present state, unalterable organs, so contrived as to discover the figure and motion of the minute parts of bodies, whereon depend those sensible qualities we now observe in them, would, perhaps, be of no advantage. GOD has, no doubt, made them so, as is best for us in our present condition. He hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies that surround us, and we have to do with : and though we cannot, by the faculties we have, attain to a perfect knowledge of things, yet they will serve us well enough for those ends abovementioned, which are our great concernment. I beg my reader's pardon, for laying before him so wild a fancy, concerning the ways of perception in beings above us: but how extravagant soever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the knowledge of angels, but after this manner, some way or other, in proportion to what we find and observe in ourselves. And though we cannot but allow, that the infinite power and wisdom of GOD may frame creatures with a thousand other faculties, and ways of perceiving things without them, than what we have; yet our thoughts can go no farther than our own: so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond the ideas received from our own sensation and reflection. The supposition, at least, that angels do sometimes assume bodies, needs not startle us, since some of the most antient, and most learned fathers of the church, seemed to believe that they had bodies: and this is certain,

that their state and way of existence is unknown to us.

§ 14. But to return to the matter in hand; the ideas we have of substances, and the ways we come by them; I say, our specific ideas of substances are nothing else but a collection of a certain number of simple ideas, considered as united in one thing. These ideas of substances, though they are commonly called simple apprehensions, and the names of them simple terms; yet in effect are complex and compounded. Thus the idea which an Englishman signifies by the name *swan*, is white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the water, and making a certain kind of noise, and perhaps, to a man who has long observed those kind of birds, some other properties, which all terminate in sensible simple ideas, all united in one common subject.

§ 15. Besides the complex ideas we have of material sensible substances, of which I have last spoken, by the simple ideas we have taken from those operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, &c. co-existing in some substance, we are able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial spirit. And thus, by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances, as we have of material. For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion, joined to substance, of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial spirit; and

by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with substance, of which likewise we have no positive idea, we have the idea of matter. The one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other: the idea of thinking, and moving a body, being as clear and distinct ideas, as the ideas of extension, solidity, and being moved. For our idea of substance is equally obscure, or none at all in both; it is but a supposed, I know not what, to support those ideas we call accidents. It is for want of reflection, that we are apt to think that our senses shew us nothing but material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, &c. that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being within me, that sees and hears. This I must be convinced cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could be without an immaterial thinking being.

§ 16. By the complex idea of extended, figured, coloured, and all other sensible qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the idea of the substance of body, as if we knew nothing at all: nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity, which we imagine we have with matter, and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive and know in bodies, will it, perhaps, upon examination be found, that they have any more, or clearer, primary ideas belonging to body, than they have belonging to immaterial spirit.

§ 17. The primary ideas we have peculiar to body, as contra-distinguished to spirit, are the co-

hesion of solid, and consequently separable parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulse. These, I think, are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body; for figure is but the consequence of finite extension.

§ 18. The ideas we have belonging, and peculiar to spirit, are *thinking* and *will*, or a power of putting body into motion by thought, and, which is consequent to it, liberty. For as body cannot but communicate its motion by impulse to another body, which it meets with at rest; so the mind can put bodies into motion, or forbear to do so, as it pleases. The ideas of existence, duration, and mobility, are common to them both.

§ 19. There is no reason why it should be thought strange, that I make mobility belong to spirit: for having no other idea of motion, but change of distance, with other beings, that are considered as at rest; and finding, that spirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where they are, and that spirits do operate at several times in several places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite spirits; (for of the infinite Spirit I speak not here). For my soul being a real being, as well as my body, is certainly as capable of changing distance with any other body or being, as body itself; and so is capable of motion. And if a mathematician can consider a certain distance, or a change of that distance between two points, one may certainly conceive a distance, and a change of distance, between two spirits; and so conceive their motion, their approach or removal, one from another.

§ 20. Every one finds in himself, that his soul can think, will, and operate on his body, in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a bo-

dy, or in a place an hundred miles distant from it. No-body can imagine, that his soul can think, or move a body at Oxford, whilst he is at London; and cannot but know, that being united to his body, it constantly changes place all the whole journey between Oxford and London, as the coach or horse does that carries him; and, I think, may be said to be truly all that while in motion; or, if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion, its being separated from the body in death, I think, will: for, to consider it as going out of the body, or leaving it, and yet to have no idea of its motion, seems to me impossible.

§ 21. If it be said by any one, that it cannot change place, because it hath none, for spirits are not in *loco*, but *ubi*; I suppose that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an age that is not much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived by such unintelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is any sense in that distinction, and that it is applicable to our present purpose, I desire him to put it into intelligible English; and then from thence draw a reason to shew, that immaterial spirits are not capable of motion. Indeed, motion cannot be attributed to GOD, not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite spirit.

§ 22. Let us compare then our complex idea of an immaterial spirit, with our complex idea of body, and see whether there be any more obscurity in one, than in the other, and in which most. Our idea of body, as I think, is an extended solid substance, capable of communicating motion by impulse: and our idea of soul, as an immaterial spirit, is of a substance that thinks, and has

a power of exciting motion in body, by willing or thought. These, I think, are our complex ideas of soul and body, as contra-distinguished; and now let us examine which has most obscurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehended. I know, that people, whose thoughts are immersed in matter, and have so subjected their minds to their senses, that they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to say, they cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which, perhaps, is true: but I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.

§ 23. If any one say, he knows not what it is thinks in him; he means, he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: no more, say I, knows he what the substance is of that solid thing. Farther, if he says, he knows not how he thinks; I answer, neither knows he how he is extended; how the solid parts of body are united, or cohere together to make extension. For though the pressure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter, that are grosser than the particles of air, and have pores less than the corpuscles of air; yet the weight, or pressure of the air, will not explain, nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves. And if the pressure of the æther, or any subtiler matter than the air, may unite and hold fast together the parts of a particle of air, as well as other bodies; yet it cannot make bonds for itself, and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that *materia subtilis*. So that that hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by shewing, that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bodies, reaches not the parts of

the æther itself; and by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the æther, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the æther itself; which we can neither conceive without parts, they being bodies, and divisible; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion, which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies.

§ 24. But in truth, the pressure of any ambient fluid, how great soever, can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter. For though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies one from another, in a line perpendicular to them, as in the experiment of two polished marbles; yet it can never in the least hinder the separation by motion, in a line parallel to those surfaces: because the ambient fluid having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space, deserted by a lateral motion, resists such a motion of bodies so joined, no more than it would resist the motion of that body, were it on all sides environed by that fluid, and touched no other body; and therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion. For if the pressure of the æther be the adequate cause of cohesion, where-ever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate against such a lateral separation, as has been shewn, therefore in every imaginary plain, intersecting any mass of matter, there could be no more cohesion, than of two polished surfaces,

which will always, notwithstanding any imaginable pressure of a fluid, easily slide one from another. So that perhaps, how clear an idea soever we think we have of the extension of body, which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his mind, may have reason to conclude, that it is as easy for him to have a clear idea how the soul thinks, as how body is extended. For since body is no farther, nor otherwise extended, than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body, without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of thinking, and how it is performed.

§ 25. I allow it is usual for most people to wonder, how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe. Do we not see, will they be ready to say, the parts of bodies stick firmly together? Is there any thing more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like I say concerning thinking and voluntary motion: Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves; and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confess; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and consider how it is done, there, I think, we are at a loss, both in the one and the other: and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere, as how we ourselves perceive or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of gold, or brass, (that but now in fusion were as loose from one another, as the particles of water, or the sands of an hour-glass), come in a few moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of

mens arms cannot separate them: a considering man will, I suppose, be here at a loss, to satisfy his own, or another man's understanding.

§ 26. The little bodies that compose that fluid we call *water*, are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one, who, by a microscope, (and yet I have heard of some that have magnified to 10,000, nay, to much above 100,000 times), pretended to perceive their distinct bulk, figure, or motion: and the particles of water are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least force sensibly separates them. Nay, if we consider their perpetual motion, we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another; and yet let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate; these little atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, separable. He that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose little bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the cement that makes them stick so fast one to another, would discover a great, and yet unknown secret: and yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making the extension of body (which is the cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, till he could shew wherein consisted the union, or consolidation of the parts of those bonds, or of that cement, or of the least particle of matter that exists. Whereby it appears, that this primary and supposed obvious quality of body, will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible as any thing belonging to our minds, and a solid extended substance as hard to be conceived as a thinking immaterial one, whatever difficulties some would raise against it.

§ 27. For to extend our thoughts a little farther, that pressure which is brought to explain the

cohesion of bodies, is as unintelligible as the cohesion itself. For if matter be considered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one send his contemplation to the extremities of the universe, and there see what conceivable hoops, what bond he can imagine to hold this mass of matter in so close a pressure together, from whence steel has its firmness, and the parts of a diamond their hardness and indissolubility. If matter be finite, it must have its extremes; and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder. If, to avoid this difficulty, any one will throw himself into the supposition and abyss of infinite matter, let him consider what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of body; and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by resolving it into a supposition, the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other: so far is our extension of body (which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts) from being clearer or more distinct, when we would inquire into the nature, cause, or manner of it, than the idea of thinking.

§ 28. Another idea we have of body, is the power of communication of motion by impulse; and of our souls, the power of exciting motion by thought. These ideas, the one of body, the other of our minds, every day's experience clearly furnishes us with: but if here again we inquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark. For in the communication of motion by impulse, wherein as much motion is lost to one body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinary case, we can have no other conception, but of the passing of motion out of one body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and inconceivable, as how our minds move or stop our bo-

dies by thought; which we every moment find they do. The increase of motion by impulse, which is observed or believed sometimes to happen, is yet harder to be understood. We have, by daily experience, clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse and by thought: but the manner how hardly comes within our comprehension; we are equally at a loss in both. So that however we consider motion, and its communication either from body or spirit, the idea which belongs to spirit, is at least as clear as that which belongs to body. And if we consider the active power of moving, or, as I may call it, *motivity*, it is much clearer in spirit than body, since two bodies, placed by one another at rest, will never afford us the idea of a power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the mind every day affords us ideas of an active power of moving of bodies; and therefore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirits, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created spirits are not totally separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, *viz.* GOD, is only active; pure matter is only passive; those beings that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. But be that as it will, I think we have as many, and as clear ideas belonging to spirit, as we have belonging to body, the substance of each being equally unknown to us; and the idea of thinking in spirit, as clear as of extension in body; and the communication of motion by thought, which we attribute to spirit, is as evident as that by impulse, which we ascribe to body. Constant experience makes us sensible of both of these, though our nar-

row understandings can comprehend neither. For when the mind would look beyond those original ideas we have from sensation or reflection, and penetrate into their causes and manner of production, we find still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness.

§ 29. To conclude; sensation convinces us, that there are solid extended substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience assures us of the existence of such beings; and that the one hath a power to move body by impulse, the other by thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other. But beyond these ideas, as received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire farther into their nature, causes, and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as easy as the other; and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a substance we know not, should by thought set body into motion, than how a substance we know not, should by impulse set body into motion. So that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist, than those belonging to spirit. From whence it seems probable to me, that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection, are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas.

§ 30. So that, in short, the idea we have of spirit, compared with the idea we have of body,

stands thus: the substance of spirit is unknown to us; and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us: two primary qualities or properties of body, *viz.* solid coherent parts, and impulse, we have distinct clear ideas of: so likewise we know, and have distinct clear ideas of, two primary qualities or properties of spirit, *viz.* thinking, and a power of action; *i. e.* a power of beginning or stopping several thoughts or motions. We have also the ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies, and have the clear distinct ideas of them; which qualities are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts, and their motion. We have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking, *viz.* believing, doubting, intending, fearing, hoping; all which are but the several modes of thinking. We have also the ideas of willing, and moving the body consequent to it, and with the body itself too; for, as has been shewn, spirit is capable of motion.

§ 31. Lastly, If this notion of immaterial spirit may have perhaps some difficulties in it, not easy to be explained, we have therefore no more reason to deny, or doubt the existence of such spirits, than we have to deny, or doubt the existence of body; because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties very hard, and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us. For I would fain have instanced any thing in our notion of spirit more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it; the divisibility *in infinitum* of any finite extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated, or made in our apprehensions consistent; con-

sequences that carry greater difficulty, and more apparent absurdity, than any thing can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance.

§ 32. Which we are not all to wonder at, since we having but some few superficial ideas of things, discovered to us only by the senses from without, or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itself within, have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal constitution, and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without us, the cohesion and separation of solid parts, which is the extension and motion of bodies; we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit, as with our notion of body; and the existence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction, that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity, than it is a contradiction, that solidity should exist separate and independent from thinking, they being both but simple ideas, independent one from another; and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking as of solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity, *i. e. immaterial*, to exist, as a solid thing without thinking, *i. e. matter*, to exist; especially since it is no harder to conceive how thinking should exist without matter, than how matter should think. For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection, and dive farther into the nature of things, we fall presently into darkness and obscurity, perplexedness and difficulties; and can discover nothing farther but our

own blindness and ignorance. But whichever of these complex ideas be clearest, that of body or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the simple ideas that make them up, are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection; and so is it of all our other ideas of substances, even of GOD himself.

§ 33. For if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible supreme Being, we shall find that we come by it the same way; and that the complex ideas we have both of GOD, and separate spirits, are made up of the simple ideas we receive from reflection: *v. g.* having from what we experiment in ourselves, got the ideas of existence and duration; of knowledge and power; of pleasure and happiness; and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without: when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so putting them together, make our complex idea of GOD. For that the mind has such a power of enlarging some of its ideas, received from sensation and reflection, has been already shewn.

§ 34. If I find that I know some few things, and some of them, or all perhaps, imperfectly, I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to number; and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge; by extending its comprehension to all things existing or possible: the same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly; *i. e.* all their qualities, powers, causes, consequences, and relations, &c. till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can any way relate to them; and thus frame the idea

of infinite or boundless knowledge: the same may also be done of power, till we come to that we call infinite; and also of the duration of existence, without beginning or end; and so frame the idea of an eternal being. The degrees or extent, wherein we ascribe existence, power, wisdom, and all other perfections, (which we can have any ideas of), to that sovereign Being, which we call GOD, being all boundless and infinite, we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of: all which is done, I say, by enlarging those simple ideas we have taken from the operations of our own minds by reflection; or by our senses, from exterior things, to that vastness to which infinity can extend them.

§ 35. For it is infinity, which joined to our ideas of existence, power, knowledge, &c. makes that complex idea, whereby we represent to ourselves, the best we can, the supreme Being. For though in his own essence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real essence of a pebble or a fly, or of our own selves) GOD be simple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may say we have no other idea of him, but a complex one of existence, knowledge, power, happiness, &c. infinite and eternal: which are all distinct ideas, and some of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been shewn, originally got from sensation and reflection, go to make up the idea or notion we have of GOD.

§ 36. This farther is to be observed, that there is no idea we attribute to GOD, bating infinity, which is not also a part of our complex idea of other spirits. Because, being capable of no other simple ideas belonging to any thing but body,

but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to spirits no other but what we receive from thence : and all the difference we can put between them in our contemplation of spirits, is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, happiness, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of spirits as of other things, we are restrained to those we receive from sensation and reflection, is evident from hence, that in our ideas of spirits, how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another : though we must necessarily conclude, that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal signs, and particular sounds, which are therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication, having no experiment in ourselves, and consequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quickness, or much less how spirits, that have no bodies, can be masters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a power.

§ 37. And thus we have seen, what kind of ideas we have of substances of all kinds, wherein they consist, and how we come by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

1st, That all our ideas of the several sorts of

substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas, with a supposition of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all.

2dly, That all the simple ideas that, thus united in one common *substratum*, make up our complex ideas of several sorts of substances, are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection. So that, even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with, and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond those simple ideas. And, even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass any thing we can perceive in ourselves by reflection, or discover by sensation in other things, we can attain to nothing but those simple ideas, which we originally received from sensation or reflection, as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of GOD himself.

3dly, That most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances, when truly considered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for positive qualities; v. g. the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of *gold*, are yellowness, great weight, ductility, fusibility, and solubility in *aqua regia*, &c. all united together in an unknown *substratum*; all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances, and are not really in the gold, considered barely in itself, though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution, whereby it has a fitness differently to operate, and be operated on by several other substances.

C H A P. XXIV.

Of COLLECTIVE IDEAS of Substances.

§ 1. *One idea.* § 2. *Made by the power of composing in the mind.* § 3. *All artificial things are collective ideas.*

§ 1. **B**ESIDES these complex ideas of several single substances, as of man, horse, gold, violet, apple, &c. the mind hath also *complex collective ideas* of substances; which I so call, because such ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together, as united into one idea, and which, so joined, are looked on as one; v. g. the idea of such a collection of men as make an army, though consisting of a great number of distinct substances, is as much one idea as the idea of a man: and the great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever, signified by the name *world*, is as much one idea, as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it; it fulfilling to the unity of any idea, that it be considered as one representation or picture, though made up of never-so many particulars.

§ 2. These collective ideas of substances, the mind makes by its power of composition, and uniting severally, either simple or complex ideas into one, as it does by the same faculty make the complex ideas of particular substances, consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas, united in one substance: and as the mind, by putting together the repeated ideas of unity, makes the collective mode, or complex idea of any number, as

a score or a gross, &c. ; so by putting together several particular substances, it makes collective ideas of substances, as a troop, an army, a swarm, a city, a fleet ; each of which, every one finds that he represents to his own mind by one idea, in one view ; and so under that notion considers those several things as perfectly one, as one ship, or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an army of ten thousand men should make one idea, than how a man should make one idea ; it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number of men, and consider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular, all the distinct ideas that make up the composition of a man, and consider them all together as one.

§ 3. Amongst such kind of collective ideas, are to be counted most part of artificial things, at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances : and in truth, if we consider all these collective ideas aright, as *army*, *constellation*, *universe*, as they are united into so many single ideas, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind, bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one view, the better to contemplate and discourse of them, united into one conception, and signified by one name. For there are no things so remote, nor so contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of composition, bring into one idea, as is visible in that signified by the name *universe*.

C H A P. XXV.

Of R E L A T I O N.

§ 1. *Relation, what.* § 2. *Relations without correlative terms, not easily perceived.* § 3. *Some seemingly absolute terms contain relations.* § 4. *Relation different from the things related.* § 5. *Change of relation may be without any change in the subject.* § 6. *Relation only betwixt two things.* § 7. *All things capable of relation.* § 8. *The ideas of relations clearer often, than of the subjects related.* § 9. *Relations all terminate in simple ideas.* § 10. *Terms leading the mind beyond the subject denominated, are relative.* § 11. *Conclusion.*

§ 1. **B**ESIDES the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of any thing, is not confined to that precise object: it can carry any idea, as it were, beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one thing, that it does, as it were, bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its view from one to the other: this is, as the words import, RELATION and RESPECT; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated, to something distinct

from it, are what we call *relatives*; and the things so brought together, *related*. Thus, when the mind considers Caius, as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that idea, but what really exists in Caius; *v. g.* when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind, but the complex idea of the species, man. So likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of man, who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name *husband*, I intimate some other person: and when I give him the name *whiter*, I intimate some other thing. In both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration. And since any idea, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together, and, as it were, takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct; therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia, is the occasion of the denomination or relation of husband, and the colour white, the occasion why he is said whiter than freestone.

§ 2. These, and the like relations, expressed by relative terms, that have others answering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as *father* and *son*, *bigger* and *less*, *cause* and *effect*, are very obvious to every one, and every body, at first sight, perceives the relation. For father and son, husband and wife, and such other correlative terms, seem so nearly to belong one to another, and, through custom, do so readily chime, and answer one another in peoples memories, that upon the naming of either of them, the thoughts are presently car-

ried beyond the thing so named ; and no-body overlooks, or doubts of a relation, where it is so plainly intimated. But where languages have failed to give correlative names, there the relation is not always so easily taken notice of. *Concubine* is, no doubt, a relative name, as well as *wife* : but in languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative term, there people are not so apt to take them to be so, as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which seem to explain one another, and not to be able to exist, but together. Hence it is, that many of those names, which, duly considered, do include evident relations, have been called external denominations. But all names, that are more than empty sounds, must signify some idea, which is either in the thing to which the name is applied ; and then it is positive, and is looked on as united to, and existing in the thing to which the denomination is given : or else it arises from the respect the mind finds in it, to something distinct from it, with which it considers it ; and then it includes a relation.

§ 3. Another sort of relative terms there is which are not looked on to be either relative, or so much as external denominations ; which yet, under the form and appearance of signifying something absolute in the subject, do conceal a tacit, though less observable, relation : such are the seemingly positive terms of *old*, *great*, *imperfect*, &c. whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following chapters.

§ 4. This farther may be observed, that the ideas of relation may be the same in men, who have far different ideas of the things that are related, or that are thus compared ; v. g. those who

have far different ideas of a man, may yet agree in the notion of a father: which is a notion superinduced to the substance, or man, and refers only to an act of that thing called man; whereby he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind, let man be what it will.

§ 5. The nature, therefore, of relation consists in the referring or comparing two things one to another; from which comparison, one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of those things be removed, or cease to be, the relation ceases, and the denomination consequent to it, though the other receive in itself no alteration at all. *V. g.* Caius, whom I consider to-day as a father, ceases to be so to-morrow, only by the death of his son, without any alteration made in himself. Nay, barely by the mind's changing the object to which it compares any thing, the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same time. *V. g.* Caius, compared to several persons, may truly be said to be older and younger, stronger and weaker &c.

§ 6. Whatsoever doth or can exist, or be considered as one thing, is positive: and so not only simple ideas and substances, but modes also, are positive beings, though the parts of which they consist are very often relative one to another; but the whole together, considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing, which idea is in our minds, as one picture, though an aggregate of divers parts, and under one name, it is a positive or absolute thing, or idea. Thus a triangle, though the parts thereof, compared one to another, be relative, yet the idea of the whole is a positive absolute idea. The same may be said of a family, a tune, &c. for

there can be no relation but betwixt two things, considered as two things. There must always be in relation two ideas, or things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison.

§ 7. Concerning relation in general, these things may be considered :

First, That there is no one thing, whether simple idea, substance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations, in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no small part of mens thoughts and words. *V. g.* one single man may at once be concerned in, and sustain all these following relations, and many more, *viz.* father, brother, son, grandfather, grandson, father-in-law, son-in-law, husband, friend, enemy; subject, general, judge, patron, client, professor, European, Englishman, islander, servant, master, possessor, captain, superior, inferior, bigger, less, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike, &c. to an almost infinite number: he being capable of as many relations, as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, disagreement, or respect whatsoever: for, as I said, relation is a way of comparing, or considering two things together; and giving one, or both of them, some appellation from that comparison, and sometimes giving even the relation itself a name.

§ 8. *Secondly*, This farther may be considered concerning relation, that though it be not contained in the real existence of things, but something extraneous and superinduced; yet the ideas which relative words stand for, are often clearer, and more distinct, than of those substances to

which they do belong. The notion we have of a father, or brother, is a great deal clearer, and more distinct than that we have of a man : or, if you will, *paternity* is a thing whereof it is easier to have a clear idea, than of *humanity* : and I can much easier conceive what a friend is, than what GOD : because the knowledge of one action, or one simple idea, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation : but to the knowing of any substantial being, an accurate collection of fundry ideas is necessary. A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them : so that when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation. The ideas then of relations are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our minds, than those of substances. Because it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas, which are really in any substance, but for the most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any relation I think on, or have a name for. *V. g.* comparing two men, in reference to one common parent, it is very easy to frame the ideas of brothers, without having yet the perfect idea of a man. For significant relative words, as well as others, standing only for ideas ; and those being all either simple, or made up of simple ones, it suffices for the knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for, to have a clear conception of that, which is the foundation of the relation ; which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the notion, that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear idea of the relation of *dam* and *chick*, between the two

cassowaries in St James's park; though, perhaps, I have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds themselves.

§ 9. *Thirdly*, Though there be a great number of considerations, wherein things may be compared one with another, and so a multitude of relations; yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about those simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection; which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I shall shew it in the most considerable relations that we have any notion of, and in some that seem to be the most remote from sense or reflection; which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it past doubt, that the notions we have of them, are but certain simple ideas, and so originally derived from sense or reflection.

§ 10. *Fourthly*, That relation being the considering of one thing with another, which is extrinsecal to it, it is evident, that all words that necessarily lead the mind to any other ideas than are supposed really to exist in that thing to which the word is applied, are relative words. *V. g. a man black, merry, thoughtful, thirsty, angry, extended*; these, and the like, are all absolute, because they neither signify nor intimate any thing, but what does, or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated: but *father, brother, king, husband, blacker, merrier, &c.* are words, which, together with the thing they denominate, imply also something else separate, and exterior to the existence of that thing.

§ 11. Having laid down these premises concerning relation in general, I shall now proceed to shew, in some instances, how all the ideas we have of relation are made up, as the others are, only of

simple ideas; and that they all, how refined or remote from sense soever they seem, terminate at last in simple ideas. I shall begin with the most comprehensive relation, wherein all things that do, or can exist, are concerned, and that is the relation of *cause* and *effect*. The idea whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, *sensation* and *reflection*, I shall in the next place consider.

CH A P. XXVI.

Of CAUSE and EFFECT, and other Relations.

- § 1. *Whence their ideas got.* § 2. *Creation, generation, making alteration.* § 3, 4. *Relations of time.* § 5. *Relations of place and extension.* § 6. *Absolute terms often stand for relations.*

§ 1. **I**N the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe, that several particulars, both qualities and substances, begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of *cause* and *effect*. That which produces any simple or complex idea, we denote by the general name *cause*; and that which is produced, *effect*. Thus finding, that in that substance which we call *wax*, *fluidity*, which is a simple idea that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat, we call the simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the

cause of it, and fluidity the effect. So also finding, that the substance, *wood*, which is a certain collection of simple ideas so called, by the application of *fire* is turned into another substance called *ashes*; *i. e.* another complex idea, consisting of a collection of simple ideas, quite different from that complex idea which we call *wood*; we consider fire, in relation to ashes, as cause, and the ashes as effect. So that whatever is considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular simple idea, or collection of simple ideas, whether substance or mode, which did not before exist, hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause, and so is denominated by us.

§ 2. Having thus, from what our senses are able to discover, in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of cause and effect; *viz.* that a cause is that which makes any other thing, either simple idea, substance, or mode, begin to be; and an effect is that which had its beginning from some other thing: the mind finds no great difficulty to distinguish the several originals of things into two sorts.

1st, When the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof did ever exist before; as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exist, *in rerum natura*, which had before no being, and this we call *creation*.

2^{dly}, When a thing is made up of particles, which did all of them before exist, but that very thing so constituted of pre-existing particles, which, considered all together, make up such a collection of simple ideas, had not any existence before, as this man, this egg, rose, or cherry, &c. And this, when referred to a substance, produced in

the ordinary course of nature, by an internal principle, but set on work by, and received from some external agent or cause, and working by insensible ways, which we perceive not, we call *generation*; when the cause is extrinsical, and the effect produced by a sensible separation, or juxtaposition of discernible parts, we call it *making*; and such are all artificial things. When any simple idea is produced, which was not in that subject before, we call it *alteration*. Thus a man is generated, a picture made, and either of them altered, when any new sensible quality, or simple idea, is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exist, which were not there before, are *effects*; and those things, which operated to the existence, *causes*. In which, and all other cases, we may observe, that the notion of *cause* and *effect* has its rise from ideas received by sensation or reflection; and that this relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates at last in them. For to have the idea of *cause* and *effect*, it suffices to consider any simple idea or substance, as beginning to exist by the operation of some other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

§ 3. Time and place are also the foundations of very large relations, and all finite beings at least are concerned in them. But having already shewn in another place, how we get these ideas, it may suffice here to intimate, that most of the denominations of things, received from time, are only relations. Thus, when any one says, that Queen Elizabeth lived sixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years, these words import only the relation of that duration to some other, and mean no more than this, that the duration of her existence

was equal to sixty-nine, and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun; and so are all words, answering, *how long*. Again, William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1070, which means this; that taking the duration from our Saviour's time, till now, for one entire great length of time, it shews at what distance this invasion was from the two extremes: and so do all words of time, answering to the question *when*, which shew only the distance of any point of time, from the period of a longer duration, from which we measure, and to which we thereby consider it as related.

§ 4. There are yet, besides those, other words of time, that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive ideas, which yet will, when considered, be found to be relative; such as are *young*, *old*, &c. which include and intimate the relation any thing has to a certain length of duration, whereof we have the idea in our minds. Thus, having settled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years, when we say a man is *young*, we mean, that his age is yet but a small part of that which usually men attain to; and when we denominate him *old*, we mean, that his duration is run out almost to the end of that which men do not usually exceed. And so it is but comparing the particular age, or duration of this or that man, to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that sort of animals: which is plain, in the application of these names to other things; for a man is called young at twenty years, and very young at seven years old: but yet a horse we call old at twenty, and a dog at seven years; because in each of these, we compare their age to

different ideas of duration, which are settled in our minds, as belonging to these several sorts of animals, in the ordinary course of nature. But the sun and stars, though they have out-lasted several generations of men, we call not old, because we do not know what period GOD hath set to that sort of beings; this term belonging properly to those things, which we can observe in the ordinary course of things, by a natural decay, to come to an end in a certain period of time; and so have in our minds, as it were, a standard, to which we can compare the several parts of their duration; and by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old; which we cannot therefore do to a ruby, or a diamond, things whose usual periods we know not.

§ 5. The relation also that things have to one another, in their places and distances, is very obvious to observe; as, above, below, a mile distant from Charing-Cross, in England, and in London. But as in duration, so in extension and bulk, there are some ideas that are relative, which we signify by names that are thought positive; as *great* and *little*, are truly relations. For here also having, by observation, settled in our minds the ideas of the bigness of several species of things, from those we have been most accustomed to, we make them, as it were, the standards whereby to denominate the bulk of others. Thus we call a great apple, such a one as is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to; and a little horse, such a one as comes not up to the size of that idea, which we have in our minds to belong ordinarily to horses: and that will be a great horse to a Welshman, which is but a little one to a Fleming: they two having, from the different breed of their

countries, taken several sized ideas, to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little.

§ 6. So likewise *weak* and *strong* are but relative denominations of power, compared to some ideas we have, at that time, of greater or less power. Thus when we say a weak man, we mean, one that has not so much strength or power to move, as usually men have, or usually those of his size have; which is a comparing his strength to the idea we have of the usual strength of men, or men of such a size. The like when we say the creatures are all weak things; *weak*, there, is but a relative term, signifying the disproportion there is in the power of God, and the creatures. And so abundance of words, in ordinary speech, stand only for relations, (and perhaps the greatest part), which, at first sight, seem to have no such signification: v. g. the ship has necessary stores: *necessary* and *stores*, are both relative words; one having a relation to the accomplishing the voyage intended, and the other to future use. All which relations, how they are confined to, and terminate in ideas derived from sensation or reflection, is too obvious to need any explication.

C H A P. XXVII.

Of IDENTITY and DIVERSITY.

§ 1. *Wherein identity consists.* § 2. *Identity of substances. Identity of modes.* § 3. *Principium individuationis.* § 4. *Identity of vegetables.* § 5. *Identity of animals.* § 6. *Identity of man.* § 7. *Identity suited to the idea.* § 8. *Same man.* § 9. *Personal identity.* § 10. *Consciousness makes personal identity.* § 11. *Personal identity in change of substances.* § 12—15. *Whether in the change of thinking substances.* § 16. *Consciousness makes the same person.* § 17. *Self depends on consciousness.* § 18—20. *Objects of reward and punishment.* § 21, 22. *Difference between identity of man and person.* § 23—25. *Consciousness alone makes self.* § 26, 27. *Person, a forensic term.* § 28. *The difficulty from ill use of names.* § 29. *Continued existence makes identity.*

§ 1. **A**NOTHER occasion the mind often takes of comparing, is, the very being of things, when considering any thing as existing at any determined time and place, we compare it with itself existing at another time, and thereon form the ideas of IDENTITY and DIVERSITY. When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure, be it what it will, that it is that very thing, and not another, which at the same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects : and in this consists *identity*, when the

ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence; and to which we compare the present. For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place, at the same time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exists any-where at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there itself alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no? it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain, at that instant, was the same with itself, and no other: from whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning, it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place, or one and the same thing in different places. That therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing, and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse. That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed.

§ 2. We have the ideas but of three sorts of substances: 1. GOD. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies. First, GOD is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and every-where; and therefore concerning his identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, Finite spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exists. Thirdly, The same will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition or sub-

traction of matter being made, it is the same. For though these three sorts of substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place; yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place; or else the notions and names of identity and diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such distinction of substances, or any thing else, one from another. For example; could two bodies be in the same place at the same time, then those two parcels of matter must be one and the same, take them great or little; nay, all bodies must be one and the same. For by the same reason that two particles of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place: which, when it can be supposed, takes away the distinction of identity and diversity of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction, that two or more should be one, identity and diversity are relations and ways of comparing well founded, and of use to the understanding. All other things being but modes or relations ultimately terminated in substances, the identity and diversity of each particular existence of them, too, will be by the same way determined. Only as to things whose existence is in succession, such as are the actions of finite beings, *v. g. motion and thought*, both which consist in a continued train of succession, concerning their diversity, there can be no question: because each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in different times, or in different places, as permanent beings can at different times exist in distant places; and therefore no motion or thought, considered as at different

times, can be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of existence.

§ 3. From what has been said, it is easy to discover what is so much inquired after, the *principium individuationis*; and that, it is plain, is existence itself, which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two beings of the same kind. This, though it seems easier to conceive in simple substances or modes, yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is applied. *V. g.* let us suppose an atom, *i. e.* a continued body under one immutable superficies, existing in a determined time and place, it is evident, that, considered in any instant of its existence, it is in that instant the same with itself. For being at that instant what it is, and nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue as long as its existence is continued; for so long it will be the same, and no other. In like manner, if two or more atoms be joined together into the same mass, every one of those atoms will be the same, by the foregoing rule: and whilst they exist united together, the mass, consisting of the same atoms, must be the same mass, or the same body, let the parts be never so differently jumbled: but if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same mass, or the same body. In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else: for in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity. An oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is still the same oak: and a colt grown up to a horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same

horse; though, in both these cases, there may be a manifest change of the parts: so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter, though they be truly one of them the same oak, and the other the same horse. The reason whereof is, that in these two cases, a mass of matter, and a living body, identity is not applied to the same thing.

§ 4. We must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter, and that seems to me to be in this; that the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak; and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of an oak, in which consists the vegetable life. That being then one plant, which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant, as long as it partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization, conformable to that sort of plants. For this organization being at any one instant in any one collection of matter, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and is that individual life, which, existing constantly from that moment, both forwards and backwards, in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the living body of the plant, it has that identity, which makes the same plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same plant, during all the time that they exist united in that continued organization, which is fit to

convey that common life to all the parts so united.

§ 5. The case is not so much different in brutes, but that any one may hence see what makes an animal, and continues it the same. Something we have like this in machines, and may serve to illustrate it. For example, What is a watch ? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization, or construction of parts, to a certain end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would suppose this machine one continued body, all whose organized parts were repaired, increased, or diminished, by a constant addition or separation of insensible parts, with one common life, we should have something very much like the body of an animal, with this difference, that in an animal, the fitness of the organization, and the motion wherein life consists, begin together the motion coming from within ; but in machines, the force coming sensibly from without, is often away when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

§ 6. This also shews wherein the identity of the same man consists ; viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body. He that shall place the identity of man in any thing else, but like that of other animals in one fitly organized body, taken in any one instant, and from thence continued under one organization of life in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and sober, the same man, by any supposition, that will not make it possible for Seth, Ishmael, Socrates, Pilate, St

Austin, and Cæsar Borgia, to be the same man. For if the identity of soul alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter, why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible, that those men, living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word *man*, applied to an idea, out of which body and shape is excluded: and that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration, and are of opinion, that the souls of men may, for their miscarriages, be detrued into the bodies of beasts, as fit habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet, I think, no-body, could he be sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet say that hog were a man, or Heliogabalus.

§ 7. It is not therefore unity of substance that comprehends all sorts of identity, or will determine it in every case; but to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what idea the word it is applied to, stands for: it being one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the same person, if person, man, and substance, are three names standing for three different ideas; for such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the identity: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that confusion, which often occurs about this matter, with no small seeming difficulties, especially concerning personal identity, which therefore we shall, in the next place, a little consider.

§ 8. An animal is a living organized body; and

consequently the same animal, as we have observed, is the same continued life communicated to different particles of matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organized living body. And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenious observation puts it past doubt, that the idea in our minds, of which the sound man in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form : since I think I may be confident, that whoever should see a creature of his own shape and make, though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call him still a man ; or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a cat or a parrot ; and say the one was a dull irrational man, and the other a very intelligent rational parrot. A relation we have in an author of great note, is sufficient to countenance the supposition of a rational parrot. His words are * :

‘ I had a mind to know from Prince Maurice’s
 ‘ own mouth the account of a common, but much
 ‘ credited story, that I had heard so often from
 ‘ many others, of an old parrot he had in Brasil,
 ‘ during his government there, that spoke, and ask-
 ‘ ed, and answered common questions, like a rea-
 ‘ sonable creature ; so that those of his train there,
 ‘ generally concluded it to be witchery or posses-
 ‘ sion ; and one of his chaplains, who lived long
 ‘ afterwards in Holland, would never from that
 ‘ time endure a parrot, but said they all had a
 ‘ devil in them. I had heard many particulars of
 ‘ this story, and asserted by people hard to be

* Sir William Temple’s Memoirs of what passed in Christendom, from 1672 to 1679.

' discredited; which made me ask Prince Maurice
 ' what there was of it. He said, with his usual
 ' plainness and dryness in talk, there was some-
 ' thing true, but a great deal false, of what had
 ' been reported. I desired to know of him what
 ' there was of the first. He told me shortly and
 ' coldly, that he had heard of such an old parrot
 ' when he came to Brasil; and though he belie-
 ' ved nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet
 ' he had so much curiosity as to send for it; that it
 ' was a very great and a very old one; and when it
 ' came first into the room where the Prince was,
 ' with a great many Dutchmen about him, it
 ' said presently, *What a company of white men*
 ' *are here!* They asked it, What it thought
 ' that man was? pointing to the Prince. It an-
 ' swered, *Some general or other.* When they
 ' brought it close to him, he asked it, *D'ou ve-*
 ' *nez-vous* †? It answered, *De Marinnan.* The
 ' prince, *A qui este-vous?* The parrot, *A un*
 ' *Portugais.* Prince, *Que fais tula?* Parrot, *Je*
 ' *gardes les poulles.* The Prince laughed, and said,
 ' *Vous gardes les poulles!* The parrot answered,
 ' *Ouy, moy, et je scay bien faire:* and made the
 ' chuck four or five times that people use to make
 ' to chickens when they call them. I set down the
 ' words of this worthy dialogue in French, just
 ' as Prince Maurice said them to me. I asked him
 ' in what language the parrot spoke? and he said,

† *Whence come ye?* It answered, *From Marinnan.* The
 Prince, *To whom do you belong?* The parrot, *To a Portu-*
gueze. Prince, *What do you there?* Parrot, *I look after the*
chickens. The Prince laughed, and said, *You look after the*
chickens! The Parrot answered, *Yes I, and I know well e-*
nough how to do it.

‘ in Brazilian. I asked, Whether he understood
‘ Brazilian ? He said, No ; but he had taken care to
‘ have two interpreters by him, the one a Dutch-
‘ man, that spoke Brazilian, and the other a Brazilian,
‘ that spoke Dutch ; that he asked them separate-
‘ ly and privately, and both of them agreed in
‘ telling him just the same thing that the parrot
‘ had said. I could not but tell this odd story, be-
‘ cause, it is so much out of the way, and from
‘ the first hand, and what may pass for a good
‘ one : for I dare say this Prince at least belie-
‘ ved himself in all he told me, having ever passed
‘ for a very honest and pious man ; I leave it to
‘ naturalists to reason, and to other men to believe,
‘ as they please upon it ; however, it is not, per-
‘ haps, amiss to relieve or enliven a busy scene
‘ sometimes with such digressions, whether to the
‘ purpose or no.’

I have taken care that the reader should have the story at large in the author’s own words, because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible ; for it cannot be imagined, that so able a man as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the testimonies he gives of himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin so close, not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a Prince, in whom he acknowledges very great honesty and piety, a story, which, if he himself thought incredible, he could not but also think ridiculous. The Prince, it is plain, who vouches this story, and our author, who relates it from him, both of them call this talker a parrot ; and I ask any one else, who thinks such a story fit to be told, whether if this parrot, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have a Prince’s word for it, as this

one did; whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of rational animals; but yet whether for all that, they would have been allowed to be men, and not parrots? For, I presume, it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone, that makes the idea of a man in most people's sense, but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it; and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body, not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man.

§ 9. This being premised, to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what *person* stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it; it being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himself that which he calls *self*, it not being considered in this case, whether the same self be continued in the same, or divers substances. For since consciousness alway accompanies thinking, and it is that that makes every one to be what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity, *i. e.* the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same

self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

§ 10. But it is farther inquired, whether it be the same identical substance? This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these perceptions, with their consciousness, always remained present in the mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently the same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty, is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view; but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and in sound sleep having no thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts: I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, *i. e.* the same substance, or no. Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not personal identity at all. The question being, what makes the same person, and not whether it be the same identical substance, which always thinks in the same person, which, in this case, matters not at all. Different substances, by the same consciousness, (where they do partake in it), being united into one person, as well as different bodies, by the same life, are united into one animal, whose identity is preserved,

in that change of substances, by the unity of one continued life. For it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances. For, as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is self to itself now, and so will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come; and would be, by distance of time, or change of substance, no more two persons, than a man be two men, by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yesterday, with a long or short sleep between: the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same person, whatever substances contributed to their production.

§ 11. That this is so, we have some kind of evidence in our very bodies, all whose particles, whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are touched, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of ourselves; *i. e.* of our thinking conscious self. Thus the limbs of his body is to every one a part of himself: he sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby separate it from that consciousness he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself, any more than the remotest part of matter. Thus we see the substance, whereof

personal self consisted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of personal identity; there being no question about the same person, though the limbs, which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

§ 12. But the question is, Whether if the same substance, which thinks, be changed, it can be the same person; or remaining the same, it can be different persons?

And to this I answer, first, This can be no question at all to those, who place thought in a purely material, animal constitution, void of an immaterial substance. For, whether their supposition be true, or no, it is plain, they conceive personal identity preserved in something else than identity of substance; as animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance. And therefore those, who place thinking in an immaterial substance only, before they can come to deal with these men, must shew why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial substances, or variety of particular immaterial substances, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances, or variety of particular bodies; unless they will say, it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes, as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person in men, which the Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.

§ 13. But next, as to the first part of the question, whether if the same thinking substance (supposing immaterial substances only to think) be changed, it can be the same person? I answer, that cannot be resolved, but by those who know what kind of substances they are that do think;

and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another. I grant, were the same consciousness the same individual action, it could not: but it being but a present representation of a past action, why it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be shewn. And therefore how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of action it is, that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the same consciousness, not being the same individual act, why one intellectual substance may not have represented to it, as done by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other agent; why, I say, such a representation may not possibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as several representations in dreams are, which yet, whilst dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking substances, be best resolved into the goodness of God, who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of his sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not, by a fatal error of theirs, transfer from one to another that consciousness, which draws reward or punishment with it. How far this may be an argument against those who would place thinking in a system of fleeting animal spirits, I leave to be considered. But yet, to return to the question before us, it must be allow-

ed, that if the same consciousness (which, as has been shewn, is quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved.

§ 14. As to the second part of the question, whether the same immaterial substance remaining, there may be two distinct persons? Which question seems to me to be built on this, whether the same immaterial being, being conscious of the actions of its past duration, may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving again: and so, as it were, beginning a new account from a new period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new state. All those who hold pre-existence, are evidently of this mind, since they allow the soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent state, either wholly separate from body, or informing any other body; and if they should not, it is plain, experience would be against them. So that personal identity reaching no farther than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent spirit not having continued so many ages in a state of silence, must needs make different persons. Suppose a Christian, Platonist, or Pythagorean, should, upon GOD's having ended all his works of creation the seventh day, think his soul hath existed ever since; and should imagine it has revolved in several human bodies, as I once met with one, who was persuaded his had been the soul of Socrates, (how

reasonably, I will not dispute. This I know, that in the post he filled, which was no inconsiderable one, he passed for a very rational man; and the press has shewn that he wanted not parts or learning); would any one say, that he, being not conscious of any of Socrates's actions or thoughts, could be the same person with Socrates? Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude, that he has in himself an immaterial spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the constant change of his body keeps him the same; and is that which he calls himself: let him also suppose it to be the same soul that was in Nestor or Therſites, at the siege of Troy, (for souls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their nature, indifferent to any parcel of matter, the supposition has no apparent absurdity in it), which it may have been, as well as it is now, the soul of any other man: but he now having no consciousness of any of the actions either of Nestor or Therſites, does, or can he, conceive himself the same person with either of them? Can he be concerned in either of their actions? attribute them to himself, or think them his own, more than the actions of any other man that ever existed? So that this consciousness not reaching to any of the actions of either of those men, he is no more one self with either of them, than if the soul or immaterial spirit that now informs him, had been created, and began to exist, when it began to inform his present body, though it were never so true, that the same spirit that informed Nestor's or Therſites's body, were numerically the same that now informs his. For this would no more make him the same person with Nestor, than if some of the particles of matter that were once a part of Nestor, were

now a part of this man; the same immaterial substance, without the same consciousness, no more making the same person by being united to any body, than the same particle of matter, without consciousness united to any body, makes the same person. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of Nestor, he then finds himself the same person with Nestor.

§ 15. And thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the same person at the resurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it. But yet the soul alone, in the change of bodies, would scarce to any one, but to him that makes the soul the man, be enough to make the same man. For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions: but who would say it was the same man? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I guess, to every body, determine the man in this case, wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the same cobbler to every one besides himself. I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same person, and the same man, stand for one and the same thing. And, indeed, every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet when we will inquire what makes the same spirit, man, or person, we must

fix the ideas of spirit, man, or person, in our minds; and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the same, and when not.

§ 16. But though the same immaterial substance or soul, does not alone, where-ever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the same man; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to ages past, unites existences and actions, very remote in time, into the same person, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness, that I saw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same self, place that self in what substance you please, than that I who write this am the same myself now, whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday. For, as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances, I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.

§ 17. Self is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever substance made up of, whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it mat-

ters not), which is sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of himself, as what is most so. Upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the person, the same person: and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body. As in this case, it is the consciousness that goes along with the substance, when one part is separate from another, which makes the same person, and constitutes this inseparable self; so it is, in reference to substances, remote in time. That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to itself, and owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects, will perceive.

§ 18. In this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment; happiness and misery being that for which every one is concerned for himself, and not mattering what becomes of any substance, not joined to, or affected with that consciousness. For as it is evident, in the instance I gave but now, if the consciousness went along with the little finger, when it was cut off, that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole body yesterday, as making part of itself, whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though if the same body should still live, and immediately, from the

separation of the little finger, have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little finger knew nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it as a part of itself, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§ 19. This may shew us, wherein personal identity consists, not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the identity of consciousness, wherein Socrates, and the present mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the same person: if the same Socrates, waking and sleeping, do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping, is not the same person. And to punish Socrates waking, for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen.

§ 20. But yet possibly it will still be objected, suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet I am not the same person that did those actions, had those thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I answer, That we must here take notice what the word *I* is applied to; which, in this case, is the man only. And the same man being presumed to be the same person, *I* is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person. But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons; which, we see, is the sense of

mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the mad man did, thereby making them two persons; which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in English, when we say, such an one is *not himself*, or, is *besides himself*; in which phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or at least first used them, thought that self was changed, the self-same person was no longer in that man.

§ 21. But yet it is hard to conceive, that Socrates, the same individual man, should be two persons. To help us a little in this, we must consider what is meant by Socrates, or the same individual man.

1st, It must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking substance: in short, the same numerical soul, and nothing else.

2^{dly}, Or the same animal, without any regard to an immaterial soul.

3^{dly}, Or the same immaterial spirit united to the same animal.

Now, take which of these suppositions you please, it is impossible to make personal identity to consist in any thing but consciousness; or reach any farther than that does.

For by the first of them, it must be allowed possible that a man born of different women, and in distant times, may be the same man. A way of speaking, which, whoever admits, must allow it possible for the same man to be two distinct persons, as any two that have lived in different ages, without the knowledge of one another's thoughts.

By the second and third, Socrates in this life, and after it, cannot be the same man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so making human

identity to consist in the same thing wherein we place personal identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the same man to be the same person. But then they who place human identity in consciousness only, and not in something else, must consider how they will make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after the resurrection. But whatsoever to some men makes a man, and consequently the same individual man, wherein perhaps few are agreed, personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness, (which is that alone which makes what we call *self*), without involving us in great absurdities.

§ 22. But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same person, as a man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punish both with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge; because in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit; and so the ignorance in drunkenness, or sleep, is not admitted as a plea. For though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did; yet human judicatures justly punish him; because the fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his doom, his conscience accusing or excusing him.

§ 23. Nothing but consciousness can unite re-

more existences into the same person; the identity of substance will not do it: for whatever substance there is, however framed, without consciousness, there is no person: and a carcase may be a person, as well as any sort of substance be so without consciousness.

Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day, the other by night; and, on the other side, the same consciousness, acting by intervals, two distinct bodies; I ask, in the first case, whether the day and the night-man, would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato? And whether, in the second case, there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings? Nor is it at all material to say, that this same, and this distinct consciousness, in the cases above mentioned, is owing to the same and distinct immaterial substances, bringing it with them to those bodies, which, whether true or no, alters not the case; since it is evident, the personal identity would equally be determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual immaterial substance, or no. For granting, that the thinking substance in man must be necessarily supposed immaterial, it is evident that immaterial thinking thing may sometimes part with its past consciousness, and be restored to it again, as appears in the forgetfulness men often have of their past actions, and the mind many times recovers the memory of a past consciousness, which it had lost for twenty years together. Make these intervals of memory and forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two persons with the same immaterial

spirit, as much as, in the former instance, two persons with the same body. So that self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness.

§ 24. Indeed it may conceive the substance whereof it is now made up, to have existed formerly, united in the same conscious being: but consciousness removed, that substance is no more itself, or makes no more a part of it, than any other substance, as is evident in the instance we have already given of a limb cut off, of whose heat or cold, or other affections, having no longer any consciousness, it is no more of a man's self, than any other matter of the universe. In like manner, it will be in reference to any immaterial substance, which is void of that consciousness whereby I am myself to myself: if there be any part of its existence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that present consciousness, whereby I am now myself, it is in that part of its existence no more myself, than any other immaterial being. For whatsoever any substance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my consciousness make my own thought and action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being any-where existing.

§ 25. I agree the more probable opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the affection of one individual immaterial substance.

But let men, according to their divers hypotheses, resolve of that as they please. This every intelligent being, sensible of happiness or misery, must grant, that there is something that is *himself*, that he is concerned for, and would have happy;

that this self has existed in a continued duration more than one instant, and therefore it is possible may exist, as it has done, months and years to come, without any certain bounds to be set to its duration; and may be the same self, by the same consciousness, continued on for the future. And thus, by this consciousness, he finds himself to be the same self which did such or such an action some years since, by which he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account of self, the same numerical substance is not considered as making the same self. But the same continued consciousness, in which several substances may have been united, and again separated from it, which, whilst they continued in a vital union with that, wherein this consciousness then resided, made a part of that same self. Thus any part of our bodies vitally united to that which is conscious in us, makes a part of ourselves: but upon separation from the vital union, by which that consciousness is communicated, that which a moment since was part of ourselves, is now no more so, than a part of another man's self is a part of me; and it is not impossible, but in a little time may become a real part of another person. And so we have the same numerical substance become a part of two different persons; and the same person preserved under the change of various substances. Could we suppose any spirit wholly stripped of all its memory or consciousness of past actions, as we find our minds always are of a great part of ours; and sometimes of them all, the union or separation of such a spiritual substance would make no variation of personal identity, any more than that of any particle of matter does. Any substance vitally united to the present thinking being, is a part of that very same self which now is: any thing united to it by a

consciousness of former actions, makes also a part of the same self, which is the same both then and now.

§ 26. *Person*, as I take it, is the name for this self. Where-ever a man finds what he calls *himself*, there, I think, another may say is the *same person*. It is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit ; and so belongs only to intelligible agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground and for the same reason that it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for happiness, the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness, that which is conscious of pleasure and pain, desiring that that self that is conscious, should be happy. And therefore whatever past actions it cannot reconcile, or appropriate to that present self by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been done : and to receive pleasure or pain, *i. e.* reward or punishment, on the account of any such action, is all one, as to be made happy or miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all. For supposing a man punished now for what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what difference is there between that punishment, and being created miserable ? And therefore conformable to this, the apostle tells us, that at the great day, when every one shall *receive according to his doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open*. The sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have, that they themselves, in what bo-

dies foever they appear, or what substances foever that conscioufness adheres to, are the same that committed those actions, and deserve that punishment for them.

§ 27. I am apt enough to think I have, in treating of this subject, made some suppositions that will look strange to some readers, and possibly they are so in themselves; but yet, I think, they are such as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the nature of that thinking thing that is in us, and which we look on as ourselves. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain system of fleeting animal spirits; or whether it could, or could not perform its operations of thinking and memory out of a body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased God, that no one such spirit shall ever be united to any one but such body, upon the right constitution of whose organs its memory should depend, we might see the absurdity of some of those suppositions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do (in the dark concerning these matters) the soul of a man for an immaterial substance, independent from matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can, from the nature of things, be no absurdity at all to suppose, that the same soul may, at different times, be united to different bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one man; as well as we suppose a part of a sheep's body yesterday, should be a part of a man's body to-morrow, and in that union make a vital part of Melibœus himself, as well as it did of his ram.

§ 28. To conclude; whatever substance begins to exist, it must, during its existence, necessarily be the same: whatever compositions of sub-

stances begin to exist, during the union of those substances, the concrete must be the same: whatsoever mode begins to exist, during its existence, it is the same; and so if the composition be of distinct substances, and different modes, the same rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter, rather rises from the names ill used, than from any obscurity in things themselves. For whatever makes the specific idea, to which the name is applied, if that idea be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the same, and divers, will easily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt about it.

§ 29. For supposing a rational spirit be the idea of a man; it is easy to know what is the same man; viz. the *same spirit*, whether separate or in a body, will be the *same man*. Supposing a rational spirit vitally united to a body of a certain conformation of parts to make a man, whilst that rational spirit, with that vital conformation of parts, though continued in a fleeting successive body, remains, it will be the same. But if to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain shape; as long as that vital union and shape remains, in a concrete no otherwise the same, but by a continued succession of fleeting particles, it will be the same. For whatever be the composition, whereof the complex idea is made, whenever existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the same existence continued, preserves it the same individual under the same denomination³.

³ The doctrine of IDENTITY and DIVERSITY, continued in this chapter, the bishop of Worcester pre-

tends to be inconsistent with the doctrine of the Christian faith, concerning the resurrection of the dead. His way of arguing from it, is this: he says, *The reason of believing the resurrection of the same body upon Mr Locke's grounds, is from the idea of identity.* To which our author answers*: Give me leave, my lord, to say, that the *reason of believing* any article of the Christian faith, (such as your lordship is here speaking of), to me, and *upon my grounds*, is its being a part of divine revelation: upon this ground I believed it before I either writ that chapter of *identity* and *diversity*, and before I ever thought of those propositions which your lordship quotes out of that chapter; and upon the same ground I believe it still; and not *from my idea of identity*. This saying of your lordship's therefore, being a proposition neither self-evident, nor allowed by me to be true, remains to be proved. So that your foundation failing, all your large superstructure built thereon comes to nothing.

But my lord, before we go any farther, I crave leave humbly to represent to your lordship, that I thought you undertook to *make out*, that my *notion of ideas was inconsistent with the articles of the Christian faith*. But that which your lordship instances in here, is not, that I yet know, an *article of the Christian faith*. The *resurrection of the dead*, I acknowledge to be an article of the Christian faith: but that the *resurrection of the same body*, in your lordship's sense of *the same body*, is an article of the Christian faith, is, what, I confess, I do not yet know.

In the New Testament (wherein, I think, are contained all the *articles of the Christian faith*) I find our Saviour and the apostles to preach *the resurrection of the dead*, and *the resurrection from the dead*, in many places: but I do not remember any place where the *resurrection of the same body* is so much as mentioned.

* In his third letter to the bishop of Worcester, p. 165, &c.

Nay, which is very remarkable in the case, I do not remember in any place of the New Testament (where the general resurrection at the last day is spoken of) any such expression as the *resurrection of the body*, much less *of the same body*.

I say the general resurrection at the last day: because where the resurrection of some particular persons presently upon our Saviour's resurrection is mentioned; the words are, *The graves were opened, and many bodies of saints, which slept, arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared to many* †: of which peculiar way of speaking of this resurrection, the passage itself gives a reason, in these words, *appeared to many*; i. e. *those who slept, appeared*, so as to be known to be risen. But this could not be known, unless they brought with them the evidence that they were those who had been dead, whereof there were these two proofs, their graves were opened, and their bodies not only gone out of them, but appeared to be the same to those who had known them formerly alive, and knew them to be dead and buried. For if they had been those who had been dead so long, that all who knew them once alive, were now gone, those to whom they appeared might have known them to be men; but could not have known they were risen from the dead, because they never knew they had been dead. All that by their appearing they could have known, was, that they were so many living strangers, of whose resurrection they knew nothing. It was necessary therefore, that they should come in such bodies as might, in make and size, &c. appear to be the same they had before, that they might be known to those of their acquaintance, whom they appeared to. And it is probable they were such as were newly dead, whose bodies were not yet dissolved and dis-

† Matth. xxvii. 52, 53.

sipated; and therefore, it is particularly said here, (differently from what is said of the general resurrection), that their *bodies* arose; because they were the same that were then lying in their graves, the moment before they rose.

But your lordship endeavours to prove it must be the *same body*: and let us grant that your lordship, nay, others too, think you have proved it *must* be the same body; will you therefore say, that he holds what is inconsistent with an article of faith, who having never seen this your lordship's interpretation of the scripture, nor your reasons for the *same body*, in your sense of *same body*; or, if he has seen them, yet not understanding them, or not perceiving the force of them, believes what the scripture proposes to him, *viz.* that at the last day the *dead shall be raised*, without determining whether it shall be with the very same bodies or no?

I know your lordship pretends not to erect your particular interpretations of scripture into articles of faith; and if you do not, he that believes the *dead shall be raised*, believes that article of faith which the scripture proposes: and cannot be accused of holding any thing *inconsistent* with it, if it should happen, that what he holds is *inconsistent* with another proposition, *viz.* that the *dead shall be raised with the same bodies*, in your lordship's sense; which I do not find proposed in holy writ as an article of faith.

But your lordship argues, it *must be the same body*; which, as you explain *same body* *, is not the same individual particles of matter, which were united at the point of death. Nor the same particles of matter, that the sinner had at the time of the commission of his sins. But that it must be the same material substance which was vitally united to the soul here: *i. e.* as I understand it, the same individual particles of matter, which were, some time or other during his life here, vitally united to his soul.

Your first argument to prove, that it *must be the same body*, in this sense of the *same body*, is taken from these words of our Saviour*: *All that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth*†. From whence your lordship argues, that these words, *all that are in their graves*, relate to no other substance than what was united to the soul in life; because a different substance cannot be said to be in the graves, and to come out of them. Which words of your lordship's, if they prove any thing, prove that the soul too is lodged in the grave, and raised out of it at the last day. For your lordship says, *Can a different substance be said to be in the graves, and come out of them?* So that, according to this interpretation of these words of our Saviour, *no other substance* being raised, but what hears his voice; and *no other substance* hearing his voice, but what being called, comes out of the grave; and *no other substance* coming out of the grave, but what was in the grave, any one must conclude, that the soul, unless it be in the grave, will make no part of the person that is raised, *unless*, as your lordship argues against me‡, *you can make it out, that a substance, which never was in the grave, may come out of it*; or, that the soul is no substance.

But, setting aside the *substance* of the soul, another thing that will make any one doubt, whether this your interpretation of our Saviour's words be necessary to be received as their true sense, is, that it will not be very easily reconciled to your saying§, you do not mean by the *same body*, the *same individual particles which were united at the point of death*. And yet, by this interpretation of our Saviour's words, you can mean no other *particles* but such as were united at the point of death; because you mean no other *substance* but what comes out of the grave; and no *substance*, no

* Page 37. † John v. 28, 29. ‡ P. 37. § P. 34.

Particles come out, you say, but what were *in the grave*; and I think your lordship will not say, that ^{the} particles that were separated from the body *by perspiration* before the point of death, were laid up in the grave.

But your lordship, I find, has an answer to this †, viz. *that by comparing this with other places, you find that the words* [of our Saviour above quoted] *are to be understood of the substance of the body, to which the soul was united, and not to* (I suppose your lordship writ of) *those individual particles, i. e. those individual particles that are in the grave at the resurrection.* For so they must be read, to make your lordship's sense entire, and to the purpose of your answer here: and then methinks this last sense of our Saviour's words, given by your lordship, wholly overturns the sense which you have given of them above, where, from those words, you press the belief of the resurrection of the same body, by this strong argument, that a *substance* could not, upon hearing the voice of Christ, *come out of the grave, which was never in the grave.* There (as far as I can understand your words) your lordship argues, that our Saviour's words must be understood of the particles in the grave, *unless*, as your lordship says, *one can make it out, that a substance which never was in the grave, may come out of it.* And here your lordship expressly says, that our Saviour's words *are to be understood of the substance of that body, to which the soul was* [at any time] *united, and not to those individual particles that are in the grave.* Which, put together, seems to me to say, that our Saviour's words are to be understood of those particles only that are in the grave, and not of those particles only which are in the grave, but of others also, which have at any time been *vitally united to the soul*, but never were in the grave.

The next text your lordship brings to make the *resurrection of the same body*, in your sense, an article of faith, are these words of St Paul †; *For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.* To which your lordship subjoins this question ‡: *Can these words be understood of any other material substance, but that body in which these things were done?* Answer, A man may suspend his determining the meaning of the apostle to be, that a sinner shall suffer for his sins in the very *same body* wherein he committed them: because St Paul does not say he shall have the very *same body* when he suffers, that he had when he sinned. The apostle says, indeed, *done in his body.* The body he had, and did things in at five or fifteen, was, no doubt, *his body*, as much as that which he did things in at fifty, was *his body*, though *his body* were not *the very same body* at those different ages: and so will the body, which he shall have after the resurrection, be *his body*, though it be not the very *same* with that, which he had at five or fifteen, or fifty. He that at threescore is broke on the wheel, for a murder he committed at twenty, is punished for what he did in *his body*, though the body he has, *i. e. his body* at threescore, be not the same, *i. e. made up of the same individual particles of matter*, that that body was, which he had forty years before. When your lordship has resolved with yourself, what that same immutable HE is, which at the last judgment shall receive the things done in *his body*, your lordship will easily see, that the body he had when an *embryo* in the womb, when a child playing in coats, when a man marrying a wife, and when bed-ridden dying of a consumption, and at last, which he shall have after the resurrection, are each of

† 2 Cor. v. 10.

‡ Page 38:

them *his body*, though neither of them be the *same body*, the one with the other.

But farther to your lordship's question, *Can these words be understood of any other material substance, but that body in which these things were done?* I answer, These words of St Paul may be understood of another material substance, than that body in which these things were done, because your lordship teaches me, and gives me a strong reason so to understand them. Your lordship says†, that you do not say the same particles of matter, which the sinner had at the very time of the commission of his sins, shall be raised at the last day. And your lordship gives this reason for it‡: For then a long sinner must have a vast body, considering the continual spending of particles by perspiration. Now, my lord, if the apostle's words, as your lordship would argue, cannot be understood of any other material substance, but that body, in which these things were done; and no-body, upon the removal or change of some of the particles, that at any time makes it up, is the same material substance, or the same body; it will, I think, thence follow, that either the sinner must have all the same individual particles vitally united to his soul when he is raised, that he had vitally united to the soul when he sinned; or else St Paul's words here cannot be understood to mean the *same body in which the things were done*. For, if there were other particles of matter in the body, wherein the things were done, than in that which is raised, that which is raised cannot be the *same body in which they were done*: unless that alone, which has just all the same individual particles when any action is done, being the same body wherein it was done, that also, which has not the same individual particles wherein that action was done, can be the same body wherein it was done; which is, in effect, to make the same body sometimes to be the same, and sometimes not the same.

† Page 34.

‡ Page 35.

Your lordship thinks it suffices to make the *same body* to have not all, but no other particles of matter, but such as were some time or other vitally united to the soul before: but such a body, made up of part of the particles some time or other vitally united to the soul, is no more the same body wherein the actions were done in the distant parts of the *long sinner's* life, than that is the same body in which a quarter, or half, or three quarters of the same particles, that made it up, are wanting. For example, a sinner has acted here in his *body* an hundred years; he is raised at the last day, but with what body? The same, says your lordship, that he acted in; because St Paul says, he must *receive the things done in his body*: what, therefore, must his body, at the resurrection, consist of? Must it consist of all the particles of matter that have ever been vitally united to his soul? For they, in succession, have all of them made up *his body* wherein he did *these things*: no, says your lordship †, that would make his body too *vast*; it suffices to make the same body in which the things were done, that it consists of some of the particles, and no other but such as were, some time during his life, vitally united to his soul. But according to this account, *his body*, at the resurrection, being, as your lordship seems to limit it, near the same size it was in some part of his life, it will be no more the *same body* in which *the things were done* in the distant parts of his life, than that is the *same body*, in which half or three quarters, or more of the individual matter that made it then up, is now wanting. For example, let *his body*, at 50 years old, consist of a million of parts; five hundred thousand at least of those parts will be different from those which made up *his body* at 10 years, and at an hundred. So that to take the numerical particles that made up his body at 50, or any other season of his life; or to gather them promiscuously out of those which, at dif-

† Page 25.

ferent times, have successively been vitally united to his soul, they will no more make the same body, which was *his*, wherein some of his actions were done, than that is the same body, which has but half the same particles: and yet all *your* lordship's argument here for the same body, is, because St Paul says, it must be *his body in which these things were done*; which it could not be, *if any other substance were joined to it*; i. e. if any other particles of matter made up the body, which were not vitally united to the soul when the action was done.

Again, your lordship says †, *that you do not say the same individual particles* (shall make up the body at the resurrection) *which were united at the point of death, for there must be a great alteration in them of a lingering disease, as if a fat man falls into a consumption*. Because, it is likely, your lordship thinks these particles of a decrepit, wasted, withered body, would be too few, or unfit to make such a plump, strong, vigorous, well-sized body, as it has pleased your lordship to proportion out, in your thoughts, to men at the resurrection; and therefore some small portion of the particles formerly united vitally to that man's soul, shall be reassumed to make up his body to the bulk your lordship judges convenient; but the greatest part of them shall be left out to avoid the making his body more *vast* than your lordship thinks will be fit, as appears by these your lordship's words immediately following ‡, *viz. that you do not say the same particles the sinner had at the very time of commission of his sins; for then a long sinner must have a vast body*.

But then, pray, my lord, what must an *embryo* do, who dying within a few hours after his body was vitally united to his soul, has no particles of matter, which were formerly united to it, to make up his body of that size and proportion which your lordship

seems to require in bodies at the resurrection? Or must we believe he shall remain content with that small pittance of matter, and that yet imperfect body, to eternity, because it is an article of faith to believe the *resurrection of the very same body*? i. e. made up of only such particles as have been vitally united to the soul. For, if it be so, as your lordship says †, *that life is the result of the union of soul and body*, it will follow, that the body of an *embryo* dying in the womb, may be very little, not the thousandth part of any ordinary man. For, since from the first conception and beginning of formation it has life, and *life is the result of the union of the soul with the body*; an *embryo*, that shall die either by the untimely death of the mother, or by any other accident presently after it has life, must, according to your lordship's doctrine, remain a man not an inch long, to eternity; because there are not particles of matter, formerly united to his soul, to make him bigger; and no other can be made use of to that purpose: though what greater congruity the soul hath with any particles of matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now so no longer, than it hath with particles of matter, which it was never united to, would be hard to determine, if that should be demanded.

By these, and not a few other the like consequences, one may see what service they do to religion, and the Christian doctrine, who raise questions, and make articles of faith about the *resurrection of the same body*; where the scripture says nothing of *the same body*; or if it does, it is with no small reprimand to those who make such an inquiry ‡. *But some men will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest, is not quickened, except it die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but*

† Page 43.

‡ 1 Cor. xv. 35, &c.

bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain. But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him. Words I should think sufficient to deter us from determining any thing for or against the same body being raised at the last day. It suffices, that all the *dead shall be raised*, and every one appear and answer for the things done in this life, and receive according to the things he hath done in his body, whether good or bad. He that believes this, and has said nothing inconsistent herewith, I presume may, and must be acquitted from being guilty of any thing *inconsistent with the article of the resurrection of the dead.*

But your lordship, to prove *the resurrection of the same body to be an article of faith*, farther asks *, *How could it be said, if any other substance be joined to the soul at the resurrection, as its body, that they were the things done in or by the body?* *Ans.* Just as it may be said of a man at an hundred years old, that hath then another substance joined to his soul, than he had at twenty, that the murder or drunkenness he was guilty of at twenty, *were things done in the body: how by the body comes in here*, I do not see.

Your lordship adds, *And St Paul's dispute about the manner of raising the body, might soon have ended, if there were no necessity of the same body.* *Ans.* When I understand what argument there is in these words to prove the resurrection of the same body, without the mixture of one new atom of matter, I shall know what to say to it. In the mean time this I understand, that St Paul would have put as short an end to all disputes about this matter, if he had said, that *there was a necessity of the same body, or that it should be the same body.*

The next text of scripture you bring for the same body, is †, *If there be no resurrection of the dead, then is not Christ raised.* From which your lordship

* Page 38.

† 2 Cor. xv. 16.

argues †, *It seems then other bodies are to be raised, as his was*; I grant other dead, as certainly raised *as Christ was*; for else his resurrection would be of no use to mankind. But I do not see how it follows, that they shall be *raised with the same body*, as Christ was raised with the same body, as your lordship infers in these words annexed; *And can there be any doubt, whether his body was the same material substance which was united to his soul before?* I answer, None at all; nor that it had just the same distinguished lineaments and marks, yea, and the same wounds that it had at the time of his death. If therefore your lordship will argue from *other bodies being raised, as his was*, that they must keep proportion with his in *sameness*; then we must believe, that every man shall be raised with the same lineaments, and other notes of distinction he had at the time of his death, even with his wounds yet open, if he had any, because our Saviour was so raised; which seems to me scarce reconcilable with what your lordship says ‡, of a *fat man falling into a consumption, and dying*.

But whether it will consist or no with your lordship's meaning in that place, this to me seems a consequence that will need to be better proved, *viz.* that our bodies must be raised the same, just as our Saviour's was: because St Paul says, *If there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen*. For it may be a good consequence, Christ is risen, and therefore there shall be a resurrection of the dead; and yet this may not be a good consequence, Christ was raised with the same body he had at his death, therefore all men shall be raised with the same body they had at their death, contrary to what your lordship says concerning a *fat man dying of a consumption*. But the case I think far different betwixt our Saviour, and those to be raised at the last day.

1. His body *saw not corruption*; and therefore to give him another body, new-molded, mixed with other particles, which were not contained in it as it lay in the grave, whole and entire as it was laid there, had been to destroy his body, to frame him a new one, without any need. But why with the remaining particles of a man's body, long since dissolved and mouldered into dust and atoms, (whereof possibly a great part may have undergone variety of changes, and enter into other concretions even in the bodies of other men), other new particles of matter mixed with them, may not serve to make his body again, as well as the mixture of new and different particles of matter with the old, did, in the compass of his life, make his body, I think no reason can be given?

This may serve to shew, why though the materials of our Saviour's body were not changed at his resurrection; yet it does not follow, but that the body of a man, dead and rotten in his grave, or burnt, may, at the last day, have several new particles in it, and that without any inconvenience: since whatever matter is vitally united to *his soul*, is *his body*, as much as is that which was united to it when he was born, or in any other part of his life.

2. In the next place, the size, shape, figure, and lineaments of our Saviour's body, even to his wounds, into which doubting Thomas put his fingers and his hands, were to be kept in the raised body of our Saviour, the same they were at his death, to be a conviction to his disciples, to whom he shewed himself, and who were to be witnesses of his resurrection, that their Master, the very same man, was crucified, dead, and buried, and raised again; and therefore he was handled by them, and eat before them after he was risen, to give them in all points full satisfaction, that it was really he, the same, and not another, nor a spectre or apparition of him: though I do not think your lordship will thence argue, that because *others are to be raised as he was*, therefore it is necessary to

believe, that because he eat after his resurrection, others at the last day shall eat and drink after they are raised from the dead, which seems to me as good an argument, as because his undissolved body was raised out of the grave, just as it there lay entire, without the mixture of any new particles; therefore the corrupted and consumed bodies of the dead at the resurrection, shall be new-framed only out of those scattered particles which were once vitally united to their souls, without the least mixture of any one single atom of new matter. But at the last day, when all men are raised, there will be no need to be assured of any one particular man's resurrection. It is enough that every one shall appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to receive according to what he had done in his former life; but in what sort of body he shall appear, or of what particles made up, the scripture having said nothing, but that it shall be a *spiritual body, raised in incorruption*, it is not for me to determine.

Your lordship asks †, *Were they* [who saw our Saviour after his resurrection] *witnesses only of some material substance then united to his soul?* I answer, I beg your lordship to consider, whether you suppose our Saviour was known to be the same man (to the witnesses that were to see him, and testify his resurrection) by his soul, that could neither be seen, nor known to be the same: or by his body, that could be seen, and by the discernible structure and marks of it, known to be the same? When your lordship has resolved that, all that you say in that page will answer itself. But because one man cannot know another to be the same, but by the outward visible lineaments, and sensible marks he has been wont to be known and distinguished by, will your lordship therefore argue, that the great Judge, at the last day, who gives to each man, whom he raises, his new body, shall not be able to know who is who, unless he gives to every

one of them a body, just of the same figure, size and features, and made up of the very same individual particles he had in his former life? Whether such a way of arguing for the *resurrection of the same body, to be an article of faith*, contributes much to the strengthening the credibility of the article of the resurrection of the dead, I shall leave to the judgment of others.

Farther, for the proving *the resurrection of the same body to be an article of faith*, your lordship says *, *But the apostle insists upon the resurrection of Christ, not merely as an argument of the possibility of ours, but of the certainty of it; because † ‘ he rose, as the ‘ first-fruits; Christ the first-fruits, afterwards they ‘ that are Christ’s, at his coming.’* Answ. No doubt, the resurrection of Christ is a proof of the certainty of our resurrection: but is it therefore a proof of the resurrection of the *same body*, consisting of the same individual particles which concurred to the making up of our body here, without the mixture of any one other particle of matter? I confess I see no such consequence.

But your lordship goes on ‡; *St Paul was aware of the objections in mens minds, about the resurrection of the same body; and it is of great consequence as to this article, to shew upon what grounds he proceeds. ‘ But some men will say, How are the dead raised up, ‘ and with what body do they come?’ First he shews, that the seminal parts of plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary providence of God, in the manner of their vegetation.* Answ. I do not perfectly understand, what it is for the seminal parts of plants to be wonderfully improved by the ordinary providence of God, in the manner of their vegetation: or else, perhaps, I should better see how this here tends to the proof of *the resurrection of the same body*, in your lordship’s sense.

It continues*, ‘*They sow bare grain of wheat, or of some other grain, but God giveth it a body, as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body.*’ Here, says your lordship, is an identity of the material substance supposed. It may be so. But to me a diversity of the material substance, i. e. of the component particles, is here supposed, or in direct words said. For the words of St Paul, taken all together, run thus†; *That which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body which shall be, but bare grain; and so on, as your lordship has set down the remainder of them.* From which words of St Paul, the natural argument seems to me to stand thus. If the body that is put in the earth in sowing, is not that body which shall be, then the body that is put in the grave, is not that, i. e. the same body that shall be.

But your lordship proves it to be the same body, by these three Greek words of the text, το ιδιον σωμα which your lordship interprets thus‡, *that proper body which belongs to it.* Answ. Indeed, by those Greek words, το ιδιον σωμα whether our translators have rightly rendered them *his own body*, or your lordship more rightly, *that proper body which belongs to it*, I formerly understood no more but this, that in the production of wheat, and other grain from seed, God continued every species distinct, so that from grains of wheat sown, root, stalk, blade, ear, and grains of wheat were produced, and not those of barley; and so of the rest, which I took to be the meaning of, *to every seed his own body.* No, says your lordship, these words prove, that to every plant of wheat, and to every grain of wheat produced in it, is given *the proper body that belongs to it*, is the same body with the grain that was sown. Answ. This, I confess, I do not understand; because I do not understand how one individual grain can be the same with twenty, fifty, or an

* Page 40.

† 1 Cor. xv. 37.

‡ Page 40.

hundred individual grains ; for such sometimes is the increase.

But your lordship proves it. For, says your lordship *, *Every seed having that body in little, which is afterwards so much enlarged ; and in grain the seed is corrupted before its germination ; but it hath its proper organical parts, which make it the same body with that which it grows up to. For although grain be not divided into lobes, as other seeds are, yet it hath been found, by the most accurate observations, that upon separating the membranes, these seminal parts are discerned in them ; which afterwards grow up to that body which we call corn.* In which words I crave leave to observe, that your lordship supposes, that a body may be *enlarged* by the addition of a hundred or a thousand times as much bulk as its own matter, and yet continue the *same body* ; which, I confess, I cannot understand.

But, in the next place, if that could be so ; and that the plant, in its full growth at harvest, increased by a thousand or a million of times as much new matter added to it, as it had when it lay in little concealed in the grain that was sown, was the very same body : yet I do not think that your lordship will say, that every minute, insensible, and inconceivably small grain of the hundred grains, contained in that little organized seminal plant, is every one of them the very same with that grain which contains that whole little seminal plant, and all those invisible grains in it. For then it will follow, that one grain is the same with an hundred, and an hundred distinct grains the same with one : which I shall be able to assent to, when I can conceive, that all the wheat in the world is but one grain.

For I beseech you, my lord, consider what it is St Paul here speaks of : it is plain he speaks of *that which is sown and dies*, i. e. the grain that the hus-

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bandman takes out of his barn to sow in his field. And of this grain, St Paul says, that *it is not that body that shall be*. These two, viz. *that which is sown, and that body that shall be*, are all the bodies that St Paul here speaks of, to represent the agreement or difference of mens bodies after the resurrection, with those they had before they died. Now, I crave leave to ask your lordship, which of these two is that little invisible seminal plant, which your lordship here speaks of? Does your lordship mean by it the grain *that is sown*? But that is not what St Paul speaks of, he could not mean this *embryonated* little plant, for he could not denote it by these words, *that which thou sowest*, for that he says must *die*; but this little embryonated plant, contained in the seed that is sown, dies not: or, does your lordship mean by it, *the body that shall be*? But neither by these words, *the body that shall be*, can St Paul be supposed to denote this insensible little embryonated plant; for that is already in being contained in the seed that is sown, and therefore could not be spoke of under the name of *the body that shall be*. And therefore, I confess I cannot see of what use it is to your lordship to introduce here this third body, which St Paul mentions not, and to make that the same, or not the same, with any other, when those which St Paul speaks of, are, as I humbly conceive, these two visible sensible bodies, the grain sown, and the corn grown up to ear, with neither of which this insensible embryonated plant can be the same body, unless an insensible body can be the same body with a sensible body, and a little body can be the same body with one ten thousand or an hundred thousand times as big as itself. So that yet, I confess, I see not the *resurrection of the same body*, proved from these words of St Paul, to be an *article of faith*.

Your lordship goes on ‡; *St Paul indeed saith,*

‘ that we sow not that body that shall be; but he speaks not of the identity, but the perfection of it. Here my understanding fails me again: for I cannot understand St Paul to say, that the same identical sensible grain of wheat, which was sown at seed-time, is the very same with every grain of wheat in the ear at harvest, that sprang from it: yet so I must understand it, to make it prove that the same sensible body that is laid in the grave, shall be the very same with that which shall be raised at the resurrection. For I do not know of any seminal *body in little*, contained in the dead carcase of any man or woman, which, as your lordship says, in seeds, having its proper organical parts, shall *afterwards be enlarged*, and at the resurrection grow up in the *same man*. For I never thought of any seed or *seminal parts*, either of *plant or animal*, *so wonderfully improved by the providence of God*, whereby the same plant or animal should beget itself; nor ever heard, that it was by divine *providence* designed to produce the same individual, but for the producing of future and distinct individuals, for the continuation of the same species.

Your lordship's next words are *, *And although there be such a difference from the grain itself, when it comes up to be perfect corn, with root, stalk, blade, and ear, that it may be said to outward appearance not to be same body; yet with regard to the seminal and organical parts, it is as much the same, as a man grown up is the same with the embryo in the womb.* Answer. It does not appear by any thing I can find in the text, that St Paul here compared the *body*, produced with the *seminal and organical parts*, contained in the grain it sprang from. but with the whole sensible grain that was sown. Microscopes had not then discovered the little *embryo* plant in the seed; and supposing it should have been revealed to St Paul, (though in the scripture we find little revelation of

natural philosophy), yet an argument taken from a thing perfectly unknown to the Corinthians, whom he writ to, could be of no manner of use to them, nor serve at all either to instruct or convince them. But granting that those St Paul writ to, knew it as well as Mr Lewenhoeek; yet your lordship thereby proves not the raising of *the same body*: your lordship says it is as much the *same* [I crave leave to add *body*] *as a man grown up is the same* (*same*, what, I beseech your lordship?) *with the embryo in the womb*. For that the *body* of the *embryo* in the womb, and *body* of the man grown up, is the *same body*, I think no one will say; unless he can persuade himself, that a *body* that is not the hundredth part of another, is the same with that other; which, I think, no one will do, till having renounced this dangerous *way by ideas* of thinking and reasoning, he has learnt to say, that a part and the whole are the *same*.

Your lordship goes on*, *And although many arguments may be used to prove, that a man is not the same, because life, which depends upon the course of the blood, and the manner of respiration and nutrition, is so different in both states; yet that man would be thought ridiculous that should seriously affirm, that it was not the same man*. And your lordship says, *I grant that the variation of great parcels of matter in plants, alters not the identity: and that the organization of the parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, makes the identity of a plant*. Answer. My lord, I think, the question is not about the *same man*, but the *same body*. For, though I do say †, (somewhat differently from what your lordship sets down as my words here), *That that which has such an organization, as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of a plant in which consists the vegetable life, continues to be the same plant, as long as it*

* Page 41.

† Essay, book. ii. chap. 27. § 4.

partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter, vitally united to the living plant: Yet I do not remember that I any-where say, that a plant, which was once no bigger than an oaten straw, and afterwards grows to be above a fathom about, is the same body, though it be still the same plant.

The well known tree in Epping Forest, called the *King's Oak*, which, from not weighing an ounce at first, grew to have many tons of timber in it, was all along the same oak, the very *same plant*; but nobody, I think, will say it was the *same body* when it weighed a ton, as it was when it weighed but an ounce, unless he had a mind to signalize himself by saying, that that is the *same body*, which has a thousand particles of different matter in it, for one particle that is the same; which is no better than to say, that a thousand different particles are but one and the same particle, and one and the same particle is a thousand different particles; a thousand times a greater absurdity, than to say half is the whole, or the whole is the same with the half; which will be improved ten thousand times yet farther, if a man shall say, (as your lordship seems to me to argue here), that that great oak is the very same body with the acorn it sprang from, because there was in that acorn an oak in little, which was *afterwards* (as your lordship expresses it) *so much enlarged*, as to make that mighty tree. For this *embryo*, if I may so call it, or oak in little, being not the hundredth, or perhaps the thousandth part of the acorn, and the acorn being not the thousandth part of the grown oak, it will be very extraordinary to prove the acorn and the grown oak to be the *same body*, by a way wherein it cannot be pretended, that above one particle of an hundred thousand, or a million, is the same in the one body that it was in the other. From which way of reasoning, it will follow, that a nurse and her sucking-child have the same body; and be past doubt, that a mother and her infant have the same

body. But this is a way of certainty found out to establish the articles of faith, and to overturn the new *method of certainty*, that your lordship says I have *started*, which is apt to leave mens minds more doubtful than before.

And now I desire your lordship to consider of what use it is to you in the present case, to quote out of my Essay these words, '*That partaking of one common life, makes the identity of a plant, since the question is not about the identity of a plant, but about the identity of a body;*' it being a very different thing to be the *same plant*, and to be the *same body*. For that which makes the same plant, does not make the same body; the one being the partaking in the same continued vegetable life; the other the consisting of the same numerical particles of matter. And therefore your lordship's inference from my words above quoted, in these which you subjoin *, seems to me a very strange one, viz. *So that in things capable of any sort of life, the identity is consistent with a continued succession of parts; and so the wheat grown up, is the same body with the grain that was sown.* For, I believe, if my words, from which you infer, *and so the wheat grown up is the same body with the grain that was sown*, were put into a fyllogism, this would hardly be brought to be the conclusion.

But your lordship goes on with consequence upon consequence, though I have not eyes acute enough every-where to see the connection, till you bring it to the resurrection of the *same body*. The connection of your lordship's words are as followeth †: *And thus the alteration of the parts of the body at the resurrection, is consistent with its identity, if its organization and life be the same; and this is a real identity of the body, which depends not upon consciousness. From whence it follows, that to make the same body, no more is required, but restoring life to the organi-*

* Page 42.

† Page 41.

zed parts of it. If the question were about raising the same plant, I do not say but there might be some appearance for making such inference from my words as this, *Whence it follows, that to make the same plant, no more is required, but to restore life to the organized parts of it.* But this deduction, wherein, from those words of mine, that speak only of the *identity of a plant*, your lordship infers, there is no more required to make the *same body*, than to make the *same plant*, being too subtile for me, I leave to my reader to find out.

Your lordship goes on, and says †, *That I grant likewise, ' That the identity of the same man consists in a participation of the same continued life, by ' constantly fleeting particles of matter in succession, ' vitality united to the same organized body.'* *Answ.* I speak in these words of the *identity of the same man*; and your lordship thence roundly concludes, *so that there is no difficulty of the sameness of the body.* But your lordship knows, that I do not take these two sounds, *man* and *body*, to stand for the same thing; nor the identity of the *man* to be the same with the identity of the *body*

But let us read out your lordship's words ‡: *So that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the body, if life were continued; and if, by divine power, life be restored to that material substance which was before united by a re-union of the soul to it, there is no reason to deny the identity of the body. Not from the consciousness of the soul, but from that life which is the result of the union of the soul and body.*

If I understand your lordship right, you, in these words, from the passages above quoted out of my book, argue, that from those words of mine it will follow, that it is or may be the *same body* that is raised at the resurrection. If so, my lord, your lordship has then proved, that my book is not inconsistent with,

but conformable to this article of the *resurrection of the same body*, which your lordship contends for, and will have to be an article of faith: for though I do by no means deny, that the *same bodies* shall be raised at the last day, yet I see nothing your lordship has said to prove it to be an article of faith.

But your lordship goes on with your proofs, and says *, *But St Paul still supposes that it must be that material substance to which the soul was before united. For, saith he, 'it is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power: it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.'* Can such a material substance, which was never united to the body, be said to be sown in corruption, and weakness, and dishonour? Either therefore he must speak of the same body, or his meaning cannot be comprehended. I answer, Can such a material substance, which was never laid in the grave, be said to be sown, &c.? For your lordship says †, *You do not say the same individual particles, which were united at the point of death, shall be raised at the last day; and no other particles are laid in the grave, but such as are united at the point of death; either therefore your lordship must speak of another body, different from that which was sown, which shall be raised, or else your meaning, I think, cannot be comprehended.*

But whatever be your meaning, your lordship proves it to be St Paul's meaning, that the *same body* shall be raised, which was *sown*, in these following words ‡; *For what does all this relate to a conscious principle?* *Ans.* The scripture being express, that the same persons should be raised and appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive according to what he had done in his body; it was very well suited to common apprehensions (which refined

* Page 43.

† Page 34.

‡ Page 43.

not about *particles that had been vitally united to the soul*) to speak of the body which each one was to have after the resurrection, as he would be apt to speak of it himself. For it being *his body* both before and after the resurrection, every one ordinarily speaks of *his body* as the same, though in a strict and philosophical sense, as your lordship speaks, it be not the very same. Thus it is no impropriety of speech to say, this body of mine, which was formerly strong and plump, is now weak and wasted, though in such a sense as you are speaking in here, it be not the same body. Revelation declares nothing any-where concerning *the same body*, in your lordship's sense of *the same body*, which appears not to have been thought of. The apostle directly proposes nothing for or against *the same body*, as necessary to be believed: that which he is plain and direct in, is opposing and condemning such curious questions about the body, which could serve only to perplex, not to confirm what was material and necessary for them to believe, *viz.* a day of judgment and retribution to men in a future state; and therefore it is no wonder that mentioning their bodies, he should use a way of speaking suited to vulgar notions, from which it would be hard positively to conclude any thing for the determining of this question (especially against expressions in the same discourse that plainly incline to the other side) in a matter, which, as it appears, the apostle thought not necessary to determine, and the Spirit of God thought not fit to gratify any one's curiosity in.

But your lordship says†, *The apostle speaks plainly of that body which was once quickened, and afterwards falls to corruption, and is to be restored with more noble qualities*. I wish your lordship had quoted the words of St Paul, *wherein he speaks plainly of that numerical body that was once quickened*, they would presently decide this question. But your lord-

† Page 44.

ship proves it by these following words of St Paul: *For this corruption must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality; to which your lordship adds, that you do not see how he could more expressly affirm the identity of this corruptible body, with that after the resurrection.* How expressly it is affirmed by the apostle, shall be considered by and by. In the mean time, it is past doubt, that your lordship best knows what you do or *do not see*. But this I will be bold to say, that if St Paul had any-where in this chapter, (where there are so many occasions for it, if it had been necessary to have been believed), but said in express words, that the *same bodies* should be raised, every one else, who thinks of it, will *see* he had *more expressly affirmed the identity* of the bodies which men now have, with those they shall have after the resurrection.

The remainder of your lordship's period is * ; *And that without any respect to the principle of self-consciousness.* *Ans.* These words, I doubt not, have some meaning, but I must own, I know not what; either towards the proof of *the resurrection of the same body*, or to shew, that any thing I have said concerning *self-consciousness*, is inconsistent: for I do not remember that I have any-where said, that the *identity of body* consisted in *self-consciousness*.

From your preceding words your lordship concludes thus † : *And so if the scripture be the sole foundation of our faith, this is an article of it.* My lord, to make the conclusion unquestionable, I humbly conceive the words must run thus: *And so if the scripture, and your lordship's interpretation of it, be the sole foundation of our faith, the resurrection of the same body is an article of it.* For, with submission, your lordship has neither produced express words of scripture for it, nor so proved that to be the meaning of any of those words of scripture which you have produced for

* Page 44.

† Ibid.

it, that a man who reads, and sincerely endeavours to understand the scripture, cannot but find himself obliged to believe, as expressly, that *the same bodies of the dead*, in your lordship's sense, shall be raised, as that *the dead shall be raised*. And I crave leave to give your lordship this one reason for it.

He who reads with attention this discourse of St Paul *, where he discourses of the resurrection, will see, that he plainly distinguishes between the *dead* that shall be raised, and the *bodies* of the dead. For it is νεκροί, πάντες, οἱ, are the nominative cases to † ελθούσι, ζωοποιήσονται, ἐξεγείσονται, all along, and not σώματα, *bodies*, which one may with reason think would somewhere or other have been expressed, if all this had been said, to propose it as an article of faith, that the very same bodies should be raised. The same manner of speaking the Spirit of God observes all through the New Testament, where it is said ‡, raise the *dead*, quicken or make alive the *dead*, the resurrection of the *dead*. Nay, these very words of our Saviour §, urged by your lordship, for the resurrection of the *same body*, run thus. Πάντες οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις ἀγασσονται τῆς φωνῆς οὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκπορεύσονται οἱ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ποιεῖν, εἰς ἀνάστασιν ζωῆς· οἱ δὲ τὰ φαντα πρᾶξαντες, εἰς ἀνάστασιν κρίσεως. Would a well meaning searcher of the scriptures be apt to think, that if the thing here intended by our Saviour were to teach, and propose it as an article of faith, necessary to be believed by every one, that the *very same bodies of the dead* should be raised; would not, I say, any one be apt to think, that if our Saviour meant so, the words should have rather been, πάντα τὰ σώματα αἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις, i. e. all the bodies that are in the graves, rather than all

* 1 Cor. xv.

† Ver. 15, 22, 23, 29, 32, 35, 52.

‡ Matth xxii. 31. Mark xii. 26. John v. 21. Acts xxvi. Rom. iv. 17. 2 Cor. i. 9. 1 Thes. iv. 14, 16.

§ John v. 28, 29.

who are in the graves; which must denote persons, and not precisely bodies?

Another evidence, that St Paul makes a distinction between *the dead*, and the *bodies of the dead*, so that the dead cannot be taken in this, 1 Cor. ch. xv. to stand precisely for the bodies of the dead, are these words of the apostle *, *But some men will say, How are the dead raised? and with what bodies do they come?* Which words, *dead* and *they*, if supposed to stand precisely for the *bodies* of the dead, the question will run thus: *How are the dead bodies raised? and with what bodies do the dead bodies come?* Which seems to have no very agreeable sense.

This therefore being so, that the Spirit of God keeps so expressly to this phrase, or form of speaking in the New Testament, of *raising, quickening, rising, resurrection, &c. of the dead*, where the resurrection at the last day is spoken of; and that the body is not mentioned, but in answer to this question, *With what bodies shall those dead, who are raised, come?* So that by the dead cannot precisely be meant *the dead bodies*: I do not see but a good Christian, who reads the scripture, with an intention to believe all that is there revealed to him concerning the resurrection, may acquit himself of his duty therein, without entering into the inquiry, whether the dead shall have the *very some bodies* or no? which sort of inquiry the apostle, by the appellation he bestows here on him that makes it, seems not much to encourage. Nor, if he shall think himself bound to determine concerning the identity of the bodies of the dead raised at the last day, will he, by the remainder of St Paul's answer, find the determination of the apostle to be much in favour of the *very same body*, unless the being told, that the body sown, *is not that body that shall be?* That the body raised is as different from that which was laid down, as the *flesh of man* is from the *flesh of beasts, fishes, and birds,*

* Ver. 35.

or as the *sun, moon, and stars* are different one from another, or as different as a corruptible, weak, natural, mortal body, is from an incorruptible, powerful, spiritual, immortal body; and lastly, as different as a body that is *flesh and blood*, is from a body that is not flesh and blood. For *flesh and blood cannot*, says St Paul, in this very place †, *inherit the kingdom of God*; unless, I say, all this, which is contained in St Paul's words, can be supposed to be the way to deliver this as an article of faith, which is required to be believed by every one, *viz.* that the *dead shall be raised with the very same bodies that they had before in this life*; which article proposed in these or the like plain and express words, could have left no room for doubt in the meanest capacities, nor for contest in the most perverse minds.

Your lordship adds, in the next words ‡, *And so it hath been always understood by the Christian church, viz. that the resurrection of the same body*, in your lordship's sense of *same body*, is an article of faith. *Answ.* What the *Christian church* has always understood, is beyond my knowledge. But for those who, coming short of your lordship's great learning, cannot gather their articles of faith from the understanding of all the whole Christian church, ever since the preaching of the gospel, (who make the far greater part of Christians, I think I may say, nine hundred ninety and nine of a thousand) but are forced to have recourse to the scripture, to find them there, I do not see, that they will easily find there this proposed as an article of faith, that there shall be a *resurrection of the same body*; but that there shall be a *resurrection of the dead*, without explicitly determining, that they shall be raised with bodies made up wholly of the same particles which were once vitally united to their souls, in their former life, without the mixture of any one other particle of matter; which is that which your lordship means by the *same body*.

But supposing your lordship to have demonstrated this to be an article of faith, though I crave leave to own, that I do not see, that all that your lordship has said here, makes it so much as probable; what is all this to me? Yes, says your lordship, in the following words †; *My idea of personal identity is inconsistent with it, for it makes the same body which was here united to the soul, not to be necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection. But any material substance united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body.*

This is an argument of your lordship's which I am obliged to answer to. But is it not fit I should first understand it, before I answer it? Now, here I do not well know, what it is to *make a thing not to be necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection.* But to help myself out the best I can, with a guess, I will conjecture (which, in disputing with learned men, is not very safe) your lordship's meaning is, that *my idea of personal identity makes it not necessary*, that for raising the same person, the body should be the same.

Your lordship's next word is *but*, to which I am ready to reply, *but* what? What does *my idea of personal identity* do? for something of that kind the adversative particle *but* should, in the ordinary construction of our language, introduce to make the proposition clear and intelligible: but here is no such thing. *But* is one of your lordship's privileged particles which I must not meddle with for fear your lordship complain of me again, as so *severe a critic*, that for the least ambiguity in any particle, fill up pages in my answer, to make my book look considerable for the bulk of it. But since this proposition here, *my idea of a personal identity makes the same body which was here united to the soul, not necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection.* But any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the

same body, is brought to prove *my idea of personal identity inconsistent* with the article of the resurrection; I must make it out in some direct sense or other, that I may see whether it be both true and conclusive. I therefore venture to read it thus: *My idea of personal identity makes the same body which was here united to the soul, not to be necessary at the resurrection, but allows, that any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness, make the same body, ergo, my idea of personal identity is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection of the same body.*

If this be your lordship's sense in this passage, as I here have guessed it to be, or else I know not what it is; I answer,

1. That *my idea of personal identity* does not allow, that *any material substance, being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body.* I say no such thing in my book, nor any thing from whence it may be inferred; and your lordship would have done me a favour to have set down the words where I say so, or those from which you infer so, and shewed how it follows from any thing I have said.

2. Granting that it were a consequence from *my idea of personal identity*, that *any material substance, being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body*; this would not prove that *my idea of personal identity* was inconsistent with this proposition, that *the same body shall be raised*; but, on the contrary, affirms it: since, if I affirm, as I do, that the same persons shall be raised, and it be a consequence of my idea of personal identity, that *any material substance, being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body*; it follows, that if the same person be raised, the same body must be raised; and so I have herein not only said nothing inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body, but have said more for it than your lordship. For there can be nothing plainer, than that in the scripture it is

revealed, that the same persons shall be raised, and appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to answer for what they have done in their bodies. If therefore *whatever matter* be joined to the same principle of consciousness make the same body, it is demonstration, that if the same persons are raised, they have the same bodies.

How then your lordship makes this an inconsistency with the resurrection, is beyond my conception. Yes, says your lordship †, *it is inconsistent with it, for it makes the same body which was here united to the soul not to be necessary.*

3. I answer therefore, thirdly, that this is the first time I ever learnt, that *not necessary* was the same with *inconsistent*. I say, that a body made up of the same numerical parts of matter, is not necessary to the making of the same person; from whence it will indeed follow, that to the resurrection of the same person, the same numerical particles of matter are not required. What does your lordship infer from hence? to wit, this: therefore he who thinks that the same particles of matter are not necessary to the making of the same person, cannot believe, that the same persons shall be raised with bodies made of the very same particles of matter, if God should reveal, that it shall be so, *viz.* that the same persons shall be raised with the same bodies they had before. Which is all one as to say, that he who thought the blowing of rams horns was not necessary in itself to the falling down of the walls of Jericho, could not believe that they should fall upon the blowing of rams horns, when God had declared it should be so.

Your lordship says, *My idea of personal identity is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection; the reason you ground it on, is this, because it makes not the same body necessary to the making the same person.* Let us grant your lordship's consequence to be

good, what will follow from it? No less than this, that your lordship's notion (for I dare not say your lordship has any so dangerous things as *ideas*) of personal identity, is inconsistent with *the articles of the resurrection*. The demonstration of it is thus; your lordship says *, it is not necessary that the body, to be raised at the last day, should consist of *the same particles of matter which were united at the point of death*; for there must be a great alteration in them in a lingering disease, as if a fat man falls into a consumption: you do not say the same particles which the sinner had at the very time of commission of his sins; for then a long sinner must have a vast body, considering the continual spending of particles by perspiration. And again, here your lordship says †, *You allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man under several changes of matter*. From which words it is evident, that your lordship supposes a person in this world may be continued and preserved the same in a body not consisting of the same individual particles of matter; and hence it demonstratively follows, that let your lordship's *notion of personal identity* be what it will, it makes *the same body not to be necessary to the same person*; and therefore it is, by your lordship's rule, *inconsistent with the article of the resurrection*. When your lordship shall think fit to clear your own *notion of personal identity* from this *inconsistency* with the article of the resurrection, I do not doubt but my *idea of personal identity* will be thereby cleared too. Till then, all *inconsistency* with that article, which your lordship has here charged on mine, will unavoidably fall upon your lordship's too.

But for the clearing of both, give me leave to say, my lord, that whatsoever is *not necessary*, does not thereby become *inconsistent*. It is *not necessary* to the same person, that his body should always consist of the same numerical particles; this is demonstration,

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* Page 34, 35.

† Page 44.

because the particles of the bodies of the same persons in this life change every moment, and your lordship cannot deny it; and yet this makes it not *inconsistent* with God's preserving, if he thinks fit, to the same persons, bodies consisting of the same numerical particles always from the resurrection to eternity. And so likewise, though I say any thing that supposes it *not necessary*, that the same numerical particles, which were vitally united to the soul in this life, should be re-united to it at the resurrection, and constitute the body it shall then have; yet it is not *inconsistent* with this, that God may, if he pleases, give to every one a body consisting only of such particles as were before vitally united to his soul. And thus, I think, I have cleared my book from all that *inconsistency* which your lordship charges on it, and would persuade the world it has with the *article of the resurrection of the dead*.

Only before I leave it, I will set down the remainder of what your lordship says upon this head, that though I see not the coherence or tendency of it, nor the force of any argument in it against me; yet, that nothing may be omitted that your lordship has thought fit to entertain your reader with on this new point; nor any one have reason to suspect, that I have passed by any word of your lordship's (on this now first introduced subject) wherein he might find your lordship had proved what you had promised in your title-page: Your remaining words are these †; *The dispute is not how far personal identity in itself may consist in the very same material substance; for we allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man under several changes of matter; but whether it doth not depend upon a vital union between the soul and body, and the life which is consequent upon it; and therefore in the resurrection, the same material substance must be re-united, or else it cannot be called a resurrection, but a renovation, i. e. it may be a new life, but not*

a raising the body from the dead. I confess, I do not see how what is here ushered in by the words *and therefore*, is a consequence from the preceding words; but as to the propriety of the name, I think it will not be much questioned, that if the same man rise who was dead, it may very properly be called the *resurrection of the dead*; which is the language of the scripture.

I must not part with this article of the resurrection without returning my thanks to your lordship for making me take notice of a fault in my Essay *. When I writ that book, I took it for granted, as I doubt not but many others have done, that the scripture had mentioned in express terms, *the resurrection of the body*. But upon the occasion your lordship has given me in your last letter, to look a little more narrowly into what revelation has declared concerning the *resurrection*, and finding not such express words in the scripture, as that *the body shall rise or be raised*, or *the resurrection of the body*; I shall, in the next edition of it, change these words of my book †, *the dead bodies of men shall rise*, into these of scripture, *the dead shall rise*. Not that I question, that the dead shall be raised with bodies; but in matters of revelation, I think it not only safest, but our duty, as far as any one delivers it for revelation, to keep close to the words of scripture; unless he will assume to himself the authority of one inspired, or make himself wiser than the Holy Spirit himself. If I had spoke of the resurrection in precisely scripture-terms, I had avoided giving your lordship the occasion of making here such a verbal reflection on my words ‡; *What not, if there be an idea of identity as to the body?*

* Page 62.

† Essay, book iv. ch. 18. § 7.

‡ Page 63.

C H A P XXVIII.

Other RELATIONS.

§ 1. *Proportional.* § 2. *Natural.* § 3. *Instituted.* § 4. *Moral.* § 5. *Moral good and evil,* § 6. *Moral rules.* § 7. *Laws.* § 8. *Divine law, the measure of sin and duty.* § 9. *Civil law, the measure of crimes and innocence.* § 10, 11. *Philosophical law, the measure of virtue and vice.* § 12. *Its enforcements, commendation, and discredit.* § 13. *These three laws, the rules of moral good and evil.* § 14, 15. *Morality is the relation of actions to those rules.* § 16. *The denominations of actions often mislead us.* § 17. *Relations innumerable.* § 18. *All relations terminate in simple ideas.* § 19. *We have ordinarily as clear, or clearer, notions of the relation, as of its foundation.* § 20. *The notion of the relation is the same, whether the rule any action is compared to, be true or false.*

§ 1. **B**ESIDES the before-mentioned occasions of time, place, and casualty of comparing, or referring things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

First, The first I shall name, is some one simple idea, which being capable of parts or degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple idea, *v. g.* *whiter, sweeter, bigger, equal, more, &c.* these relations depending on the equality and excess of the same simple idea, in several subjects, may

be called, if one will, *proportional*; and that these are only conversant about those simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, is so evident, that nothing need be said to evince it.

§ 2. *Secondly*, Another occasion of comparing things together, or considering one thing, so as to include in that consideration some other thing, is the circumstances of their origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the relations depending thereon as lasting as the subjects to which they belong; *v. g.* *father* and *son*, *brothers*, *cousin-germans*, &c. which have their relations by one community of blood, wherein they partake in several degrees; *countrymen*, *i. e.* those who were born in the same country, or tract of ground; and these I call *natural relations* wherein we may observe, that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life, and not to the truth and extent of things. For it is certain, that in reality the relation is the same betwixt the begetter and the begotten, in the several races of other animals, as well as men: but yet it is seldom said, this bull is the grandfather of such a calf; or that two pigeons are cousin-germans. It is very convenient, that by distinct names these relations should be observed, and marked out in mankind, there being occasion, both in laws, and other communications one with another, to mention and take notice of men under these relations: from whence also arise the obligations of several duties amongst men: whereas in brutes, men having very little or no cause to mind these relations, they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar names. This, by the way, may give us some light into the different state and growth of lan-

guages: which being suited only to the convenience of communication, are proportioned to the notions men have, and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongst them; and not to the reality or extent of things, nor to the various respects might be found among them; nor the different abstract considerations might be framed about them. Where they had no philosophical notions, there they had no terms to express them: and it is no wonder men should have framed no names for those things they found no occasion to discourse of. From whence it is easy to imagine, why, as in some countries, they may not have so much as the name for a horse; and in others, where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horses than of their own, that there they may have not only names for particular horses, but also of their several relations of kindred one to another.

§ 3. *Thirdly*, Sometimes the foundation of considering things, with reference to one another, is some act whereby any one comes by a moral right, power, or obligation, to do something. Thus a general is one that hath power to command an army; and an army under a general, is a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man. A citizen, or burgher, is one who has a right to certain privileges in this or that place. All this sort depending upon mens wills, or agreement in society, I call *instituted* or *voluntary*, and may be distinguished from the natural, and that they are most, if not all of them, some way or other alterable, and separable from the persons to whom they have sometimes belonged, though neither of the substances, so related, be destroyed. Now, though these are all reciprocal, as well as the rest,

and contain in them a reference of two things one to the other; yet because one of the two things often wants a relative name, importing that reference, men usually take no notice of it, and the relation is commonly overlooked, *v. g.* a patron and client are easily allowed to be relations: but a constable, or dictator, are not so readily, at first hearing, considered as such: because there is no peculiar name for those who are under the command of a dictator, or constable, expressing a relation to either of them; though it be certain, that either of them hath a certain power over some others; and so is so far related to them, as well as a patron is to his client, or general to his army.

§ 4. *Fourthly*, There is another sort of relation, which is the conformity, or disagreement, mens voluntary actions have to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which, I think, may be called *moral relation*, as being that which denominates our moral actions, and deserves well to be examined, there being no part of knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determined ideas, and avoid, as much as may be, obscurity and confusion. Human actions, when with their various ends, objects, manners, and circumstances, they are framed into distinct complex ideas, are, as has been shewn, so many mixed modes, a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, supposing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received; polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once: when we frame these notions thus in our minds, we have there so many determined ideas of mixed modes. But this is not all that concerns our actions: it is not enough to have determined ideas of them, and

to know what names belong to such and such combinations of ideas. We have a farther and greater concernment, and that is, to know whether such actions, so made up, are morally good or bad.

§ 5. Good and evil, as hath been shewn*, are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions, or procures pleasure or pain to us. *Moral good and evil* then, is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good and evil is drawn on us from the will and power of the law-maker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance, or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call *reward* and *punishment*.

§ 6. Of these *moral rules*, or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions, there seem to me to be three sorts, with their three different enforcements, or rewards and punishments. For, since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will, we must, where-ever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and punish deviation from his rule, by some good and evil, that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself: for that being a natural convenience, or inconvenience, would operate

* Book ii. ch. 20. § 2. and ch. 21. § 42.

of itself without a law. This, if I mistake not, is the nature of all *law*, properly so called.

§ 7. The laws that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude or obliquity, seem to me to be these three. 1. The divine law. 2. The civil law. 3. The law of opinion or reputation, if I may so call it. By the relation they bear to the first of these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties; by the second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices.

§ 8. *First*, The divine law, whereby I mean that law which GOD hath set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of revelation. That GOD has given a rule whereby men should govern themselves, I think there is no-body so brutish as to deny. He has a right to do it; we are his creatures: he has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best; and he has power to enforce it by rewards and punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another life; for no-body can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude; and by comparing them to this law, it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions; that is, whether as duties, or sins, they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the Almighty.

§ 9. *Secondly*, The civil law, the rule set by the commonwealth, to the actions of those who belong to it, is another rule to which men refer their actions, to judge whether they be criminal or no. This law no-body overlooks; the rewards and punishments that enforce it being ready at

hand, and suitable to the power that makes it; which is the force of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions of those who live according to its laws, and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods, from him who disobeys; which is the punishment of offences committed against this law.

§ 10. *Thirdly*, The law of opinion or reputation. Virtue and vice are names pretended, and supposed every-where to stand for actions in their own nature right or wrong; and as far as they really are so applied, they so far are co-incident with the divine law above mentioned. But yet, whatever is pretended, this is visible; that these names, *virtue* and *vice*, in the particular instances of their application, through the several nations and societies of men in the world, are constantly attributed only to such actions, as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange, that men every-where should give the name of *virtue* to those actions, which amongst them are judged praise-worthy; and call that *vice*, which they account blameable: since, otherwise, they would condemn themselves, if they should think any thing right, to which they allowed not commendation; any thing wrong, which they let pass without blame. Thus the measure of what is every-where called and esteemed *virtue* and *vice*, is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which, by a secret and tacit consent, establishes itself in the several societies, tribes, and clubs of men in the world, whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions of that place. For though men uniting into politic societies, have resigned up to the

public the disposing of all their force, so that they cannot employ it against any fellow-citizen, any farther than the law of the country directs; yet they retain still the power of thinking well or ill, approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst, and converse with: and by this approbation and dislike, they establish amongst themselves what they will call *virtue* and *vice*.

§ 11. That this is the common measure of virtue and vice, will appear to any one, who considers, that though that passes for vice in one country, which is counted a virtue, or at least not vice, in another; yet every-where, virtue and praise, vice and blame, go together. Virtue is every-where that which is thought praise-worthy; and nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem, is called *virtue*. Virtue* and praise are so united, that they are called often by

* Our author, in his preface to the fourth edition, taking notice how apt men have been to mistake him, added what here follows. ‘Of this the ingenious author of *the discourse concerning the nature of man*, has given me a late instance, to mention no other. For the civility of his expressions, and the candour that belongs to his order, forbid me to think, that he would have closed his preface with an insinuation, as if in what I had said †, concerning the third rule, which men refer their actions to, I went about to make *virtue vice*, and *vice virtue*, unless he had mistaken my meaning; which he could not have done, if he had but given himself the trouble to consider what the argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief design of that chapter, plainly enough set down

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† Book ii. chap. 28.

the same name. *Sunt sua præmia laudi*, says Virgil; and so Cicero, *Nihil habet natura præstantius, quam honestatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus*; which, he tells you, are all names for

in the fourth section, and those following. For I was there, not laying down moral rules, but shewing the original and nature of moral ideas, and enumerating the rules men make use of in moral relations, whether those rules were true or false: and pursuant thereunto, I tell what has every-where that denomination, which, in the language of that place, answers to *virtue* and *vice* in ours, which *alters not the nature of things*, though men generally do judge of, and denominate their actions according to the esteem and fashion of the place, or sect they are of.

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had said †, he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call *virtue* and *vice*: and if he had observed, that in the place he quotes, I only report as matter of fact what others call *virtue* and *vice*, he would not have found it liable to any great exception. For, I think, I am not much out in saying, that one of the rules made use of in the world for a ground or measure of a moral relation, is that esteem and reputation; which several sorts of actions find variously in the several societies of men, according to which they are there called *virtues* or *vices*: and whatever authority the learned Mr Lowde places in his *old English dictionary*, I dare say, it no-where tells him (if I should appeal to it) that the same action is not in credit, called and counted a virtue in one place, which being in disrepute, passes for, and under the name of vice in another. The taking notice that men bestow the names

† Book i. chap. 3. § 18; and in this present chapter, § 13, 14, 15, and 20.

the same thing, Tusc. l. ii. This is the language of the heathen philosophers, who well understood wherein their notions of virtue and vice consisted. And though perhaps, by the different temper,

of *virtue* and *vice*, according to this rule of reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making *vice virtue*, and *virtue vice*. But the good man does well, and as becomes his calling, to be watchful in such points, and to take the alarm, even at expressions, which, standing alone by themselves, might sound ill, and be suspected.

It is to this zeal, allowable in his function, that I forgive his citing, as he does, these words of mine*. *The exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute, 'whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise,' &c. Phil. iv. 8.* without taking notice of those immediately preceding, which introduce them, and run thus: *Whereby in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preserved: so that even the exhortations of inspired teachers. &c.* By which words, and the rest of that section, it is plain, that I brought that passage of St Paul, not to prove, that the general measure of what men call *virtue* and *vice* throughout the world, was the reputation and fashion of each particular society within itself; but to shew, that though it were so, yet, for reasons I there give, men, in that way of denominating their actions, did not, for the most part, much vary from the law of nature, which is that standing and unalterable rule, by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and pravity of their actions, and accordingly denomi-

* In § 11. of this chapter.

education, fashion, maxims, or interest of different sorts of men, it fell out, that what was thought praise-worthy in one place, escaped not censure in another; and so in different societies,

nate them *virtues* or *vices*. Had Mr Lowde considered this, he would have found it little to his purpose, to have quoted that passage in a sense that I used it not; and would, I imagine, have spared the application he subjoins to it, as not very necessary. But I hope this second edition will give him satisfaction in the point, and that this matter is now so expressed, as to shew him there was no cause of scruple.

Though I am forced to differ from him in those apprehensions he has expressed in the latter end of his preface, concerning what I had said about *virtue* and *vice*; yet we are better agreed than he thinks, in what he says in his third chapter *, concerning *natural inscriptions*, and *innate notions*. I shall not deny him the privilege he claims †, to state the question as he pleases, especially when he states it so, as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have said: for, according to him, *innate notions being conditional things depending upon the concurrence of several other circumstances, in order to the soul's exerting them*, all that he says for *innate, imprinted, impressed notions*, (for of *innate ideas* he says nothing at all), amounts at last only to this; that there are certain propositions, which, though the soul from the beginning, or when a man is born, does not know, yet by *assistance from the outward senses, and the help of some previous cultivation*, it may afterwards come certainly to know the truth of; which is no more than what I have affirmed in my first book. For, I suppose, by the soul's exerting them, he means its beginning to know them, or else the *soul's exerting of notions*, will be to me a very unintelligible expression; and, I think, at best is a very

* Page 78.

† Page 52.

virtues and vices were changed : yet, as to the main, they, for the most part, kept the same every-where. For since nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with esteem and reputation that, wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and discountenance the contrary ;

unfit one in this case, it misleading mens thoughts by insinuation, as if these notions were in the mind before the *soul exerts them*, i. e. before they are known ; whereas, truly, before they are known, there is nothing of them in the mind, but a capacity to know them, when the *concurrence of those circumstances*, which this ingenious author thinks necessary, *in order to the soul's exerting them*, brings them into our knowledge.

I find him express it thus * ; *These natural notions are not so imprinted upon the soul, as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves (even in children and idiots) without any assistance from the outward senses, or without the help of some previous cultivation.* Here he says, *they exert themselves*, as p. 78. that the *soul exerts them*. When he has explained to himself or others, what he means by the *soul's exerting innate notions*, or *their exerting themselves*, and what that *previous cultivation and circumstances, in order to their being exerted*, are, he will, I suppose, find there is so little of controversy between him and me in the point, bating that he calls that *exerting of notions*, which I, in a more vulgar stile, call *knowing*, that I have reason to think he brought in my name upon this occasion only, out of the pleasure he has to speak civilly of me, which I must gratefully acknowledge he has done every-where he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as some others have done, a title I have no right to.

it is no wonder, that esteem and discredit, virtue and vice, should, in a great measure, every-where correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong, which the law of GOD hath established; there being nothing that so directly and visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind in this world, as obedience to the laws he has set them, and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and confusion, as the neglect of them. And therefore men, without renouncing all sense and reason, and their own interest, which they are so constantly true to, could not generally mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that side, that really deserved it not. Nay, even those men, whose practice was otherwise, failed not to give their approbation right; few being depraved to that degree as not to condemn, at least in others, the faults they themselves were guilty of: whereby even in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preserved. So that even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute: *Whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, &c.* Phil. iv. 8.

§ 12. If any one should imagine, that I have forgot my own notion of a law, when I make the law, whereby men judge of virtue and vice, to be nothing else but the consent of private men, who have not authority enough to make a law: especially wanting that, which is so necessary and essential to a law, a power to enforce it: I think, I may say, that he who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives to men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules

of those with whom they converse, seems little skilled in the nature or history of mankind: the greatest part whereof he shall find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this law of fashion; and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company, little regarding the laws of GOD or the magistrate. The penalties that attend the breach of GOD's laws, some, nay, perhaps most men, seldom seriously reflect on; and amongst those that do, many, whilst they break the law, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their peace for such breaches: and as to the punishments due from the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves with the hope of impunity. But no man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike, who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a strange and unusual constitution, who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society. Solitude many men have sought, and been reconciled to: but no-body, that has the least thought or sense of a man about him, can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars, and those he converses with. This is a burden too heavy for human sufferance: and he must be made up of irreconcilable contradictions, who can take pleasure in company, and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions.

§ 13. These three then, 1. The law of GOD,
2 The law of politic societies, 3. The law of

fashion, or private censure, are those to which men variously compare their actions: and it is by their conformity to one of these laws, that they take their measures, when they would judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or bad.

§ 14. Whether the rule, to which, as to a touchstone, we bring our voluntary actions, to examine them by, and try their goodness, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the mark of the value we set upon them: whether, I say, we take that rule from the fashion of the country, or the will of a law-maker, the mind is easily able to observe the relation any action hath to it; and to judge, whether the action agrees or disagrees with the rule; and so hath a notion of *moral goodness or evil*, which is either conformity, or not conformity of any action to that rule: and therefore is often called moral rectitude. This rule being nothing but a collection of several simple ideas, the conformity thereto is but so ordering the action, that the simple ideas belonging to it may correspond to those which the law requires. And thus we see how moral beings and notions are founded on, and terminated in these simple ideas we have received from sensation or reflection. For example, let us consider the complex idea we signify by the word *murder*; and when we have taken it asunder, and examined all the particulars, we shall find them to amount to a collection of simple ideas derived from reflection or sensation, viz. 1. From reflection on the operations of our own minds, we have the ideas of willing, considering, purposing before-hand, malice, or wishing ill to another; and also of life, or perception, and self-motion. 2. From sensa-

tion, we have the collection of those simple sensible ideas which are to be found in a man, and of some action, whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man; all which simple ideas are comprehended in the word *murder*. This collection of simple ideas being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held by most men there, worthy praise or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious: if I have the will of a supreme, invisible law-giver for my rule; then, as I supposed the action commanded or forbidden by GOD, I call it good or evil, sin or duty: and if I compare it to the civil law, the rule made by the legislative power of the country, I call it lawful, or unlawful, a crime, or no crime. So that whencesoever we take the rule of moral actions, or by what standard soever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices, they consist only, and are made up of collections of simple ideas, which we originally received from sense or reflection, and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law.

§ 15. To conceive rightly of moral actions, we must take notice of them under this twofold consideration. 1. As they are in themselves each made up of such a collection of simple ideas. Thus *drunkenness* or *lying* signify such or such a collection of simple ideas, which I call *mixed modes*: and in this sense, they are as much positive absolute ideas, as the drinking of a horse, or speaking of a parrot. 2. Our actions are considered as *good*, *bad*, or *indifferent*; and in this respect they are relative; it being their conformity to, or disagreement with some rule, that makes

them to be regular or irregular, good or bad: and so, as far as they are compared with a rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a man, as it is a certain positive mode, or particular sort of action, by particular ideas, distinguished from all others, is called *duelling*; which, when considered, in relation to the law of GOD, will deserve the name *sin*; to the law of fashion, in some countries, valour and virtue; and to the municipal laws of some governments, a capital crime. In this case, when the positive mode has one name, and another name as it stands in relation to the law, the distinction may as easily be observed, as it is in substances, where one name, *v. g. man*, is used to signify the thing, another, *v. g. father*, to signify the relation.

§ 16. But because very frequently the positive idea of the action, and its moral relation, are comprehended together under one name, and the same word made use of to express both the mode or action, and its moral rectitude or obliquity; therefore the relation itself is less taken notice of; and there is often no distinction made between the positive idea of the action, and the reference it has to a rule. By which confusion of these two distinct considerations under one term, those who yield too easily to the impressions of sounds, and are forward to take names for things, are often misled in their judgment of actions. Thus the taking from another what is his, without his knowledge or allowance, is properly called *stealing*: but that name being commonly understood to signify also the moral pravity of the action, and to denote its contrariety to the law, men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called stealing, as an

ill action, disagreeing with the rule of right. And yet the private taking away his sword from a madman, to prevent his doing mischief, though it be properly denominated *stealing*, as the name of such a mixed mode; yet when compared to the law of God, and considered in its relation to that supreme rule, it is no sin or transgression, though the name *stealing* ordinarily carries such an intimation with it.

§ 17. And thus much for the relation of human actions to a law, which therefore I call *moral relation*.

It would make a volume to go over all sorts of relations: it is not therefore to be expected, that I should here mention them all. It suffices to our present purpose, to shew by these, what the ideas are we have of this comprehensive consideration, called *relation*: which is so various, and the occasions of it so many, (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another), that it is not very easy to reduce it to rules, or under just heads. Those I have mentioned, I think, are some of the most considerable, and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our ideas of relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this argument, from what has been said, give me leave to observe,

§ 18. *First*, That it is evident, that all relation terminates in, and is ultimately founded on those simple ideas we have got from sensation or reflection: so that all that we have in our thoughts ourselves, (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning), or would signify to others, when we use words standing for relations, is nothing but some simple ideas, or collections of simple ideas, compared one with another. This is so manifest

in that sort called *proportional*, that nothing can be more. For when a man says, honey is sweeter than wax, it is plain that his thoughts in this relation terminate in this simple idea, sweetness, which is equally true of all the rest; though, where they are compounded, or decompounded, the simple ideas they are made up of, are perhaps seldom taken notice of; *v. g.* when the word *father* is mentioned: 1. There is meant that particular species, or collective idea, signified by the word *man*. 2. Those sensible simple ideas, signified by the word *generation*. And, 3. The effects of it, and all the simple ideas, signified by the word *child*. So the word *friend*, being taken for a man who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all these following ideas, to the making of it up. 1. All the simple ideas, comprehended in the word *man*, or intelligent being. 2. The idea of *love*. 3. The idea of *readiness* or *disposition*. 4. The idea of *action*, which is any kind of thought or motion. 5. The idea of *good*, which signifies any thing that may advance his happiness, and terminates at last, if examined, in particular simple ideas, of which the word *good*, in general, signifies any one; but if removed from all simple ideas quite, it signifies nothing at all. And thus also all moral words terminate at last, though, perhaps, more remotely, in a collection of simple ideas: the immediate signification of relative words, being very often other supposed known relations; which, if traced one to another, still end in simple ideas.

§ 19. *Secondly*, That in relations, we have for the most part, if not always, as clear a notion of the relation, as we have of those simple ideas, wherein it is founded; agreement or disagree-

ment, whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear ideas as of any other whatsoever; it being but the distinguishing simple ideas, or their degrees one from another, without which we could have no distinct knowledge at all. For if I have a clear idea of sweetness, light, or extension, I have too of equal, or more, or less, of each of these: if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman, viz. Sempronia, I know what it is for another man to be born of the same woman, Sempronia; and so have as clear a notion of brothers, as of births, and perhaps clearer. For, if I believed that Sempronia digged Titus out of the parsley-bed, as they use to tell children, and thereby became his mother; and that afterwards, in the same manner, she digged Caius out of the parsley-bed, I had a clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them, as if I had all the skill of a midwife; the notion that the same woman contributed, as mother, equally to their births, (though I were ignorant or mistaken in the manner of it), being that on which I grounded the relation; and that they agreed in that circumstance of birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their descent from the same person, without knowing the particular circumstances of that descent, is enough to found my notion of their having or not having the relation of brothers. But though the ideas of particular relations are capable of being as clear and distinct in the minds of those, who will duly consider them, as those of mixed modes, and more determinate than those of substances; yet the names belonging to relation, are often of as doubtful and uncertain signification, as those of substances or mixed modes;

and much more than those of simple ideas; because relative words being the marks of this comparison, which is made only by mens thoughts, and is an idea only in mens minds, men frequently apply them to different comparisons of things, according to their own imaginations, which do not always correspond with those of others using the same names.

§ 20. *Thirdly*, That in these I call *moral relations*, I have a true notion of relation, by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or false. For if I measure any thing by a yard, I know whether the thing I measure be longer or shorter than that supposed yard, though perhaps the yard I measure by be not exactly the standard: which, indeed, is another inquiry. For though the rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it; yet the agreement or disagreement observable in that which I compare with, makes me perceive the relation. Though measuring by a wrong rule, I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude, because I have tried it by that which is not the true rule; yet I am not mistaken in the relation which that action bears to that rule I compare it to, which is agreement or disagreement.

C H A P. XXIX.

Of CLEAR and OBSCURE, DISTINCT
and CONFUSED IDEAS.

§ 1. *Ideas, some clear and distinct, others obscure and confused.* § 2. *Clear and obscure, explained by sight.* § 3. *Causes of obscurity.* § 4. *Distinct and confused, what.* § 5. *Objection.* § 6. *Confusion of ideas, is in reference to their names.* § 7. *Defaults which make confusion. First, Complex ideas made up of too few simple ones.* § 8. *Secondly, Or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.* § 9. *Thirdly, Or are mutable and undetermined.* § 10. *Confusion without reference to names, hardly conceivable.* § 11. *Confusion concerns always two ideas.* § 12. *Causes of confusion.* § 13. *Complex ideas may be distinct in one part, and confused in another.* § 14. *This, if not heeded, causes confusion in our arguings.* § 15. *Instance in eternity.* § 16. *Divisibility of matter.*

§ 1. **H**AVING shewn the original of our ideas, and taken a view of their several sorts; considered the difference between the simple and the complex, and observed how the complex ones are divided into those of modes, substances, and relations, all which, I think, is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the progress of the mind in its apprehension and knowledge of things; it will perhaps be thought I have

dwelt long enough upon the examination of ideas. I must, nevertheless, crave leave to offer some few other considerations concerning them. The first is, that some are *clear*, and others *obscure*; some *distinct*, and others *confused*.

§ 2. The perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to the sight, we shall best understand what is meant by clear and obscure in our ideas, by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight. Light being that which discovers to us visible objects, we give the name of *obscure* to that which is not placed in a light sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours which are observable in it, and which, in a better light, would be discernible. In like manner our simple ideas are clear, when they are such as the objects themselves, from whence they were taken, did, or might, in a well-ordered sensation or perception, present them. Whilst the memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the mind, whenever it has occasion to consider them, they are clear ideas. So far as they either want any thing of the original exactness, or have lost any of their first freshness, and are, as it were, faded or tarnished by time, so far are they obscure. Complex ideas, as they are made up of simple ones, so they are clear, when the ideas that go to their composition are clear; and the number and order of those simple ideas, that are the ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.

§ 3. The causes of obscurity in simple ideas, seem to be either dull organs, or very slight and transient impressions made by the objects; or else a weakness in the memory not able to retain them

as received. For to return again to visible objects, to help us to apprehend this matter : if the organs or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold, will not receive the impression of the seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it ; or, like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it well when well imprinted ; or else supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with a sufficient force to make a clear impression ; in any of these cases, the print left by the seal will be obscure. This, I suppose, needs no application to make it plainer.

§ 4. As a clear idea is that whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception, as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-disposed organ ; so a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other ; and a confused idea is such an one as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different.

§ 5. If no idea be confused, but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it should be different, it will be hard, may any one say, to find any-where a confused idea. For, let any idea be as it will, it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be ; and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas, which cannot be other, *i. e.* different, without being perceived to be so. No idea therefore can be undistinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself ; for from all other it is evidently different.

§ 6. To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the confusion ideas are at any time chargeable with, we

must consider, that things ranked under distinct names, are supposed different enough to be distinguished; that so each sort, by its peculiar name, may be marked and discoursed of a-part upon any occasion: and there is nothing more evident, than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for different things. Now every idea a man has, being visible what it is, and distinct from all other ideas but itself, that which makes it confused, is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another name, as that which it is expressed by, the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked under those two different names) distinct; and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and some of them to the other of those names, being left out; and so the distinction, which was intended to be kept up by those different names, is quite lost.

§ 7. The defaults which usually occasion this confusion, I think, are chiefly these following:

First, When any complex idea (for it is complex ideas that are most liable to confusion) is made up of too small a number of simple ideas; and such only as are common to other things, whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name, are left out. Thus he that has an idea made up of barely the simple ones of a beast with spots, has but a confused idea of a leopard, it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a lynx, and several other sorts of beasts that are spotted. So that such an idea, though it hath the peculiar name *leopard*, is not distinguishable from those designed by the names *lynx* or *panther*, and may as well come under the name *lynx*, as *leopard*. How much the custom of defining of words by general terms, contributes to

make the ideas we would express by them confused and undetermined, I leave others to consider. This is evident, that confused ideas are such as render the use of words uncertain, and take away the benefit of distinct names. When the ideas, for which we use different terms, have not a difference answerable to their distinct names, and so cannot be distinguished by them, there it is that they are truly confused.

§ 8. *Secondly*, Another default which makes our ideas confused, is, when though the particulars that make up any idea, are in number enough; yet they are so jumbled together, that it is not easily discernible, whether it more belongs to the name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this confusion, than a sort of pictures usually shewn, as surprising pieces of art, wherein the colours, as they are laid by the pencil on the table itself, mark out very odd and unusual figures, and have no discernible order in their position. This draught, thus made up of parts, wherein no symmetry nor order appears, is, in itself, no more a confused thing, than the picture of a cloudy sky; wherein though there be as little order of colours or figures to be found, yet no-body thinks it a confused picture. What is it then that makes it be thought confused, since the want of symmetry does not? As it is plain it does not; for another draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be called confused. I answer, that which makes it be thought confused, is, the applying it to some name, to which it does no more discernibly belong, than to some other. *V. g.* when it is said to be the picture of a man, or Cæsar, then any one with reason counts it confused: because it is not

discernible, in that state, to belong more to the name *man* or *Cæsar*, than to the name *baboon* or *Pompey*; which are supposed to stand for different ideas from those signified by *man* or *Cæsar*. But when a cylindrical mirror, placed right, hath reduced those irregular lines on the table into their due order and proportion, then the confusion ceases, and the eye presently sees that it is a man, or Cæsar; *i. e.* that it belongs to those names; and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a baboon, or Pompey; *i. e.* from the ideas signified by those names. Just thus it is with our ideas, which are, as it were, the pictures of things. No one of these mental draughts, however the parts are put together, can be called confused, (for they are plainly discernible as they are), till it be ranked under some ordinary name, to which it cannot be discerned to belong, any more than it does to some other name of an allowed different signification.

§ 9. *Thirdly*, A third defect that frequently gives the name of confused to our ideas, is, when any one of them is uncertain and undetermined. Thus we may observe men, who not forbearing to use the ordinary words of their language, till they have learned their precise signification, change the idea they make this or that term stand for, almost as often as they use it. He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his idea of *church*, or *idolatry*, every time he thinks of either, and holds not steady to any one precise combination of ideas that makes it up, is said to have a confused idea of *idolatry*, or the *church*: though this be still for the same reason as the former, *viz.* because a mutable idea (if we will allow it to be one idea) cannot be-

long to one name, rather than another: and so loses the distinction that distinct names are designed for.

§ 10. By what has been said, we may observe how much names, as supposed steady signs of things, and by their difference to stand for, and keep things distinct, that in themselves are different, are the occasion of denominating ideas distinct or confused, by a secret and unobserved reference the mind makes of its ideas to such names. This, perhaps, will be fuller understood, after what I say of words, in the third book, has been read and considered. But without taking notice of such a reference of ideas to distinct names, as the signs of distinct things, it will be hard to say what a confused idea is. And therefore when a man designs, by any name, a sort of things, or any one particular thing distinct from all others, the complex idea he annexes to that name is the more distinct, the more particular the ideas are, and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable differences whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all ideas belonging to other names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby all confusion with them is avoided.

§ 11. Confusion, making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated, concerns always two ideas; and those most which most approach one another. Whenever therefore we suspect any idea to be confused, we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from; and that will always be found an idea belonging

to another name; and so should be a different thing from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct; being either the same with it, or making a part of it, or at least, as properly called by that name as the other it is ranked under; and so keeps not that difference from that other idea, which the different names import.

§ 12. This, I think, is the confusion proper to ideas, which still carries with it a secret reference to names. At least, if there be any other confusion of ideas, this is that which most of all disorders mens thoughts and discourses: ideas, as ranked under names, being those that for the most part men reason of within themselves, and always those which they commune about with others. And therefore where there are supposed two different ideas, marked by two different names, which are not as distinguishable as the sounds that stand for them, there never fails to be confusion: and where any ideas are distinct, as the ideas of those two sounds they are marked by, there can be between them no confusion. The way to prevent it, is to collect and unite into our complex idea, as precisely as is possible, all those ingredients whereby it is differenced from others; and to them so united in a determinate number and order, apply steadily the same name. But this neither accommodating mens ease or vanity, or serving any design but that of naked truth, which is not always the thing aimed at, such exactness is rather to be wished than hoped for. And since the loose application of names to undetermined, variable, and almost no ideas, serves both to cover our own ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for learning and superiority in knowledge, it is no wonder that most

men should use it themselves, whilst they complain of it in others. Though, I think, no small part of the confusion to be found in the notions of men, might by care and ingenuity be avoided; yet I am far from concluding it every-where wilful. Some ideas are so complex, and made up of so many parts, that the memory does not easily retain the very same precise combination of simple ideas under one name; much less are we able constantly to divine for what precise complex idea such a name stands in another man's use of it. From the first of these, follows confusion in a man's own reasonings and opinions within himself; from the latter, frequent confusion in discoursing and arguing with others. But having more at large treated of words, their defects and abuses, in the following book, I shall here say no more of it.

§ 13. Our complex ideas being made up of collections, and so variety of simple ones may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part, and very obscure and confused in another. In a man who speaks of a chiliaedron, or a body of a thousand sides, the ideas of the figure may be very confused, though that of the number be very distinct; so that he being able to discourse, and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex idea, which depends upon the number of a thousand, he is apt to think he has a distinct idea of a chiliaedron; though it be plain, he has no precise idea of its figure, so as to distinguish it, by that, from one that has but 999 sides. The not observing whereof, causes no small error in mens thoughts, and confusion in their discourses.

§ 14. He that thinks he has a distinct idea of the figure of a chiliaedron, let him for trial's sake

take another parcel of the same uniform matter, viz. gold, or wax, of an equal bulk, and make it into a figure of 999 sides: he will, I doubt not, be able to distinguish these two ideas one from another, by the number of sides; and reason and argue distinctly about them, whilst he keeps his thoughts and reasoning to that part only of these ideas, which is contained in their numbers; as that the sides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers, and of the other not, &c. But when he goes about to distinguish them by their figure, he will there be presently at a loss, and not be able, I think, to frame in his mind two ideas, one of them distinct from the other, by the bare figure of these two pieces of gold; as he could, if the same parcel of gold were made one into a cube, the other a figure of five sides. In which incomplete ideas, we are very apt to impose on ourselves, and wrangle with others, especially where they have particular and familiar names. For being satisfied in that part of the idea, which we have clear; and the name which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole, containing that part also which is imperfect and obscure, we are apt to use it for that confused part, and draw deductions from it in the obscure part of its signification, as confidently as we do from the other.

§ 15. Having frequently in our mouths the name *eternity*, we are apt to think we have a positive comprehensive idea of it, which is as much as to say, that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly contained in our idea. It is true, that he that thinks so, may have a clear idea of duration; he may also have a very clear idea of a very great length of duration; he may also have a clear idea of the comparison of that great

one, with still a greater: but it not being possible for him to include in his idea of any duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole extent together of a duration where he supposes no end, that part of his idea, which is still beyond the bounds of that large duration he represents to his own thoughts, is very obscure and undetermined. And hence it is, that in disputes and reasonings concerning eternity, or any other infinite, we are apt to blunder, and involve ourselves in manifest absurdities.

§ 16. In matter, we have no clear ideas of the smallness of parts much beyond the smallest that occur to any of our senses; and therefore when we talk of the divisibility of matter *in infinitum*, though we have clear ideas of division and divisibility, and have also clear ideas of parts made out of a whole by division; yet we have but very obscure and confused ideas of corpuscles, or minute bodies so to be divided, when, by former divisions they are reduced to a smallness much exceeding the perception of any of our senses; and so all that we have clear and distinct ideas of, is of what division in general, or abstractly, is, and the relation of *totum* and *pars*: but of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain progressions, I think, we have no clear nor distinct idea at all. For, I ask any one, whether taking the smallest atom of dust he ever saw, he has any distinct idea (bating still the number which concerns not extension) betwixt the 100,000th, and the 1000,000th part of it. Or if he thinks he can refine his ideas to that degree, without losing sight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of those numbers. Such a degree of smallness is not unreasonable to be supposed, since a division carried on so

far, brings it no nearer the end of infinite division, than the first division into two halves does. I must confess, for my part, I have no clear distinct ideas of the different bulk or extension of those bodies, having but a very obscure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of division of bodies *in infinitum*, our idea of their distinct bulks, which is the subject and foundation of division, comes, after a little progression, to be confounded, and almost lost in obscurity. For that idea, which is to represent only bigness, must be very obscure and confused, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big, but only by number; so that we have clear distinct ideas, we may say, of ten and one, but no distinct ideas of two such extensions. It is plain, from hence, that when we talk of infinite divisibility of body, or extension, our distinct and clear ideas are only of numbers: but the clear distinct ideas of extension, after some progress of division, is quite lost; and of such minute parts, we have no distinct ideas at all; but it returns, as all our ideas of infinite do, at last to that of number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any distinct idea of actual infinite parts. We have, it is true, a clear idea of division, as often as we will think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts in matter, than we have a clear idea of an infinite number, by being able still to add new numbers to any assigned number we have: endless divisibility, giving us no more a clear and distinct idea of actually infinite parts, than endless addibility, if I may so speak, gives us a clear and distinct idea of an actually infinite number, they both being only in a power still of increasing the number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what re-

mains to be added, wherein consists the infinity, we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confused idea ; from or about which we can argue or reason with no certainty or clearness, no more than we can in arithmetic, about a number of which we have no such distinct idea, as we have of 4 or 100 : but only this relative obscure one, that compared to any other, it is still bigger : and we have no more a clear positive idea of it, when we say or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we should say, it is bigger than 40, or 4 ; 400,000,000, having no nearer a proportion to the end of addition, or number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and so proceeds, shall as soon come to the end of all addition as he that adds 400,000,000, to 400,000,000. And so likewise in eternity, he that has an idea of but four years, has as much a positive complete idea of eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of years : for what remains of eternity beyond either of these two numbers of years, is as clear to the one as the other ; *i. e.* neither of them has any clear positive idea of it at all. For he that adds only 4 years to 4, and so on, shall as soon reach eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of years, and so on ; or if he please, doubles the increase as often as he will ; the remaining abyss being still as far beyond the end of all these progressions, as it is from the length of a day, or an hour. For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite ; and therefore our ideas, which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is also in our idea of *extension*, when we increase it by addition, as well as when we diminish it by division, and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space. After a few doublings of those ideas

of extension, which are the largest we are accustomed to have, we lose the clear distinct idea of that space: it becomes a confusedly great one, with a surplus of still greater; about which, when we would argue or reason, we shall always find ourselves at a loss; confused ideas, in our arguments and deductions from that part of them which is confused, always leading us into confusion.

CHAP. XXX.

Of REAL and FANTASTICAL IDEAS.

§ 1. *Real ideas are conformable to their archetypes.*

§ 2. *Simple ideas all real.* § 3. *Complex ideas are voluntary combinations.* § 4. *Mixed modes made of consistent ideas, are real.* § 5. *Ideas of substances are real, when they agree with the existence of things.*

§ 1. **B**ESIDES what we have already mentioned concerning ideas, other considerations belong to them, in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be supposed to represent; and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold distinction; and are,

I. Either real or fantastical.

II. Adequate or inadequate.

III. True or false.

I. By *real ideas*, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. *Fantastical* or *chimerical*, I call such as have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to

which they are tacitly referred, as to their archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of ideas before mentioned, we shall find, that,

§ 2. *First*, Our simple ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things. Not that they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist, the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shewed. But though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness, pain, &c. being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker, to produce in us such sensations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves. For these several appearances being designed to be the marks whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they be only constant effects, or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves; the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to those constitutions as to causes or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them. And thus our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds, that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in simple ideas, as has been shewn, the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea, more than what it has received.

§ 3. Though the mind be wholly passive, in respect of its simple ideas; yet, I think, we may

I say, it is not so in respect of its complex ideas : for those being combinations of simple ideas put together, and united under one general name ; it is plain, that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty in forming those complex ideas : how else comes it to pass, that one man's idea of gold, or justice, is different from another's ? but because he has put in, or left out of his, some simple idea which the other has not. The question then is, which of these are real, and which barely imaginary combinations ? what collections agree to the reality of things, and what not ? And to this I say, that,

§ 4. *Secondly*, Mixed modes and relations, having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to those kind of ideas, to make them real, but that they be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them. These ideas themselves being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind would signify them to others, so bare possibility of existing is not enough ; they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical : as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea which common use calls liberality. But this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech, than reality of ideas : for a man to be undisturbed in danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to execute it steadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action which may

exist. But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one's reason or industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as real an idea as the other. Though the first of these having the name *courage* given to it, may, in respect of that name, be a right or wrong idea: but the other, whilst it has not a common received name of any known language assigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but itself.

§ 5. *Thirdly*, Our complex ideas of substances being made all of them in reference to things existing without us, and intended to be representations of substances, as they really are, are no farther real, than as they are such combinations of simple ideas, as are really united, and co-exist in things without us. On the contrary, those are fantastical, which are made up of such collections of simple ideas as were really never united, never were found together in any substance: *v. g.* a rational creature, consisting of a horse's head, joined to a body of human shape, or such as the centaurs are described: or, a body yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed; but lighter than common water: or, an uniform, unorganized body, consisting, as to sense, all of similar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it. Whether such substances as these can possibly exist, or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, these ideas of substances being made conformable to no pattern existing that we know, and consisting of such collections of ideas as no substance ever shewed us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: but much more are those complex ideas so, which contain in them any inconsistency or contradiction of their parts.

C H A P. XXXI.

Of ADEQUATE and INADEQUATE
I D E A S.

§ 1. *Adequate ideas, are such as perfectly represent their archetypes.* § 2. *Simple, ideas all adequate.* § 3. *Modes are all adequate.* § 4, 5. *Modes, in reference to settled names, may be inadequate.* § 6, 7. *Ideas of substances, as referred to real essences, not adequate.* § 8—11. *Ideas of substances, as collections of their qualities, are all inadequate.* § 12. *Simple ideas ελεγχτι, and adequate.* § 13. *Ideas of substances are εκτυπα, inadequate.* § 14. *Ideas of modes and relations, are archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.*

§ 1. **O**ur real ideas, some are adequate, and some are inadequate. Those I call *adequate*, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. *Inadequate ideas* are such, which are but a partial, or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

§ 2. *First*, That all our simple ideas are adequate; because being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things, fitted and ordained by God, to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers: and we are sure they agree to the reality of things. For if sugar produce in us the ideas which we call *whiteness* and *sweetness*, we are

sure there is a power in sugar to produce those ideas in our minds, or else they could not have been produced by it. And so each sensation answering the power that operates on any of our senses, the idea so produced is a real idea, (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce any simple idea); and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us these simple ideas are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if those ideas were real beings in them. For, though fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is signified the power of producing in us the idea of pain; yet it is denominated also light, and hot; as if light and heat were really something in the fire, more than a power to excite these ideas in us; and therefore are called *qualities* in, or of the fire. But these being nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such ideas in us, I must in that sense be understood, when I speak of secondary qualities as being in things; or of their ideas, as beings the object that excite them in us. Such ways of speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well understood; yet truly signify nothing, but those powers which are in things, to excite certain sensations or ideas in us. Since, were there no fit organs to receive the impressions fire makes on the sight and touch; nor a mind joined to those organs to receive the ideas of light and heat by those impressions from the fire, or sun, there would yet be no more light or heat in the world, than there would be pain, if there were no sensible creature to feel it, though the sun should

continue just as it is now, and mount *Ætna* flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and extension, and the termination of it, figure, with motion and rest, whereof we have the ideas, would be really in the world as they are, whether there were any sensible being to perceive them, or no : and therefore we have reason to look on those as the real modifications of matter, and such as are the exciting causes of all our various sensations from bodies. But this being an inquiry not belonging to this place, I shall enter no farther into it, but proceed to shew what complex ideas are adequate, and what not.

§ 3. *Secondly*, Our complex ideas of modes, being voluntary collections of simple ideas, which the mind puts together, without reference to any real archetypes, or standing patterns, existing any where, are, and cannot but be, adequate ideas : because they not being intended for copies or things really existing, but for archetypes made by the mind, to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing ; they having each of them that combination of ideas, and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they should : so that the mind acquiesces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus, by having the idea of a figure, with three sides meeting at three angles, I have a complete idea, wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect. That the mind is satisfied with the perfection of this its idea, is plain in that it does not conceive, that any understanding hath, or can have a more complete or perfect idea of that thing it signifies by the word *triangle*, supposing it to exist, than itself has in that complex idea of three sides, and three angles ; in which is contained all that is, or can be essential to it, or

necessary to complete it, where-ever or however it exists. But in our ideas of substances, it is otherwise. For there desiring to copy things, as they really do exist, and to represent to ourselves that constitution on which all their properties depend, we perceive our ideas attain not that perfection we intend: we find they still want something we should be glad were in them; and so are all inadequate. But mixed modes, and relations, being archetypes without patterns, and so having nothing to represent but themselves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being so to itself. He that at first put together the idea of danger perceived, absence of disorder from fear, sedate consideration of what was justly to be done, and executing of that without disturbance, or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his mind that complex idea made up of that combination, and intending it to be nothing else, but what it is; nor to have in it any other simple ideas, but what it hath, it could not also but be an adequate idea: and laying this up in his memory, with the name *courage* annexed to it, to signify to others, and denominate from thence any action he should observe to agree with it, had thereby a standard to measure and denominate actions by, as they agreed to it. This idea thus made, and laid up for a pattern, must necessarily be adequate, being referred to nothing else but itself, nor made by any other original, but the good-looking and will of him that first made this combination.

§ 4. Indeed, another coming after, and in conversation learning from him the word *courage*, may make an idea, to which, he gives the name *courage*, different from what the first author ap-

plied it to, and has in his mind, when he uses it. And in this case, if he designs that his idea in thinking should be conformable to the other's idea, as the name he uses in speaking is conformable in sound to his, from whom he learned it, his idea may be very wrong and inadequate: because in this case, making the other man's idea the pattern of his idea in thinking, as the other man's word, or sound, is the pattern of his in speaking, his idea is so far defective and inadequate, as it is distant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to and intends to express and signify by the name he uses for it; which name he would have to be a sign of the other man's idea, (to which, in its proper use, it is primarily annexed), and of his own, as agreeing to it: to which, if his own does not exactly correspond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§ 5. Therefore these complex ideas of modes, when they are referred by the mind, and intended to correspond to the ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being, expressed by the names we apply to them, they may be very deficient, wrong, and inadequate; because they agree not to that, which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern: in which respect only, any idea of modes can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate. And on this account, our ideas of mixed modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper speaking, than knowing right.

§ 6. *Thirdly*, What ideas we have of substances, I have above shewed: now, those ideas have in the mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a supposed real essence of each species of things. 2. Sometimes they are only

designed to be pictures and representations in the mind of things that do exist by ideas of those qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways, these copies of those originals and archetypes, are imperfect and inadequate.

First, It is usual for men to make the names of substances stand for things, as supposed to have certain real essences, whereby they are of this or that species: and names standing for nothing but the ideas that are in mens minds, they must consequently refer their ideas to such real essences, as to their archetypes. That men (especially such as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do suppose certain specific essences of substances, which each individual, in its several kinds, is made conformable to, and partakes of, is so far from needing proof, that it will be thought strange if any one should do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specific names they rank particular substances under, to things, as distinguished by such specific real essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss, if it should be doubted, whether he called himself man, with any other meaning, than as having the real essence of a man? And yet if you demand, what those real essences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the ideas they have in their minds, being referred to real essences, as to archetypes which are unknown, must be so far from being adequate, that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all. The complex ideas we have of substances, are, as it has been shewn, certain collections of simple ideas that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together. But such a

complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance; for then the properties we discover in that body, would depend on that complex idea, and be deducible from it, and their necessary connection with it be known; as all properties of a triangle depend on, and as far as they are discoverable, are deducible from the complex idea of three lines, including a space. But it is plain, that in our complex ideas of substances, are not contained such ideas, on which all the other quantities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common idea men have of *iron*, is a body of a certain colour, weight, and hardness; and a property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleableness. But yet this property has no necessary connection with that complex idea, or any part of it: and there is no more reason to think, that malleableness depends on that colour, weight, and hardness, than that that colour, or that weight, depends on its malleableness. And yet, though we know nothing of these real essences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that men should attribute the sorts of things to such essences. The particular parcel of matter, which makes the ring I have on my finger, is forwardly, by most men, supposed to have a real existence, whereby it is gold; and from whence those quantities flow, which I find in it, *viz.* its peculiar colour, weight, hardness, fusibility, fixedness, and change of colour upon a slight touch of mercury, &c. This essence, from which all these properties flow, when I inquire into it, and search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover: the farthest I can go, is only to presume, that it being nothing but body, its real essence, or internal constitution, on which these qualities de-

pend, can be nothing but the figure, size, and connection of its solid parts; of neither of which having any distinct perception at all, can I have any idea of its essence, which is the cause that it has that particular shining yellowness, a greater weight than any thing I know of the same bulk, and a fitness to have its colour changed by the touch of quicksilver. If any one will say, that the real essence, and internal constitution, on which these properties depend, is not the figure, size, and arrangement or connection of its solid parts, but something else, called its particular *form*; I am farther from having any idea of its real essence, than I was before; for I have an idea of figure, size, and situation of solid parts in general, though I have none of the particular figure, size, or putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above mentioned are produced; which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut the pen I write with. But when I am told, that something besides the figure, size, and posture of the solid parts of that body, is its essence, something called *substantial form*; of that, I confess, I have no idea at all, but only of the sound *form*; which is far enough from an idea of its real essence, or constitution. The like ignorance as I have of the real essence of this particular substance, I have also of the real essence of all other natural ones: of which essences, I confess I have no distinct ideas at all; and I am apt to suppose others, when they examine their own knowledge, will find in themselves, in this one point, the same sort of ignorance.

§ 7. Now then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger, a general

name already in use, and denominate it *gold*, do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that name as belonging to a particular species of bodies, having a real internal essence; by having of which essence, this particular substance comes to be of that species, and to be called by that name? If it be so, as it is plain it is, the name, by which things are marked, as having that essence, must be referred primarily to that essence; and consequently the idea to which that name is given, must be referred also to that essence, and be intended to represent it. Which essence, since they, who so use the names, know not, their ideas of substances must be all inadequate in that respect, as not containing in them that real essence which the mind intends they should.

§ 8. *Secondly*, Those who neglecting that useless supposition of unknown real essences, whereby they are distinguished, endeavour to copy the substances that exist in the world, by putting together the ideas of those sensible qualities which are found co-existing in them, though they come much nearer a likeness of them, than those who imagine they know not what real specific essences: yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of those substances they would thus copy into their minds; nor do those copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes. Because those qualities, and powers of substances, whereof we make their complex ideas, are so many and various, that no man's complex idea contains them all. That our abstract ideas of substances do not contain in them all the simple ideas that are united in the things themselves, is evident, in that men do rarely put into their complex idea of any substance, all the simple ideas

they do know to exist in it. Because endeavouring to make the signification of their names as clear, and as little cumbersome as they can, they make their specific ideas of the sorts of substances, for the most part, of a few of those simple ideas which are to be found in them: but these having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the specific idea more than others that are left out, it is plain, that both these ways our ideas of substances are deficient and inadequate. The simple ideas, whereof we make our complex ones of substances, are all of them (bating only the figure and bulk of some sorts) powers, which being relations to other substances, we can never be sure that we know all the powers that are in any one body, till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give to, or receive from other substances, in their several ways of application: which being impossible to be tried upon any one body, much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate ideas of any substance, made up of a collection of all its properties.

§ 9. Whosoever first lit on a parcel of that sort of substance we denote by the word *gold*, could not rationally take the bulk and figure he observed in that lump, to depend on its real essence or internal constitution. Therefore those never went into his idea of that species of body; but its peculiar colour, perhaps, and weight, were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex idea of that species. Which both are but powers; the one to affect our eyes after such a manner, and to produce in us that idea we call *yellow*; and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk, they being put into a pair of equal scales, one against another. Another, perhaps, added to these,

the ideas of fusibility and fixedness, two other passive powers, in relation to the operation of fire upon it; another, its ductility and solubility in *aqua regia*; two other powers, relating to the operation of other bodies, in changing its outward figure or separation of it into insensible parts. These, or part of these, put together, usually make the complex idea in mens minds, of that sort of body we call *gold*.

§ 10. But no one, who hath considered the properties of bodies in general, or this sort in particular, can doubt, that this, called *gold*, has infinite other properties, not contained in that complex idea. Some, who have examined this species more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many properties in gold, all of them as inseparable from its internal constitution, as its colour or weight: and, it is probable, if any one knew all the properties that are by divers men known of this metal, there would be an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold, as any one man yet has in his; and yet, perhaps, that not be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it. The changes which that one body is apt to receive, and make in other bodies, upon a due application, exceeding far, not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear so much a paradox to any one, who will but consider how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one, no very compound figure, a *triangle*, though it be no small number, that are already by mathematicians discovered of it.

§ 11. So that all our complex ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate. Which would be so also in mathematical figures, if we

were to have our complex ideas of them, only by collecting their properties in reference to other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipsis, if we had no other idea of it, but some few of its properties? Whereas having in our plain idea, the whole essence of that figure, we from thence discover those properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it.

§ 12. Thus the mind has three sorts of abstract ideas, or nominal essences :

First, Simple ideas, which are *ετυπα*, or *copies*; but yet certainly *adequate*. Because being intended to express nothing but the power in things to produce in the mind such a sensation, that sensation, when it is produced, cannot but be the effect of that power. So the paper I write on, having the power, in the light, (I speak according to the common notion of light), to produce in me the sensation which I call *white*, it cannot but be the effect of such a power, in something without the mind, since the mind has not the power to produce any such idea in itself, and being made for nothing else but the effect of such a power; that simple idea is real and adequate: the sensation of white, in my mind, being the effect of that power, which is in the paper to produce it, is perfectly adequate to that power; or else that power would produce a different idea.

§ 13. *Secondly*, The complex ideas of substances are *ετυπες*, *copies* too; but not perfect ones, not *adequate*: which is very evident to the mind, in that it plainly perceives, that whatever collection of simple ideas it makes of any substance that exists, it cannot be sure that it exactly answers all that are in that substance; since not

having tried all the operations of all other substances upon it, and found all the alterations it would receive from, or cause in other substances, it cannot have an exact adequate collection of all its active and passive capacities; and so not have an adequate complex idea of the powers of any substance existing, and its relations, which is that sort of complex idea of substances we have. And, after all, if we would have, and actually had, in our complex idea, an exact collection of all the secondary qualities, or powers of any substance, we should not yet thereby have an idea of the essence of that thing. For since the powers or qualities, that are observable by us, are not the real essence of that substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any collection whatsoever of these qualities cannot be the real essence of that thing. Whereby it is plain, that our ideas of substances are not adequate; are not what the mind intends them to be. Besides, a man has no idea of substance in general, nor knows what substance is in itself.

§ 14. *Thirdly*, Complex ideas of modes and relations, are originals, and archetypes; are not copies, nor made after the pattern of any real existence, to which the mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to answer. These being such collections of simple ideas, that the mind itself puts together, and such collections, that each of them contains in it precisely all that the mind intends that it should, they are archetypes and essences of modes that may exist; and so are designed only for, and belong only to such modes, as, when they do exist, have an exact conformity with those complex ideas. The ideas therefore of modes and relations cannot but be adequate.

C H A P. XXXII.

Of TRUE and FALSE IDEAS.

§ 1. *Truth and falsehood properly belong to propositions.* § 2. *Metaphysical truth contains a tacit proposition.* § 3. *No idea as an appearance in the mind, true or false.* § 4. *Ideas, referred to any thing, may be true or false.* § 5. *Other mens ideas, real existence, and supposed real essences, are what men usually refer their ideas to.* § 6—8. *The cause of such references.* § 9. *Simple ideas may be false, in reference to others of the same name, but are least liable to be so.* § 10. *Ideas of mixed modes most liable to be false in this sense.* § 11. *Or at least to be thought false.* § 12. *And why.* § 13. *As referred to real existences, none of our ideas can be false, but those of substances.* § 14—15. *First, simple ideas, in this sense, not false, and why.* § 16. *Though one man's ideas of blue should be different from another's.* § 17. *Secondly, Modes not false.* § 18. *Thirdly, Ideas of substances, when false.* § 19. *Truth or falsehood always supposes affirmation or negation.* § 20. *Ideas, in themselves, neither true nor false.* § 21. *But are false; First, When judged agreeable to another man's idea, without being so.* § 22. *Secondly, When judged to agree to real existence, when they do not.* § 23. *Thirdly, When judged adequate, without being so.* § 24. *Fourthly, When judged to represent the real essence.* § 25. *Ideas, when false.* § 26. *More properly to be called right or wrong.*

§ 1. **T**HOUGH truth and falsehood belong, in propriety of speech, only to propositions; yet ideas are oftentimes termed *true* or *false*, (as what words are there that are not used with great latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations?) Though, I think, that when ideas themselves are termed true or false, there is still some secret or tacit proposition, which is the foundation of that denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the particular occasions, wherein they come to be called true or false. In all which, we shall find some kind of affirmation or negation, which is the reason of that denomination. For our ideas, being nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be true or false, no more than a single name of any thing can be said to be true or false.

§ 2. Indeed, both ideas and words may be said to be true in a metaphysical sense of the word *truth*, as all other things that any way exist, are said to be true; *i. e.* really to be such as they exist. Though in things called *true*, even in that sense, there is, perhaps, a secret reference to our ideas, looked upon as the standards of that truth, which amounts to a mental proposition, though it be usually not taken notice of.

§ 3. But it is not in that metaphysical sense of truth which we inquire here, when we examine, whether our ideas are capable of being true or false; but in the more ordinary acceptation of those words: and so I say, that the ideas in our minds, being only so many perceptions, or appearances there, none of them are false. The idea of a centaur having no more falsehood in it,

when it appears in our minds, than the name centaur has falsehood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths, or written on paper. For truth or falsehood, lying always in some affirmation or negation, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any of them, of being false, till the mind passes some judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them.

§ 4. Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to any thing extraneous to them, they are then capable to be called true or false. Because the mind, in such a reference, makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing: which supposition, as it happens to be true or false; so the ideas themselves come to be denominated. The most usual cases wherein this happens, are these following:

§ 5. *First*, When the mind supposes any idea it has, conformable to that in other mens minds, called by the same common name; *v. g.* when the mind intends or judges its ideas of *justice, temperance, religion*, to be the same with what other men give those names to.

Secondly, When the mind supposes any idea it has in itself, to be conformable to some real existence. Thus the two ideas, of a man, and a centaur, supposed to be the ideas of real substances, are the one true, and the other false; the one having a conformity to what has really existed, the other not.

Thirdly, When the mind refers any of its ideas to that real constitution, and essence of any thing, whereon all its properties depend: and thus the greatest part, if not all our ideas of substances, are false.

§ 6. These suppositions the mind is very apt

tacitly to make concerning its own ideas. But yet if we will examine it, we shall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its abstract complex ideas. For the natural tendency of the mind being towards knowledge; and finding, that, if it should proceed by, and dwell upon only particular things, its progress would be very slow, and its work endless: therefore to shorten its way to knowledge, and make each perception more comprehensive, the first thing it does, as the foundation of the easier enlarging its knowledge, either by contemplation of the things themselves that it would know, or conference with others about them, is to bind them into bundles, and rank them so into sorts, that what knowledge it gets of any of them, it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort; and so advance by larger steps in that, which is its great business, knowledge. This, as I have elsewhere shewn, is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive ideas, with names annexed to them, into *genera* and *species*, *i. e.* into kinds and sorts.

§ 7. If therefore we will warily attend to the motions of the mind, and observe what course it usually takes in its way to knowledge, we shall, I think, find, that the mind having got an idea, which it thinks it may have use of, either in contemplation or discourse, the first thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a name to it; and so lay it up in its storehouse, the memory, as containing the essence of a sort of things, of which that name is always to be the mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that when any one sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not, he presently asks what it is, meaning by that inquiry, nothing but the name. As if the name carried

with it the knowledge of the species, or the essence of it, whereof it is indeed used as the mark, and is generally supposed annexed to it.

§ 8. But this abstract idea being something in the mind between the thing that exists, and the name that is given to it; it is in our ideas that both the rightness of our knowledge, and the propriety or intelligibleness of our speaking, consists. And hence it is, that men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract ideas they have in their minds, are such as agree to the things existing without them, to which they are referred, and are the same also, to which the names they give them, do, by the use and propriety of that language, belong. For without this double conformity of their ideas, they find they should both think amiss of things in themselves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

§ 9. *First* then, I say, that when the truth of our ideas is judged of by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have, and commonly signify by the same name, they may be any of them false. But yet simple ideas are least of all liable to be so mistaken: because a man, by his senses, and every day's observation, may easily satisfy himself what the simple ideas are, which their several names that are in common use stand for, they being but few in number, and such, as if he doubts or mistakes in, he may easily rectify by the objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is seldom that any one mistakes in his names of simple ideas; or applies the name *red*, to the idea of *green*; or the name *sweet*, to the idea *bitter*: much less are men apt to confound the names of ideas, belonging to different senses; and call a *colour*, by the name of a *taste*, &c. Whereby it

is evident, that the simple ideas they call by any name, are commonly the same that others have and mean, when they use the same names.

§ 10. Complex ideas are much more liable to be false in this respect; and the complex ideas of mixed modes, much more than those of substances: because in substances, (especially those which the common and unborrowed names of any language are applied to), some remarkable sensible qualities, serving ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another, easily preserve those, who take any care in the use of their words, from applying them to sorts of substances to which they do not at all belong. But in mixed modes, we are much more uncertain, it being not so easy to determine of several actions, whether they are to be called *justice*, or *cruelty*; *liberality*, or *prodigality*. And so in referring our ideas to those of other men, called by the same names, ours may be false; and the idea in our minds, which we express by the word *justice*, may perhaps be that which ought to have another name.

§ 11. But whether or no our ideas of mixed modes are more liable than any sort, to be different from those of other men, which are marked by the same names; this, at least, is certain, that this sort of falsehood is much more familiarly attributed to our ideas of mixed modes, than to any other. When a man is thought to have a false idea of *justice*, or *gratitude*, or *glory*, it is for no other reason, but that his agrees not with the ideas which each of those names are the signs of in other men.

§ 12. The reason whereof seems to me to be this, that the abstract ideas of mixed modes, being mens voluntary combinations of such a precise

collection of simple ideas; and so the essence of each species being made by men alone, whereof we have no other sensible standard existing anywhere, but the name itself, or the definition of that name; we have nothing else to refer these our ideas of mixed modes to, as a standard, to which we would conform them, but the ideas of those, who are thought to use those names in their most proper significations; and so, as our ideas conform, or differ from them, they pass for true or false. And thus much concerning the truth and falsehood of our ideas, in reference to their names.

§ 13. *Secondly*, As to the truth and falsehood of our ideas, in reference to the real existence of things, when that is made the standard of their truth, none of them can be termed false, but only our complex ideas of substances.

§ 14. *First*, Our simple ideas being barely such perceptions as GOD has fitted us to receive, and given power to external objects to produce in us by established laws, and ways, suitable to his wisdom and goodness, though incomprehensible to us, their truth consists in nothing else but in such appearances as are produced in us, and must be suitable to those powers he has placed in external objects, or else they could not be produced in us; and thus answering those powers, they are what they should be, true ideas. Nor do they become liable to any imputation of falsehood, if the mind (as in most men I believe it does) judges these ideas to be in the things themselves. For GOD, in his wisdom, having set them as marks of distinction in things, whereby we may be able to discern one thing from another, and so chuse any of them for our uses, as we have occasion, it

alters not the nature of our simple idea, whether we think, that the idea of *blue* be in the violet itself, or in our mind only; and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts, reflecting the particles of light, after a certain manner, to be in the violet itself. For that texture in the objects, by a regular and constant operation, producing the same idea of blue in us, it serves us to distinguish, by our eyes, that from any other thing, whether that distinguishing mark, as it is really in the violet, be only a peculiar texture of parts, or else that very colour, the idea whereof, which is in us, is the exact resemblance. And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated *blue*, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that causes in us that idea: since the name *blue* notes properly nothing but that mark of distinction that is in a violet, discernible only by our eyes, whatever it consists in, that being beyond our capacities distinctly to know, and perhaps would be of less use to us, if we had faculties to discern it.

§ 15. Neither would it carry any imputation of falsehood to our simple ideas, if by the different structure of our organs, it were so ordered, that the same object should produce in several mens minds different ideas at the same time; *v. g.* if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes, were the same that a marigold produced in another man's, and *vice versa*. For since this could never be known; because one man's mind could not pass into another man's body, to perceive what appearances were produced by those organs; neither the ideas hereby, nor the names, would be at all confounded, or any falsehood be in either. For all things that had the

texture of a violet, producing constantly the idea that he called *blue*; and those which had the texture of a marigold, producing constantly the idea which he as constantly called *yellow*, whatever those appearances were in his mind, he would be able as regularly to distinguish things for his use by those appearances, and understand and signify those distinctions, marked by the names *blue* and *yellow*, as if the appearances, or ideas in his mind, received from those two flowers, were exactly the same with the ideas in other mens minds: I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible ideas produced by any object in different mens minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which opinion, I think, there might be many reasons offered: but that being besides my present business, I shall not trouble my reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life; and so we need not trouble ourselves to examine it.

§ 16. From what has been said concerning our simple ideas, I think it evident, that our simple ideas can none of them be false, in respect of things existing without us. For the truth of these appearances, or perceptions in our minds, consisting, as has been said, only in their being answerable to the powers in external objects, to produce by our senses such appearances in us, and each of them being in the mind, such as it is, suitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it represents, it cannot upon that account, or as referred to such a pattern, be false. *Blue* and *yellow*, *bitter* or *sweet*, can never be false ideas, these perceptions in the mind are just such as they are

there, answering the powers appointed by GOD to produce them; and so are truly what they are, and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be misapplied; but that, in this respect, makes no falsehood in the ideas; as if a man ignorant in the English tongue, should call *purple*, *scarlet*.

§ 17. Secondly, Neither can our complex ideas of modes, in reference to the essence of any thing really existing, be false. Because whatever complex idea I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern existing, and made by nature: it is not supposed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath; nor to represent any thing, but such a complication of ideas as it does. Thus when I have the idea of such an action of a man, who forbears to afford himself such meat, drink, and clothing, and other conveniencies of life, as his riches and estate will be sufficient to supply, and his station requires, I have no false idea but such an one as represents an action, either as I find or imagine it; and so is capable of neither truth nor falsehood. But when I give the name *frugality*, or *virtue*, to this action, then it may be called a *false idea*, if thereby it be supposed to agree with that idea, to which, in propriety of speech, the name of *frugality* doth belong; or to be conformable to that law, which is the standard of virtue and vice.

§ 18. *Thirdly*, Our complex ideas of substances, being all referred to patterns in things themselves, may be false. That they are all false, when looked upon as the representations of the unknown essences of things, is so evident, that there needs nothing to be said of it. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical supposition, and consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind, taken

from combinations of simple ideas existing together constantly in things, of which patterns they are the supposed copies: and in this reference to them, to the existence of things, they are false ideas. 1. When they put together simple ideas, which in the real existence of things have no union; as when to the shape and size that exist together in a horse, is joined, in the same complex idea, the power of barking like a dog: which three ideas, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this therefore may be called a false idea of an horse. 2. Ideas of substances are, in this respect, also false, when, from any collection of simple ideas that do always exist together, there is separated, by a direct negation, any other simple idea which is constantly joined with them. Thus, if to extension, solidity, fusibility, the peculiar weightiness, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedness than is in lead or copper, he may be said to have a false complex idea, as well as when he joins to those other simple ones, the idea of perfect absolute fixedness. For either way, the complex idea of *gold*, being made up of such simple ones as have no union in nature, may be termed false. But if he leave out of this his complex idea, that of fixedness quite, without either actually joining to, or separating of it from the rest in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea, rather than a false one; since though it contains not all the simple ideas that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exist together.

§ 19. Though, in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking, I have shewed in what sense,

and upon what ground our ideas may be sometimes called *true* or *false*; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter in all cases, where any idea is called *true* or *false*, it is from some judgment that the mind makes, or is supposed to make, that is true or false. For truth and falsehood, being never without some affirmation or negation, express or tacit, it is not to be found but where signs are joined and separated, according to the agreement or disagreement of the things they stand for. The signs we chiefly use, are either ideas, or words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal propositions. Truth lies in so joining or separating these representatives, as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or disagree; and falsehood in the contrary, as shall be more fully shewn hereafter.

§ 20. Any idea then which we have in our minds, whether conformable or not to the existence of things, or to any ideas in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this alone be called false. For these representations, if they have nothing in them but what is really existing in things without, cannot be thought false, being exact representations of something: nor yet if they have any thing in them, differing from the reality of things, can they properly be said to be false representations, or ideas of things they do not represent. But the mistake and falsehood is,

§ 21. *First*, When the mind having any idea, it judges and concludes it the same that is in other mens minds, signified by the same name; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received signification or definition of that word, when indeed it is not: which is the most usual mistake in mixed modes, though other ideas also are liable to it.

§ 22. *Secondly*, When it having a complex idea made up of such a collection of simple ones, as nature never puts together, it judges it to agree to a species of creatures really existing; as when it joins the weight of tin to the colour, fusibility, and fixedness of gold.

§ 23. *Thirdly*, When in its complex idea it has united a certain number of simple ideas that do really exist together in some sort of creatures, but has also left out others as much inseparable, it judges this to be a perfect complete idea of a sort of things, which really it is not; *v. g.* having joined the ideas of substance, yellow, malleable, most heavy, and fusible, it takes that complex idea to be the complete idea of gold, when yet its peculiar fixedness and solubility in *aqua regia*, are as inseparable from those other ideas or qualities of that body, as they are one from another.

§ 24. *Fourthly*, The mistake is yet greater, when I judge, that this complex idea contains in it the real essence of any body existing; when at least it contains but some few of those properties which flow from its real essence and constitution. I say, only some few of those properties; for those properties consisting mostly in the active and passive powers it has in reference to other things, all that are vulgarly known of any one body, and of which the complex idea of that kind of things is usually made, are but a very few, in comparison of what a man, that has several ways tried and examined it, knows of that sort of things; and all that the most expert man knows, are but few, in comparison of what are really in that body, and depend on its internal or essential constitution. The essence of a triangle lies in a very little compass, consists in a very few ideas; three

lines, including a space, make up that essence: but the properties that flow from this essence are more than can be easily known or enumerated. So I imagine it is in substances: their real essences lie in a little compass; though the properties flowing from that internal constitution are endless.

§ 25. To conclude; a man having no notion of any thing without him, but by the idea he has of it in his mind, (which idea he has a power to call by what name he pleases), he may indeed make an idea neither answering the reason of things, nor agreeing to the ideas commonly signified by other people's words; but cannot make a wrong or false idea of a thing which is no otherwise known to him, but by the idea he has of it, *v. g.* when I frame an idea of the legs, arms, and body of a man, and join to this a horse's head and neck, I do not make a false idea of any thing; because it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a *man*, or *Tartar*, and imagine it either to represent some real being without me, or to be the same idea that others call by the same name; in either of these cases, I may err. And upon this account it is that it comes to be termed a *false idea*; though indeed the falsehood lies not in the idea, but in that tacit mental proposition, wherein a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having framed such an idea in my mind, without thinking either that existence, or the name *man*, or *Tartar*, belongs to it, I will call it *man*, or *Tartar*, I may be justly thought fantastical in the naming; but not erroneous in my judgment, nor the idea any way false.

§ 26. Upon the whole matter, I think, that our ideas, as they are considered by the mind, ei-

ther in reference to the proper signification of their names, or in reference to the reality of things, may very fitly be called *right* or *wrong ideas*, according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them *true* or *false*, it is fit he use a liberty, which every one has, to call things by those names he thinks best ; though, in propriety of speech, *truth* or *falsehood*, will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them some mental proposition. The ideas that are in a man's mind, simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless complex ones, wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other ideas are in themselves right ; and the knowledge about them, right and true knowledge : but when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their patterns and archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such archetypes.

C H A P. XXXIII.

Of the ASSOCIATION of IDEAS.

- § 1. *Something unreasonable in most men.* § 2. *Not wholly from self-love.* § 3. *Nor from education.* § 4. *A degree of madness.* § 5. *From a wrong connection of ideas.* § 6. *This connection, how made.* § 7, 8. *Some antipathies an effect of it.* § 9. *A great cause of errors.* § 10—12. *Instances.* § 13. *Why time cures some disorders in the mind, which reason cannot.* § 14—16. *Farther instances of the effect of the association of ideas.* § 17. *Its influence on intellectual habits.* § 18. *Observable in different sects.* § 19. *Conclusion.*

§ 1. **T**HERE is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant, in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of other men. The least flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy in another, and will, by the authority of reason, forwardly condemn, though he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.

§ 2. This proceeds not wholly from self-love, though that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair minds, and not given up to the over-weening of self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in many cases one with amazement hears the arguments, and is astonished at the obstinacy of a worthy

man, who yields not to the evidence of reason, though laid before him as clear as day-light.

§ 3. This sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice, and for the most part truly enough, though that reaches not the bottom of the disease, nor shews distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assigned for the cause, and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself: but yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther, who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to shew whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds, and wherein it consists.

§ 4. I shall be pardoned for calling it by so harsh a name as *madness*, when it is considered, that opposition to reason deserves that name, and is really madness; and there is scarce a man so free from it, but that if he should always, on all occasions, argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for bedlam, than civil conversation. I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly passion, but in the steady calm course of his life. That which will yet more apologize for this harsh name, and ungrateful imputation on the greatest part of mankind, is, that inquiring a little by-the-bye into the nature of madness †, I found it to spring from the very same root, and to depend on the very same cause we are here speaking of. This consideration of the thing itself, at a time when I thought not the least on the subject which I am now treating of, suggested it to me. And if this

† Book ii. chap. 11. § 13.

be a weakness to which all men are so liable ; if this be a taint which so universally infects mankind, the greater care should be taken to lay it open under its due name, thereby to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure.

§ 5. Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connection one with another : it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another connection of ideas wholly owing to chance or custom ; ideas, that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some mens minds, that it is very hard to separate them ; they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding, but its associate appears with it ; and if they are more than two which are thus united, the whole gang, always inseparable, shew themselves together.

§ 6. This strong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance : and hence it comes in different men to be very different, according to their different inclinations, education, interests, &c. Custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body ; all which seem to be but trains of motion in the animal spirits, which once set a-going, continue in the same steps they have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and, as it were, natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus ideas seem to be produced in our minds ; or if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another

in an habitual train, when once they are put into that tract, as well as it does to explain such motions of the body. A musician used to any tune, will find, that let it but once begin in his head, the ideas of the several notes of it will follow one another orderly in his understanding, without any care or attention, as regularly as his fingers move orderly over the keys of the organ to play out the tune he has begun, though his inattentive thoughts be elsewhere a-wandering. Whether the natural cause of these ideas, as well as of that regular dancing of his fingers, be the motion of his animal spirits, I will not determine, how probable soever, by this instance, it appears to be so: but this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual habits, and of the tying together of ideas.

§ 7. That there are such associations of them made by custom in the minds of most men, I think no-body will question, who has well considered himself or others; and to this, perhaps, might be justly attributed most of the sympathies and antipathies observable in men, which work as strongly, and produce as regular effects as if they were natural, and are therefore called so, though they at first had no other original but the accidental connection of two ideas, which either the strength of the first impression, or future indulgence so united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that man's mind, as if they were but one idea. I say, most of the antipathies, I do not say all, for some of them are truly natural, depend upon our original constitution, and are born with us; but a great part of those which are counted natural, would have been known to be from unheeded, though, perhaps, early impressions, or wanton fancies at first, which

would have been acknowledged the original of them, if they had been warily observed. A grown person surfeiting with honey, no sooner hears the name of it, but his fancy immediately carries sickness and qualms to his stomach, and he cannot bear the very idea of it; other ideas of dislike, and sickness, and vomiting, presently accompany it, and he is disturbed; but he knows from whence to date this weakness, and can tell how he got this indisposition: had this happened to him by an over-dose of honey, when a child, all the same effects would have followed; but the cause would have been mistaken, and the antipathy counted natural.

§ 8. I mention this not out of any great necessity there is, in this present argument, to distinguish nicely between natural and acquired antipathies, but I take notice of it for another purpose, *viz.* that those who have children, or the charge of their education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue connection of ideas in the minds of young people. This is the time most susceptible of lasting impressions; and though those relating to the health of the body, are by discreet people minded and fenced against; yet I am apt to doubt, that those which relate more peculiarly to the mind, and terminate in the understanding or passions, have been much less heeded than the thing deserves; nay, those relating purely to the understanding, have, as I suspect, been by most men wholly overlooked.

§ 9. This wrong connection in our minds of ideas in themselves loose and independent one of another, has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions, as well

moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after.

§ 10. The ideas of *goblins* and *sprights*, have really no more to do with darkness than light; yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives; but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other.

§ 11. A man receives a sensible injury from another, thinks on the man and that action over and over, and by ruminating on them strongly, or much in his mind, so cements those two ideas together, that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the man, but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it, so that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as much an aversion for the one as the other. Thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and almost innocent occasions, and quarrels propagated and continued in the world.

§ 12. A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place; he saw his friend die in such a room: though these have, in nature, nothing to do one with another, yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it; he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

§ 13. When this combination is settled, and while it lasts, it is not in the power of reason to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it. Ideas in our minds, when they are there, will operate

according to their natures and circumstances; and here we see the cause why time cures certain affections, which reason, though in the right, and allowed to be so, has not power over, nor is able against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other cases. The death of a child, that was the daily delight of his mother's eyes, and joy of her soul, rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life, and gives her all the torment imaginable: use the consolations of reason in this case, and you were as good preach ease to one on the rack, and hope to allay, by rational discourses, the pain of his joints tearing asunder: till time has, by disuse, separated the sense of that enjoyment and its loss, from the idea of the child returning to her memory, all representations, though never so reasonable, are in vain; and therefore some, in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved, spend their lives in mourning, and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves.

§ 14. A friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and offensive operation. The gentleman who was thus recovered, with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgement, owned the cure all his life after, as the greatest obligation he could have received; but whatever gratitude and reason suggested to him, he could never bear the sight of the operator: that image brought back with it the idea of that agony which he suffered from his hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

§ 15. Many children, imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for, so join those ideas together, that a book becomes their aversion, and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives

after; and thus reading becomes a torment to them, which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives. There are rooms convenient enough, that some men cannot study in, and fashions of vessels, which, though never so clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that by reason of some accidental ideas which are annexed to them, and make them offensive; and who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance, or in the company of some certain person, not otherwise superior to him, but because having once, on some occasion, got the ascendant, the idea of authority and distance goes along with that of the person? and he that has been thus subjected, is not able to separate them.

§ 16. Instances of this kind are so plentiful every-where, that if I add one more, it is only for the pleasant oddness of it. It is of a young gentleman, who having learned to dance, and that to great perfection, there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learned. The idea of this remarkable piece of household-stuff had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances, that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilst that trunk was there, nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that, or some such other trunk, had its due position in the room. If this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances, a little beyond precise nature; I answer for myself, that I had it some years since from a very sober and worthy man, upon his own knowledge, as I report it; and I dare say, there are very few inquisitive persons, who read this, who have not met with accounts, if

not examples, of this nature, that may parallel, or at least justify this.

§ 17. Intellectual habits and defects, this way contracted, are not less frequent and powerful, though less observed. Let the ideas of being and matter be strongly joined either by education or much thought, whilst these are still combined in the mind, what notions, what reasonings, will there be about separate spirits? Let custom, from the very childhood, have joined figure and shape to the idea of GOD, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity?

Let the idea of *infallibility* be inseparably joined to any person, and these two constantly together possess the mind, and then one body, in two places at once, shall unexamined be swallowed for a certain truth, by an implicit faith, whenever that imagined infallible person dictates and demands assent, without inquiry.

§ 18. Some such wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to establish the irreconcilable opposition between different sects of philosophy and religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain reason. Interest, though it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, as that every one of them to a man should knowingly maintain falsehood: some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to, *i. e.* to pursue truth sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their understandings, and makes them not see the falsehood of what they embrace for real truth. That which thus captivates their reasons, and leads men of sincerity blindfold

from common sense, will, when examined, be found to be what we are speaking of : some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are by education, custom, and the constant din of their party, so coupled in their minds, that they always appear there together, and they can no more separate them in their thoughts, than if they were but one idea, and they operate as if they were so. This gives sense to jargon, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost said, of all the errors in the world ; or if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most dangerous one, since, so far as it obtains, it hinders men from seeing and examining. When two things, in themselves disjoined, appear to the sight constantly united ; if the eye sees these things riveted, which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the mistakes that follow in two ideas, that they have been accustomed so to join in their minds, as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves ? This, whilst they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for error ; and the confusion of two different ideas, which a customary connection of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their heads with false views, and their reasonings with false consequences.

§ 19. Having thus given an account of the original, sorts, and extent of our ideas, with several other considerations, about these (I know not whether I may say) instruments, or materials, of our knowledge ; the method I at first proposed to

myself, would now require, that I should immediately proceed to shew, what *use* the understanding makes of them, and what *knowledge* we have by them. This was that which, in the first general view I had of this subject, was all that I thought I should have to do : but, upon a nearer approach, I find, that there is so close a connection between IDEAS and WORDS; and our abstract ideas, and general words, have so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge, which all consists in propositions, without considering, first, the nature, use, and signification of language; which therefore must be the business of the next book.

B O O K III.

O F W O R D S.

C H A P I.

Of WORDS, or LANGUAGE in general.

§ 1. *Man fitted to form articulate sounds.* § 2. *To make them signs of ideas.* § 3, 4. *To make general signs.* § 5. *Words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible ideas.* § 6. *Distribution.*

§ 1. **G**OD having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument, and common tie of society. Man therefore had by nature his organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame articulate sounds, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language; for parrots, and several other birds, will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of language.

§ 2. Besides articulate sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereby they might be made

known to others, and the thoughts of mens minds be conveyed from one to another.

§ 3. But neither was this sufficient to make words so useful as they ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of language, that sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless those signs can be so made use of, as to comprehend several particular things: for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by. To remedy this inconvenience, language had yet a farther improvement in the use of general terms, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences: which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were made signs of. Those names becoming general, which are made to stand for general ideas, and those remaining particular, where the ideas they are used for are particular.

§ 4. Besides these names which stand for ideas, there be other words which men make use of, not to signify any idea, but the want or absence of some ideas simple or complex, or all ideas together; such as are *nihil* in Latin, and in English, *ignorance* and *barrenness*. All which negative or privative words, cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify no ideas; for then they would be perfectly insignificant sounds: but they relate to positive ideas, and signify their absence.

§ 5. It may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark, how great a dependence our words have on common sensible ideas; and how those, which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from

thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses; v. g. to *imagine*, *apprehend*, *comprehend*, *adhere*, *conceive*, *instil*, *disgust*, *disturbance*, *tranquillity*, &c. are all words taken from the operations of sensible things, and applied to certain modes of thinking. *Spirit*, in its primary signification, is breath; *angel*, a messenger; and I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their sources; we should find, in all languages, the names, which stand for things that fall not under our senses, to have had their first rise from sensible ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess, what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds who were the first beginners of languages; and how nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge: whilst, to give names, that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves, or any other ideas that came not under their senses, they were fain to borrow words from ordinary known ideas of sensation, by that means to make others the more easily to conceive those operations they experimented in themselves, which made no outward sensible appearances; and then when they had got known and agreed names, to signify those internal operations of their own minds, they were sufficiently furnished to make known by words all their other ideas; since they could consist of nothing, but either of outward sensible perceptions, or of the inward operations of their minds about them; we having, as has been proved, no ideas at all, but what originally come either from sensible objects without,

or what we feel within ourselves, from the inward workings of our own spirits, of which we are conscious to ourselves within.

§ 6. But to understand better the use and force of language, as subservient to instruction and knowledge, it will be convenient to consider,

First, To what it is that names, in the use of language, are immediately applied.

Secondly, Since all (except proper) names are general, and so stand not particularly for this or that single thing, but for sorts and ranks of things, it will be necessary to consider, in the next place, what the sorts and kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin names, what the species and genera of things are; wherein they consist; and how they come to be made. These being, as they ought, well looked into, we shall the better come to find the right use of words; the natural advantages and defects of language; and the remedies that ought to be used, to avoid the inconveniencies of obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of words, without which it is impossible to discourse with any clearness or order, concerning knowledge: which being conversant about propositions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greater connection with words, than perhaps is suspected.

These considerations, therefore, shall be the matter of the following chapters.

C H A P. II.

Of the SIGNIFICATION of WORDS.

§ 1. *Words are sensible signs necessary for communication.* § 2, 3. *Words are the sensible signs of his ideas who uses them.* § 4. *Words often secretly referred; First, To the ideas in other mens minds.* § 5. *Secondly, To the reality of things.* § 6. *Words, by use, readily excite ideas.* § 7. *Words often used without signification.* § 8. *Their signification perfectly arbitrary.*

§ 1. **M**AN, though he has great variety of thoughts, and such, from which others, as well as himself, might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his own breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made appear. The comfort and advantage of society, not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereby those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose, nothing was so fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which, with so much ease and variety, he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made use of by men as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connection that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but

by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. The use then of words is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate signification.

§ 2. The use men have of these marks, being either to record their own thoughts for the assistance of their own memory, or, as it were, to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others; words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever, or carelessly, those ideas are collected from the things which they are supposed to represent. When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the marks of, are the ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them, as marks, immediately to any thing else, but the ideas that he himself hath. For this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs, and not signs of his ideas at the same time; and so in effect to have no signification at all. Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification. A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another whereof he has none in his own. Till he has some ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them; for

thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothing. But when he represents to himself other mens ideas by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same names that other men do, it is still to his own ideas ; to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he has not.

§ 3. This is so necessary in the use of language, that in this respect the knowing and the ignorant, the learned and unlearned, use the words they speak, with any meaning, all alike. They, in every man's mouth, stand for the ideas he has, and which he would express by them. A child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called gold, but the bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to his own idea of that colour, and nothing else ; and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock's tail, gold. Another, that hath better observed, adds to shining yellow, great weight ; and then the sound gold, when he uses it, stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow and very weighty substance. Another adds to these qualities, fusibility : and then the word gold, to him, signifies a body, bright, yellow, fusible, and very heavy. Another adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word gold, when they have occasion to express the idea which they have applied it to : but it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own idea ; nor can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not.

§ 4. But though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker ; yet they, in their thoughts, give them a secret reference to two other things.

First, They suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men, with whom they communicate: for else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one idea, were such as by the hearer were applied to another; which is to speak two languages. But in this, men stand not usually to examine, whether the idea they, and those they discourse with, have in their minds, be the same: but think it enough, that they use the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they suppose, that the idea they make it a sign of, is precisely the same to which the understanding men of that country apply that name.

§ 5. *Secondly*, Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imaginations, but of things as really they are; therefore they often suppose their words to stand also for the reality of things. But this relating more particularly to substances, and their names, as perhaps the former does to simple ideas and modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large, when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes, and substances in particular: tho' give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting the use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification, whenever we make them stand for any thing but those ideas we have in our own minds.

§ 6. Concerning words also, it is farther to be considered: *First*, That they being immediately the signs of mens ideas; and by that means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, and express to one another those thoughts

and imaginations they have within their own breasts, there comes by constant use to be such a connection between certain sounds, and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas, as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities, and in all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us.

§ 7. *Secondly*, That though the proper and immediate signification of words, are ideas in the mind of the speaker; yet because, by familiar use from our cradles, we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our memories; but yet are not always careful to examine, or settle their significations perfectly, it often happens that men, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set their thoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of them learned before the ideas are known for which they stand: therefore some, not only children, but men, speak several words, no otherwise than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those sounds. But so far as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant connection between the sound and the idea, and a designation, that the one stand for the other: without which application of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant noise.

§ 8. Words, by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in men certain ideas, so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose a natural connection between them. But that they signify only mens peculiar ideas, and that

by a perfect arbitrary imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same language) the same ideas we take them to be the signs of : and every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has, when they use the same words that he does. And therefore the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word : which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language of his subjects. It is true, common use, by a tacit consent, appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak properly : and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer, which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequence of any man's using of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them, this is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else.

C H A P. III.

Of GENERAL TERMS.

§ 1. *The greatest part of words general.* § 2. *For every particular thing to have a name, is impossible.* § 3, 4. *And useless.* § 5. *What things have proper names.* § 6—8. *How general words are made.* § 9. *General names are nothing but abstract ideas.* § 10. *Why the genius is ordinarily made use of in definitions.* § 11. *General and universal are creatures of the understanding.* § 12. *Abstract ideas are the essences of the genera and species.* § 13. *They are the workmanship of the understanding, but have their foundation in the similitude of things.* § 14. *Each distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence.* § 15. *Real and nominal essence.* § 16. *Constant connection between the name and nominal essence.* § 17. *Supposition that species are distinguished by their real essences, useless.* § 18. *Real and nominal essence, the same in simple ideas and modes, different in substances.* § 19. *Essences, ingenerable and incorruptible.* § 20. *Recapitulation.*

§ 1. **A**L I. things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, should be so too, I mean in their signification: but yet we find the quite contrary. The far greatest part of words, that make all languages, are general terms: which has not been the

effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and necessity.

§ 2. *First*, It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name. For the signification and use of words, depending on that connection which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the application of names to things, that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with: every bird and beast men saw, every tree and plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army by his proper name; we may easily find a reason, why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf of plants; or grain of sand that came in their way, by a peculiar name.

§ 3. *Secondly*, If it were possible, it would yet be useless; because it would not serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood: which is then only done, when by use or consent, the sound I make by the organs of speech, excites in another man's mind, who hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I

alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be significant, or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very particular things, which had fallen under my notice.

§ 4. *Thirdly*, But yet granting this also feasible; which I think is not, yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge: which, though founded in particular things, enlarges itself by general views; to which things reduced into sorts under general names, are properly subservient. These, with the names belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or use requires. And therefore in these, men have, for the most part, stopped; but yet not so, as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things, by appropriated names, where convenience demands it. And therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons, they make use of proper names; and their distinct individuals have distinct denominations.

§ 5. Besides persons, countries also, cities, rivers, mountains, and other the like distinctions of place, have usually found peculiar names, and that for the same reason; they being such as men have often an occasion to mark particularly, and, as it were, set before others in their discourses with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reason to mention particular horses, as often as we have to mention particular men, we should have proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other; and Bucephalus would be a word as much in use,

as Alexander. And therefore we see that amongst jockeys, horses have their proper names to be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants : because amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or that particular horse, when he is out of sight.

§ 6. The next thing to be considered is, how general words come to be made. For since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms, or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for ? Words become general, by being made the signs of general ideas : and ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one ; each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is, as we call it, of that sort.

§ 7. But to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be amiss to trace our notions, and names, from their beginning, and observe by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from our first infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of the persons children converse with, (to instance in them alone), are like the persons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse, and the mother, are well framed in their minds ; and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them, are confined to these individuals : and the names of *nurse* and *mamma*, the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time, and a larger acquaintance, has made

them observe, that there are a great many other things in the world, that in some other agreements of shape, and several other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and those persons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they find those many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name *man* for example. And thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§ 8. By the same way that they come by the general name and idea of man, they easily advance to more general names and notions. For observing, that several things that differ from their idea of man, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with man, by retaining only those qualities, and uniting them into one idea, they have again another and a more general idea; to which having given a name, they make a term of a more comprehensive extension: which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the shape, and some other properties signified by the name *man*, and retaining only a body, with life, sense, and spontaneous motion, comprehended under the name *animal*.

§ 9. That this is the way, whereby men first formed general ideas, and general names to them, I think, is so evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the considering of a man's self, or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge: and he that thinks general natures

or notions, are any thing else but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at first from particular existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his idea of *man* differ from that of *Peter* and *Paul*; or his idea of *horse* from that of *Bucephalus*, but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual; and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas of several particular existences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas, signified by the names *man* and *horse*, leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct complex idea, and giving the name *animal* to it, one has a more general term, that comprehends, with man, several other creatures. Leave out of the idea of *animal*, sense and spontaneous motion, and the remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of body, life and nourishment becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive term, *vivens*. And not to dwell longer upon this particular, so evident in itself, by the same way the mind proceeds to *body*, *substance*, and at last to *being*, *thing*, and such universal terms, which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever. To conclude, this whole mystery of *genera* and *species*, which make such a noise in the schools, and are, with justice, so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them. In all which, this is constant and invariable, that every more general term stands for such an idea, as is but a part of any of those contained under it.

§ 10. This may shew us the reason, why, in

the defining of words, which is nothing but declaring their significations, we make use of the *genus*, or next general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of necessity, but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas, which the next general word, or *genus*, stands for; or, perhaps, sometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But though defining by *genus* and *differentia*, (I crave leave to use these terms of art, though originally Latin, since they most properly suit those notions they are applied to); I say, though defining by the *genus* be the shortest way; yet, I think, it may be doubted, whether it be the best. This, I am sure, it is not the only, and so not absolutely necessary. For definition being nothing but making another understand by words, what idea the term defined stands for, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined: and if instead of such an enumeration, men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term, it has not been out of necessity, or for greater clearness; but for quickness and dispatch sake. For, I think, that to one who desired to know what idea the word *man* stood for; if it should be said, that man was a solid extended substance, having life, sense spontaneous motion, and the faculty of reasoning, I doubt not but the meaning of the term *man*, would be as well understood, and the idea it stands for, be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a *rational animal*; which by the several definitions of *animal*, *vivens*, and *corpus*, resolves itself into those enumerated ideas. I have, in explaining the term *man*, followed here the ordinary definition of the schools: which though,

perhaps, not the most exact, yet serves well enough to my present purpose. And one may, in this instance, see what gave occasion to the rule, that a definition must consist of *genus* and *differentia*: and it suffices to shew us the little necessity there is of such a rule, or advantage in the strict observing of it. For definitions, as has been said, being only the explaining of one word, by several others, so that the meaning or idea it stands for may be certainly known; languages are not always so made, according to the rules of logic, that every term can have its signification exactly and clearly expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary; or else those who have made this rule, have done ill that they have given us so few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions, more in the next chapter.

§ 11. To return to general words, it is plain, by what has been said, that *general* and *universal*, belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words are general, as has been said, when used for signs of general ideas; and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things: but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas, which, in their signification, are general. When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest, are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding, of signifying

or representing many particulars. For the signification they have, is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of man is added to them ¹.

¹ Against this the bishop of Worcester objects, and our author answers, as followeth *: *However, saith the bishop, the abstracted ideas are the work of the mind, as appears by an instance produced of the essence of the sun being in one single individual: in which case it is granted, that the idea may be so abstracted, that more suns might agree in it, and it is as much a sort, as if there were as many suns as there are stars. So that here we have a real essence subsisting in one individual, but capable of being multiplied into more, and the same essence remaining. But in this one sun there is a real essence, and not a mere nominal, or abstracted essence: but suppose there were more suns; would not each of them have the real essence of the sun? For what is it makes the second sun, but having the same real essence with the first? If it were but a nominal essence, then the second would have nothing but the name.*

This, as I understand it, replies Mr Locke, is to prove, that the abstract general essence of any sort of things, or things of the same denomination, *v. g.* of *man* or *marigoles*, hath a *real being* out of the understanding; which, I confess, I am not able to conceive. Your lordship's proof here brought out of my essay, concerning the sun, I humbly conceive will not reach it; because what is said there, does not at all concern the *real* but *nominal* essence, as is evident from hence, that the idea I speak of there, is a *complex idea*; but we have no *complex idea* of the internal constitution or real essence of the sun. Besides, I say expressly, that our distinguishing substances into species, by names, is not at all founded on their real essences. So that the sun being one of the substances, I cannot, in the

* In his first letter, p. 189, &c.

§ 12. The next thing therefore to be considered, is, what kind of signification it is, that general words have. For, as it is evident, that they do not signify barely one particular thing; for

place quoted by your lordship, be supposed to mean by *essence of the sun*, the real essence of the sun, unless I had so expressed. But all this argument will be at an end, when your lordship shall have explained what you mean by these words, *true sun*. In my sense of them, any thing will be a *true sun* to which the name *sun* may be truly and properly applied, and to that substance or thing, the name *sun* may be truly and properly applied, which has united in it that combination of sensible qualities, by which any thing else that is called *sun* is distinguished from other substances; *i. e.* by the *nominal essence*: and thus our sun is denominated and distinguished from a fixed star, not by a *real essence* that we do not know (for if we did, it is possible we should find the *real essence* or *constitution* of one of the fixed stars to be the same with that of our *sun*) but by a complex idea of sensible qualities co-existing, which, wherever they are found, *make a true sun*. And thus I crave leave to answer your lordship's question: *For what is it makes the second sun to be a true sun, but having the same real essence with the first? If it were but a nominal essence, then the second would have nothing but the name.*

I humbly conceive, if it had the *nominal essence*, it would have something besides *the name*, viz. that nominal essence which is sufficient to denominate it truly a *sun*, or to make it be a *true sun*, though we know nothing of that real essence whereon that nominal one depends; your lordship will then argue, that that *real essence* is in the *second sun*, and *makes the second sun*. I grant it, when the *second sun* comes to exist, so as to be perceived by us to have all the ideas contained in our complex idea, *i. e.* in our *no-*

then they would not be general terms, but proper names; so, on the other side, it is as evident, they do not signify a plurality; for *man* and *men* would then signify the same; and the distinction

minimal essence of a sun. For, should it be true, as is now believed by astronomers, that the real essence of the sun were in any of the fixed stars, yet such a star could not for that be by us called a *sun*, whilst it answers not our complex idea, or nominal essence of a *sun*. But how far that will prove, *that the essences of things, as they are knowable by us, have a reality in them distinct from that of abstract ideas in the mind, which are merely creatures of the mind, I do not see*; and we shall farther inquire, in considering your lordship's following words. *Therefore, say you, there must be a real essence in every individual of the same kind.* Yes, and I beg leave of your lordship to say, of a different kind too. *For that alone is it which makes it to be what it is.*

That every individual substance has a real, internal, individual constitution, *i. e.* a real essence, that makes it to be what it is, I grant. Upon this your lordship says, Peter, James, and John, are all true and real men. *Ans.* Without doubt, supposing them to be men, they are true and real men, *i. e.* supposing the names of that species belong to them. And so three Bobaques are all true and real Bobaques, supposing the name of that species of animals belongs to them.

For I beseech your lordship to consider, whether in your way of arguing, by naming them Peter, James, and John, names familiar to us, as appropriated to individuals of the species *man*, your lordship does not first suppose them men, and then very safely ask whether they be not *all true and real men*? But if I should ask your lordship, whether Wewcena, Cuckery, and Conshedra, were true and real men or no? your lordship would not be able to tell me, till I have pointed

of numbers, as the grammarians call them, would be superfluous and useless. That then which general words signify, is a sort of things; and each of them does that, by being a sign of an

out to your lordship the individuals called by those names, your lordship by examining whether they had in them those sensible qualities, which your lordship has combined into that complex idea, to which you give the specific name *man*, determined them all, or some of them to be of the species which you call *man*, and so to be *true and real man*; which, when your lordship has determined, it is plain you did it by that which is only the nominal essence, as not knowing the *real* one. But your lordship farther asks, *What is it makes Peter, James, and John, real men? Is it the attributing the general name to them? No certainly; but that the true and real essence of a man is in every one of them.*

If, when your lordship asks, *What makes them men?* your lordship used the word *making* in the proper sense for the efficient cause, and in that sense it were true, that the essence of a man, *i. e.* the specific essence of that species made a man; it would undoubtedly follow, that this specific essence had a reality beyond that of being only a general abstract idea in the mind. But when it is said, that it is *the true and real essence of a man in every one of them that makes Peter, James, and John, true and real men*, the true and real meaning of those words is no more but that the essence of that species, *i. e.* the properties answering the complex abstract idea, to which the specific name is given, being found in them, that makes them be properly and truly called men, or is the reason why they are called men. Your lordship adds, *And we must be as certain of this, as we are that we are men.*

How, I beseech your lordship, are we certain, that they are men, but only by our senses, finding those

abstract idea in the mind, to which idea, as things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that name; or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident,

properties in them which answer the abstract complex idea, which is in our minds of the specific idea, to which we have annexed the specific name *man*? This I take to be the true meaning of what your lordship says in the next words, *viz. they take their denomination of being men, from that common nature or essence which is in them*; and I am apt to think, these words will not hold true in any other sense.

Your lordship's fourth inference begins thus: *That the general idea is not made from the simple ideas by the mere act of the mind abstracting from circumstances, but from reason and consideration of the nature of things.*

I thought, my lord, that *reason and consideration* had been *acts of the mind, mere acts of the mind*, when any thing was done by them. Your lordship gives a reason for it, *viz. For when we see several individuals, that have the same powers and properties, we thence infer, that there must be something common to all, which makes them of one kind.*

I grant the inference to be true; but must beg leave to deny that this proves, that the general idea the name is annexed to, is not made by the mind. I have said, and it agrees with what your lordship here says*, that *the mind in making its complex ideas of substances, only follows nature, and puts no ideas together, which are not supposed to have an union in nature*; no-body joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of an horse; nor the colour of lead with the weight and fixedness of gold, to be the complex ideas of any real substances; unless he has a mind to fill his head

* Book iii. chap. 6. § 28, 29.

that the essences of the sorts, or, if the Latin word pleases better, *species* of things, are nothing else but these abstract ideas. For the having the essence of any species, being that which makes

with chimeras, and his discourses with unintelligible words. Men observing certain qualities always joined and existing together, therein copied nature, and of ideas so united, made their complex ones of substances, &c. Which is very little different from what your lordship here says, that it is from our observation of individuals, that we come to infer, *that there is something common to them all.* But I do not see how it will thence follow, that the general or specific idea is not made by the mere act of the mind. No, says your lordship, *There is something common to them all, which makes them of one kind; and if the difference of kinds be real, that which makes them all of one kind must not be a nominal, but real essence.*

This may be some objection to the name of *nominal essence*; but is, as I humbly conceive, none to the thing designed by it. There is an internal constitution of things, on which their properties depend. This your lordship and I are agreed of, and this we call the *real essence*. There are also certain complex ideas, or combinations of these properties in mens minds, to which they commonly annex specific names, or names of sorts or *kinds* of things. This, I believe, your lordship does not deny. These complex ideas, for want of a better name, I have called *nominal essence*; how properly I will not dispute. But if any one will help me to a better name for them. I am ready to receive it; till then, I must, to express myself, use this. Now, my lord, *body, life*, and the power of *reasoning*, being not the real essence of a man, as I believe your lordship will agree, will your lordship say, that they are not enough to make the thing wherein they are found, of the kind called *man*, and not of the

any thing to be of that species, and the conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to that name, the having the essence, and the having that conformi-

kind called *baboon*, because the difference of these kinds is real? If this be not real enough to make the thing of one kind, and not of another, I do not see how *animal rationale* can be enough really to distinguish a man from an horse; for that is but the nominal, not real essence of that kind, designed by the name *man*. And yet, I suppose, every one thing is *real* enough to make a *real* difference between that and other kinds. And if nothing will serve the turn, to MAKE things of one kind, and not of another, (which, as I have shewed, signifies no more but ranking of them under different specific names), but their real, unknown constitutions, which are the *real* essences we are speaking of, I fear it would be a long while before we should have really different kinds of substances, or distinct names for them, unless we could distinguish them by these differences, of which we have no distinct conceptions. For, I think, it would not be readily answered me, if I should demand, wherein lies the real difference in the internal constitution of a *stag* from that of a *buck*, which are each of them very well known to be of one kind, and not of the other; and no-body questions but that the kind whereof each of them is, are really different.

Your lordship farther says, *And this difference doth not depend upon the complex ideas of substances, whereby men arbitrarily join modes together in their minds*. I confess, my lord, I know not what to say to this, because I do not know what these complex ideas of substances are, whereby men arbitrarily join modes together in their minds. But I am apt to think there is a mistake in the matter, by the words that follow, which are these: *For let them mistake in their com-*

ty, must needs be the same thing: since to be of any species, and to have a right to the name of that species, is all one. As for example, to be a man, or of the species man, and to have right to

plication of ideas, either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them; and let their ideas be what they will, the real essence of a man, and an horse, and a tree, are just what they were.

The mistake I spoke of, I humbly suppose, is this, that things are here taken to be distinguished by their real essence; when, by the very way of speaking of them, it is clear, that they are already distinguished by their nominal essences, and are so taken to be. For what, I beseech your lordship, does your lordship mean, when you say, *the real essence of a man, and an horse, and a tree*, but that there are such kinds already set out by the signification of these names, *man, horse, tree*? And what, I beseech your lordship, is the signification of each of these specific names, but the complex idea it stands for? And that complex idea is the nominal essence, and nothing else. So that, taking *man*, as your lordship does here, to stand for a kind or sort of individuals, all which agree in that common complex idea, which that specific name stands for, it is certain that the real essence of all the individuals, comprehended under the specific name *man*, in your use of it, would be just the same; let others leave out or put into their complex idea of *man* what they please; because the real essence on which that unaltered complex idea, *i. e.* those properties depend, must necessarily be concluded to be the same.

For I take it for granted, that in using the name *man*, in this place, your lordship uses it for that complex idea which is in your lordship's mind of that species. So that your lordship, by putting it for or substituting it in the place of that complex idea where you say the real essence of it is *just as it was*, or

the name man, is the same thing. Again, to be a man, or of the species man, and to have the essence of a man, is the same thing. Now, since nothing can be a man, or have a right to the

the very same it was, does suppose the idea it stands for to be ideally the same. For, if I change the signification of the word *man*, whereby it may not comprehend just the same individuals which in your lordship's sense it does, but shut out some of those that to your lordship are *man*, in your signification of the word *man*, or take in others to which your lordship does not allow the name *man*; I do not think you will say, that the real essence of *man*, in both these senses is the same; and yet your lordship seems to say so, when you say, *Let men mistake in the complication of their ideas, either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them; and let their ideas be what they please, the real essence of the individuals comprehended under the names annexed to these ideas, will be the same: for so, I humbly conceive, it must be put, to make out what your lordship aims at.* For, as your lordship puts it by the name of *man*, or any other specific name, your lordship seems to me to suppose, that that name stands for, and not for the same idea, at the same time.

For example, my lord, let your lordship's idea, to which you annex the sign *man*, be a rational animal: let another man's idea be a rational animal of such a shape; let a third man's idea be of an animal of such a size and shape, leaving out rationality; let a fourth be an animal with a body of such a shape, and an immaterial substance, with a power of reasoning; let a fifth leave out of his idea an immaterial substance: It is plain every one of these will call his a *man*, as well as your lordship, and yet it is as plain that *man*, as standing for all these distinct, complex ideas, cannot be supposed to have the same internal constitu-

name *man*, but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name *man* stands for; nor any thing be a *man*, or have a right to the species *man*, but what has the essence of that species; it

tion, *i. e.* the same *real essence*. The truth is, every distinct, abstract idea, with a name to it, makes a real, distinct kind, whatever the real essence (which we know not of any of them) be.

And therefore I grant it true what your lordship says in the next words, *And let the nominal essence differ never so much, the real, common essence, or nature of the several kinds, are not at all altered by them; i. e.* that our thoughts or ideas cannot alter the real constitutions that are in things that exist, there is nothing more certain. But yet it is true, that the changes of ideas to which we annex them, can and does alter the signification of their names, and thereby alter the kinds, which by these names we rank and sort them into. Your lordship farther adds, *And these real essences are unchangeable, i. e.* the internal constitutions *are unchangeable*. Of what, I beseech your lordship, are the *intern. l constitutions unchangeable*? Not of any thing that exists, but of God alone; for they may be changed all as easily by that hand that made them, as the internal frame of a watch. What then is it that is unchangeable? The internal constitution or real essence of a species: which, in plain English, is no more but this, whilst the same specific name, *v. g.* of *man*, *horse*, or *tree*, is annexed to or made the sign of the same abstract complex idea, under which I rank several individuals; it is impossible but the real constitution on which that unaltered, complex idea or nominal essence depends, must be the same, *i. e.* in other words, where we find all the same properties, we have reason to conclude there is the same real, internal constitution from which those properties flow.

But your lordship proves the real essences to be un-

follows, that the abstract idea for which the name stands, and the essence of the species, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that the essences of the sorts of things, and consequently the sorting of this, is the workmanship of the understanding that abstracts and makes those general ideas.

§ 13. I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that nature in the production of things, makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by seed. But yet, I think, we may say, the sorting of them under names, is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion from the similitude it observes amongst them, to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as patterns or forms, (for in that sense the word *form* has a very proper signification), to which, as particular things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, or are put into that classis. For when we say, that this is a *man*, that a *horse*; this *justice*, that *cruelty*; this a *watch*, that a *jack*;

changeable, because God makes them, in those following words: *For however there may happen some variety in individuals by particular accidents, yet the essence of men, and horses, and trees, remain always the same; because they do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the Creator, who hath made several sorts of beings.*

It is true, the real constitutions or essences of particular things existing, do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the Creator: but their being ranked into sorts, under such and such names, does depend, and wholly depend, on the ideas of men.

what do we else but rank things under different specific names, as agreeing to those abstract ideas, of which we have made those names the signs? And what are the essences of those species, set out and marked by names, but those abstract ideas in the mind; which are, as it were, the bonds between particular things that exist, and the names they are to be ranked under? And when general names have any connection with particular beings, these abstract ideas are the medium that unites them: so that the essences of species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are, nor can be any thing but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds. And therefore the supposed real essences of substances, if different from our abstract ideas, cannot be the essences of the species we rank things into. For two species may be one, as rationally, as two different essences be the essence of one species: and I demand, what are the alterations may, or may not be in a *horse* or *lead*, without making either of them to be of another species? In determining the species of things by our abstract ideas, this is easy to resolve: but if any one will regulate himself herein by supposed real essences, he will, I suppose, be at a loss: and he will never be able to know when any thing precisely ceases to be of the species of a *horse*, or *lead*.

§ 14. Nor will any one wonder, that I say these essences, or abstract ideas, (which are the measures of name, and the boundaries of species,) are the workmanship of the understanding, who considers, that at least the complex ones are often, in several men, different collections of simple ideas: and therefore that is covetousness to one man, which is not so to another. Nay, even in substances,

where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no not in that species which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted, whether the *fœtus* born of a woman were a *man*, even so far, as that it hath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nourished and baptized: which could not be, if the abstract idea or essence, to which the name *man* belonged, were of nature's making; and were not the uncertain and various collection of simple ideas, which the understanding puts together, and then abstracting it, affixed a name to it. So that in truth every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence; and the names that stand for such distinct ideas are the names of things essentially different. Thus a circle is as essentially different from an oval, as a sheep from a goat; and rain is as essentially different from snow, as water from earth; that abstract idea which is the essence of one, being impossible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abstract ideas, that in any part vary one from another, with two distinct names annexed to them, constitute two distinct sorts, or, if you please, *species*, as essentially different as any two the most remote or opposite in the world.

§ 15. But since the essences of things are thought by some, and not without reason, to be wholly unknown; it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word *essence*.

First, ESSENCE may be taken for the being of any thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally in substances, unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable

qualities depend, may be called their *essence*. This is the proper original signification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it; *essentia*, in its primary notation, signifying properly *being*. And in this sense it is still used, when we speak of the *essence* of particular things, without giving them any name.

Secondly, The learning and disputes of the schools, having been much busied about *genus* and *species*, the word *essence* has almost lost its primary signification; and instead of the real constitution of things, has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of *genus* and *species*. It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things; and it is past doubt, there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple ideas co-existing, must depend. But it being evident, that things are ranked under names into sorts of species only as they agree to certain abstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names, the *essence* of each *genus*, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea, which the general, or *sortal* (if I may have leave so to call it from *sort*, as I do general from *genus*) name stands for. And this we shall find to be that which the word *essence* imports in its most familiar use. These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the real, the other the nominal essence.

§ 16. Between the nominal essence, and the name, there is so near a connection, that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being but what has this essence, whereby it answers that abstract idea, whereof that name is the sign.

§ 17. Concerning the real essences of corporeal

substances, to mention these only, there are, if I mistake not, two opinions. The one is of those, who using the word *essence*, for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those essences, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that species. The other, and more rational opinion, is of those, who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown constitution of their insensible parts, from which flow those sensible qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts, under common denominations. The former of these opinions, which supposes these essences as a certain number of forms or molds, wherein all natural things that exist, are cast, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things. The frequent productions of monsters, in all the species of animals, and of changelings, and other strange issues of human birth, carry with them difficulties not possible to consist with this hypothesis: since it is as impossible, that two things, partaking exactly of the same real essence, should have different properties, as that two figures partaking in the same real essence of a circle, should have different properties. But were there no other reason against it, yet the supposition of essences, that cannot be known, and the making them nevertheless to be that which distinguishes the species of things, is so wholly useless, and unserviceable to any part of our knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and content ourselves with such essences of the sorts or species of things, as come within the reach of our knowledge; which, when

seriously considered, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else but those abstract complex ideas, to which we have annexed distinct general names.

§ 18. Essences being thus distinguished into nominal and real, we may farther observe, that in the species of simple ideas and modes, they are always the same: but in substances always quite different. Thus a figure including a space between three lines, is the real as well as nominal essence of a triangle; it being not only the abstract idea to which the general name is annexed, but the very *essentia*, or being, of the thing itself, that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to which they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise concerning that parcel of matter, which make the ring on my finger, wherein these two essences are apparently different. For it is the real constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c. which makes it to be gold, or gives it a right to that name, which is therefore its nominal essence. Since nothing can be called gold, but what has a conformity of qualities to that abstract complex idea, to which that name is annexed. But this distinction of essences, belonging particularly to substances, we shall, when we come to consider their names, have an occasion to treat of more fully.

§ 19. That such abstract ideas, with names to them, as we have been speaking of, are essences, may farther appear by what we are told concerning essences, *viz.* that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real constitutions of things, which begin and perish with them. All things that exist, besides their author, are all liable to change; especially those

things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into bands, under distinct names or ensigns. Thus that which was grass to-day, is to-morrow the flesh of a sheep; and, within few days after, becomes part of a man: in all which, and the like changes, it is evident, their real essence, *i. e.* that constitution whereon the properties of these several things depended, is destroyed, and perishes with them. But essences being taken for ideas, established in the mind, with names annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily the same, whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to. For whatever becomes of Alexander and Bucephalus, the ideas to which man and horse are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain the same; and so the essences of those species are preserved whole and undestroyed, whatever changes happen to any, or all of the individuals of those species. By this means the essence of a species rests safe and entire, without the existence of so much as one individual of that kind. For were there now no circle existing anywhere in the world, (as, perhaps, that figure exists not any-where exactly marked out), yet the idea annexed to that name would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to be as a pattern, to determine which of the particular figures we meet with have, or have not a right to the name *circle*, and so to shew which of them, by having that essence, was of that species. And though there neither were, nor had been in nature such a beast as an unicorn, nor such a fish as a mermaid; yet supposing those names to stand for complex abstract ideas, that contained no inconsistency in them; the essence of a mermaid is as intelligible, as that of a man; and the idea of an unicorn, as certain,

steady, and permanent, as that of a horse. From what has been said, it is evident, that the doctrine of the immutability of essences, proves them to be only abstract ideas; and is founded on the relation established between them, and certain sounds as signs of them; and will always be true, as long as the same name can have the same signification.

§ 20. To conclude; this is that, which in short I would say, *viz.* that all the great business of *genera* and *species*, and their *essences*, amounts to no more but this, that men making abstract ideas, and settling them in their minds, with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and discourse of them, as it were, in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge, which would advance but slowly, were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.

C H A P. IV.

Of the NAMES of SIMPLE IDEAS.

§ 1. *Names of simple ideas, modes, and substances, have each something peculiar.* § 2. *First, Names of simple ideas and substances, intimate real existence.* § 3. *Secondly, Names of simple ideas and modes signify always both real and nominal essence.* § 4. *Thirdly, Names of simple ideas undefinable.* § 5. *If all were definable, it would be a process in infinitum.* § 6. *What a definition is.* § 7. *Simple ideas, why undefinable.* § 8, 9. *Instances; motion.* § 10. *Light.* § 11. *Simple ideas, why undefinable, farther explained.* § 12, 13. *The contrary shewed in complex ideas, by instances of a statue and rainbow.* § 14. *The same of complex ideas, when to be made intelligible by words.* § 15. *Fourthly, Names of simple ideas least doubtful.* § 16. *Fifthly, Simple ideas have few ascents in linea prædicatoriali.* § 17. *Sixthly, Names of simple ideas stand for ideas not at all arbitrary.*

§ 1. **T**HOUGH all words, as I have shewn, signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker; yet upon a nearer survey, we shall find that the names of *simple ideas, mixed modes*, (under which I comprise relations too), and *natural substances*, have each of them something peculiar, and different from the other. For example :

§ 2. *First, The names of simple ideas, and substances, with the abstract ideas in the mind, which*

they immediately signify, intimate also some real existence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names of *mixed modes* terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any farther, as we shall see more at large in the following chapter.

§ 3. *Secondly*, The names of *simple ideas* and *modes* signify always the *real*, as well as *nominal essence* of their species. But the names of *natural substances* signify rarely, if ever, any thing but barely the nominal essences of those species; as we shall shew in the chapter that treats of the names of substances in particular.

§ 4. *Thirdly*, The names of *simple ideas* are not capable of any *definition*; the names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet observed by any body, what words are, and what are not capable of being defined: the want whereof is, as I am apt to think, not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in mens discourses, whilst some demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined; and others think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more general word, and its restriction, (or, to speak in terms of art, by a *genus* and *difference*), when, even after such definition made according to rule, those who hear it, have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word, than they had before. This at least, I think, that the shewing what words are, and what are not capable of definitions, and wherein consists a good definition, is not wholly besides our present purpose; and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature of these signs, and our ideas, as to deserve a more particular consideration.

§ 5. I will not here trouble myself to prove

that all terms are not definable from that progress *in infinitum*, which it will visibly lead us into, if we should allow that all names could be defined. For if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at last should we stop? But I shall, from the nature of our ideas, and the signification of our words, shew, why some names can, and others cannot be defined, and which they are.

§ 6. I think, it is agreed, that a definition is nothing else, but the shewing the meaning of one word by several other not synonymous terms. The meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them; the meaning of any term is then shewed, or the word is defined, when by other words, the idea it is made the sign of, and annexed to in the mind of the speaker, is, as it were, represented, or set before the view of another; and thus its signification ascertained. This is the only use and end of definitions; and therefore the only measure of what is, or is not a good definition.

§ 7. This being premised, I say, that the names of simple ideas, and those only, are incapable of being defined. The reason whereof is this, that the several terms of a definition, signifying several ideas, they can altogether by no means represent an idea, which has no composition at all: and therefore a definition, which is properly nothing but the shewing the meaning of one word by several others not signifying each the same thing, can in the names of simple ideas have no place.

§ 8. The not observing this difference in our ideas, and their names, has produced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is so easy to be observed in the definitions they give us of some

few of these simple ideas. For, as to the greatest part of them, even those masters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite jargon could the wit of man invent than this definition, *The act of a being in power, as far forth as in power?* which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity, to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of. If Tully asking a Dutchman what *beveeginge* was, should have received this explication in his own language, that it was *Actus entis in potentia, quatenus in potentia*; I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the word *beveeginge* signified, or have guessed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to another, when he used that sound.

§ 9. Nor have the modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the jargon of the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded in defining simple ideas, whether by explaining their causes, or any otherwise. The atomists, who define motion to be a *passage from one place to another*, what do they more than put one synonymous word for another? For, what is *passage* other than *motion*? And if they were asked what *passage* was, how would they better define it than by *motion*? For, is it not at least as proper and significant to say, *Passage is a motion from one place to another*, as to say, *Motion is a passage*, &c. This is to translate, and not to define, when we change two words of the same signification one for another; which, when one is better understood than the other, may serve to discover what idea the unknown stands for; but

is very far from a definition, unless we will say, every English word in the dictionary, is the definition of the Latin word it answers, and that motion is a definition of *motus*. Nor will the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body, to those of another, which the Cartesians give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well examined.

§ 10. *The act of perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous*, is another Peripatetic definition of a simple idea; which, though not more absurd than the former of motion, yet betrays its uselessness and insignificancy more plainly, because experience will easily convince any one, that it cannot make the meaning of the word *light*, which it pretends to define, at all understood by a blind man: but the definition of motion appears not at first sight so useless, because it escapes this way of trial. For this simple idea, entering by the touch as well as sight, it is impossible to shew an example of any one, who has no other way to get the idea of *motion*, but barely by the definition of that name. Those who tell us, that *light* is a great number of little globules, striking briskly on the bottom of the eye, speak more intelligibly than the schools: but yet these words, ever so well understood, would make the idea the word *light* stands for no more known to a man that understands it not before, than if one should tell him, that *light* was nothing but a company of little tennis-balls, which fairies all day long struck with rackets against some mens foreheads, whilst they passed by others. For, granting this explication of the thing to be true; yet the idea of the *cause* of light, if we had it never so exact, would no more give us the idea of light itself, as it is such a particular perception.

in us, than the idea of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel would give us the idea of that pain which it is able to cause in us. For the cause of any sensation, and the sensation itself, in all the simple ideas of one sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so different, and distant one from another, that no two can be more so. And therefore should Des Cartes's globules strike never so long on the *retina* of a man, who was blind by a *gutta serena*, he would thereby never have any idea of *light*, or any thing approaching it, though he understood what little globules were, and what striking on another body was, never so well. And therefore the Cartesians very well distinguish between that light which is the cause of that sensation in us, and the idea which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly light.

§ 11. Simple ideas, as has been shewn, are only to be got by those impressions objects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each sort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the world, made use of to explain or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea it stands for. For words, being sounds, can produce in us no other simple ideas than of those very sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connection which is known to be between them, and those simple ideas which common use has made them signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pineapple, and make him have the true idea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a resemblance with any tastes, whereof he has the ideas already in his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, not strangers to

his palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting in us other simple ideas by their known names; which will be still very different from the true taste of that fruit itself. In light and colours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing: for the signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no definition of *light*, or *redness*, is more fitted or able to produce either of those ideas in us, than the sound *light*, or *red*, by itself. For to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound, however formed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible; and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses. Which is all one as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see by the ears: a sort of philosophy worthy only of Sancho Pancha, who had the faculty to see Dulcinea by hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea which any word stands for, can never come to know the signification of that word, by any other words or sounds whatsoever, put together according to any rules of definition. The only way is, by applying to his senses the proper object; and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the name already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and friends to understand those names of light and colours, which often came in his way; bragged one day, that he now understood what scarlet signified. Upon which his friend demanding what scarlet was? the blind man answered, It was like the *sound of a trumpet*. Just such an understand-

ing of the name of any other simple idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to explain it.

§ 12. The case is quite otherwise in complex ideas; which consisting of several simple ones, it is in the power of words, standing for the several ideas that make that composition, to imprint complex ideas in the mind, which were never there before, and so make their names be understood. In such collections of ideas, passing under one name, *definition*, or the teaching the signification of one word by several others, has place, and may make us understand the names of things which never came within the reach of our senses, and frame ideas suitable to those in other mens minds, when they use those names: provided that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas, which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in his thought. Thus the word *statue* may be explained to a blind man by other words, when *picture* cannot, his senses having given him the idea of *figure*, but not of *colours*, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gained the prize to the painter against the statuary; each of which contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging, that his was to be preferred, because it reached farther, and even those who had lost their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it: the painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man; who being brought where there was a statue made by the one, and a picture drawn by the other, he was first led to the statue, in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body; and with great admiration applauded the skill of

the workman. But being led to the picture, and having his hands laid upon it, was told, that now he touched the head, and then the forehead, eyes, nose, &c. as his hands moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the least distinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanship, which could represent to them all those parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing.

§ 13. He that would use the word *rainbow*, to one who knew all these colours, but yet had never seen that phænomenon, would, by enumerating the figure, largeness, position, and order of the colours, so well define that word, that it might be perfectly understood. But yet that definition, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind man understand it; because several of the simple ideas that make that complex one, being such as he never received by sensation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.

§ 14. Simple ideas, as has been shewn, can only be got by experience, from those objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions. When by this means we have our minds stored with them, and know the names for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition to understand the names of complex ideas that are made up of them. But when any term stands for a simple idea that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning to him. When any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the sign of it, there

another name, of the same idea which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand its meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any name of any simple idea capable of a definition.

§ 15. *Fourthly*, But though the names of simple ideas have not the help of definition to determine their signification; yet that hinders not but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those of mixed modes and substances. Because they standing only for one simple perception, men, for the most part, easily and perfectly agree in their signification: and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that whiteness is the name of that colour he has observed in snow or milk, will not be apt to misapply that word, as long as he retains that idea; which, when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor a supposed, but an unknown real essence, with properties depending thereon, the precise number whereof are also unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of substances. But on the contrary, in simple ideas the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consists not of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea may be varied, and so the signification of its name be obscure or uncertain.

§ 16. *Fifthly*, This farther may be observed, concerning simple ideas and their names, that they have but few ascents *in linea prædicamentali*, as they call it, from the lowest species to the sum-

num genus. The reason whereof is, that the lowest species being but one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it, that so the difference being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both; which having one name, is the *genus* of the other two: *v. g.* there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of *white* and *red*, to make them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name; as *rationality* being left out of the complex idea of *man*, makes it agree with *brute*, in the more general idea and name of *animal*. And therefore when, to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both *white* and *red*, and several other such simple ideas, under one general name, they have been fain to do it by a word which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For, when *white*, *red*, and *yellow*, are all comprehended under the *genus*, or name *colour*, it signifies no more, but such ideas as are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term to comprehend both *colours* and *sounds*, and the like simple ideas, they do it by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one sense: and so the general term *quality*, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible qualities, with distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure, and pain, which make impressions on the mind, and introduce their ideas by more senses than one.

§ 17. *Sixthly*, The names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed modes, have also this difference, that those of mixed modes stand for ideas

perfectly arbitrary: those of substances are not perfectly so; but refer to a pattern, though with some latitude: and those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which what difference it makes in the significations of their names, we shall see in the following chapters.

The names of simple modes differ little from those of simple ideas.

C H A P. V.

Of the NAMES of mixed Modes and Relations.

§ 1. *They stand for abstract ideas, as other general names.* § 2. *First, The ideas they stand for are made by the understanding.* § 3. *Secondly, Made arbitrarily, and without patterns.* § 4. *How this is done.* § 5. *Evidently arbitrary, that the idea is often before the existence.* § 6. *Instances; murder, incest, stabbing.* § 7. *But still subservient to the end of language.* § 8. *Whereof the intranslatable words of divers languages are a proof.* § 9. *This shews species to be made for communication.* § 10, 11. *In mixed modes, it is the name that ties the combination together, and makes it a species.* § 12. *For the originals of mixed modes, we look no farther than the mind, which also shews them to be the workmanship of the understanding.* § 13. *Their being made by the understanding without patterns, shews the reason why they are so compounded.* § 14. *Names of mixed modes stand always for the real essences.* § 15. *Why their names are usually got before their ideas.* § 16. *Reason of my being so large on this subject.*

§ 1. **T**HE names of mixed modes being general, they stand, as has been shewn, for sorts or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence. The essences of these species also, as has been shewn, are nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and essences of

mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas : but if we take a little nearer survey of them, we shall find that they have something peculiar, which, perhaps, may deserve our attention.

§ 2. The first particularity I shall observe in them is, that the abstract ideas, or, if you please, the essences of the several species of mixed modes are made by the understanding, wherein they differ from those of simple ideas : in which sort, the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives such as are presented to it, by the real existence of things operating upon it.

§ 3. In the next place, these essences of the species of mixed modes, are not only made by the mind, but made very arbitrarily, made without patterns, or reference to any real existence. Wherein they differ from those of substances, which carry with them the supposition of some real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain collections, as so many distinct specific ideas, whilst others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward things, pass neglected without particular names or specifications. Nor does the mind, in these of mixed modes, as in the complex idea of substances, examine them by the real existence of things ; or verify them by patterns, containing such peculiar compositions in nature. To know whether his idea of *adultery* or *incest* be right, will a man seek it any-where amongst things existing ? or is it true, because any one has been witness to such an action ? No : but it suffices here, that

men have put together such a collection into one complex idea, that makes the archetype, and specific idea, whether ever any such action were committed in *rerum natura*, or no.

§ 4. To understand this aright, we must consider wherein this making of these complex ideas consists; and that is not in the making any new idea, but putting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three things: 1. It chuses a certain number. 2. It gives them connection, and makes them into one idea. 3. It ties them together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe, how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind; and consequently, that the species themselves are of mens making.

§ 5. No-body can doubt but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of ideas put together in the mind, independent from any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect, that this sort of complex ideas may be made, abstracted, and have names given them, and so a species be constituted, before any one individual of that species ever existed. Who can doubt but the ideas of *sacrilege* or *adultery*, might be framed in the mind of men, and have names given them; and so these species of mixed modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed; and might be as well discoursed of and reasoned about, and as certain truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain, how much the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding, where they

have a being as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they really exist: and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about species of actions, which were only the creatures of their own understandings; beings that had no other existence but in their own minds. And, I think, no-body can deny but that the resurrection was a species of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed.

§ 6. To see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the mind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking into them will satisfy us, that it is the mind that combines several scattered independent ideas, into one complex one; and by the common name it gives them, makes them the essence of a certain species, without regulating itself by any connection they have in nature. For, what greater connection in nature has the idea of a man, than the idea of a sheep, with killing; that this is made a particular species of action, signified by the word *murder*; and the other not? Or what union is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father, with killing, than that of a son or neighbour; that those are combined into one complex idea, and thereby made the essence of the distinct species *parricide*, whilst the other make no distinct species at all? But though they have made killing a man's father or mother, a distinct species from killing his son or daughter; yet in some other cases, son and daughter are taken in too, as well as father and mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the same species, as in that of *incest*. Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex ideas, such as it finds convenient; whilst others that have al-

together as much union in nature, are left loose, and never combined into one idea, because they have no need of one name. It is evident then, that the mind, by its free choice, gives a connection to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more union with one another, than others that it leaves out: why else is the part of the weapon, the beginning of the wound is made with, taken notice of, to make the distinct species called *stabbing*, and the figure and matter of the weapon left out? I do not say, this is done without reason, as we shall see more by-and-bye; but this, I say, that it is done by the free choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends; and that therefore these species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding: and there is nothing more evident, than that, for the most part, in the framing these ideas, the mind searches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the ideas it makes to the real existence of things; but puts such together as may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to a precise imitation of any thing that really exists.

§ 7. But though these complex ideas, or essences of mixed modes, depend on the mind, and are made by it with great liberty; yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any reason at all. Though these complex ideas be not always copied from nature, yet they are always suited to the end for which abstract ideas are made: and though they be combinations made of ideas that are loose enough, and have as little union in themselves, as several other, to which the mind never gives a connection that combines them into one idea; yet they are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the

chief end of language. The use of language is, by short sounds, to signify with ease and dispatch, general conceptions; wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but also a great variety of independent ideas collected into one complex one. In the making therefore of the species of mixed modes, men have had regard only to such combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined into distinct complex ideas, and given names to; whilst others, that in nature have as near an union, are left loose and unregarded. For, to go no farther than human actions themselves, if they would make distinct abstract ideas of all the varieties might be observed in them, the number must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as well as overcharged to little purpose. It suffices, that men make and name so many complex ideas of these mixed modes, as they find they have occasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs. If they join to the idea of *killing*, the idea of *father* or *mother*, and so make a distinct species from killing a man's son or neighbour, it is because of the different heinousness of the crime, and the distinct punishment is due to the murdering a man's father or mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a son or neighbour; and therefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct name, which is the end of making that distinct combination. But though the ideas of *mother* and *daughter*, are so differently treated, in reference to the idea of *killing*, that the one is joined with it to make a distinct abstract idea with a name, and so a distinct species, and the other not; yet in respect of carnal knowledge they are

both taken in under *incest*; and that still for the same convenience of expressing under one name, and reckoning of one species, such unclean mixtures as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions, and tedious descriptions.

§ 8. A moderate skill in different languages will easily satisfy one of the truth of this, it being so obvious to observe great store of words in one language, which have not any that answer them in another. Which plainly shews, that those of one country, by their customs and manner of life, have found occasion to make several complex ideas, and give names to them, which others never collected into specific ideas. This could not have happened, if these species were the steady workmanship of nature; and not collections made and abstracted by the mind, in order to naming, and for the convenience of communication. The terms of our law, which are not empty sounds, will hardly find words that answer them in the Spanish or Italian, no scanty languages; much less, I think, could any one translate them into the Caribbee or Westoe tongues: and the *Versura* of the Romans, or *Corban* of the Jews, have no words in other languages to answer them: the reason whereof is plain, from what has been said. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different languages, we shall find, that though they have words, which, in translations and dictionaries, are supposed to answer one another; yet there is scarce one of ten, amongst the names of complex ideas, especially of mixed modes, that stands for the same precise idea, which the word does that in dictionaries it is rendered by. There are no ideas more common,

and less compounded, than the measures of time, extension, and weight; and the Latin names *hora*, *pes*, *libra*, are without difficulty rendered by the English names, *hour*, *foot*, and *pound*: but yet there is nothing more evident, than that the ideas a Roman annexed to these Latin names, were very far different from those which an Englishman expresses by those English ones. And if either of these should make use of the measures that those of the other language designed by their names, he would be quite out in his account. These are too sensible proofs to be doubted; and we shall find this much more so, in the names of more abstract and compounded ideas: such as are the greatest part of those which make up moral discourses: whose names, when men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into in other languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their significations.

§ 9. The reason why I take so particular notice of this, is, that we may not be mistaken about *genera* and *species*, and their essences, as if they were things regularly and constantly made by nature, and had a real existence in things; when they appear, upon a more wary survey, to be nothing else but an artifice of the understanding, for the easier signifying such collections of ideas, as it should often have occasion to communicate by one general term; under which divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abstract idea, might be comprehended. And if the doubtful signification of the word *species* may make it sound harsh to some, that I say the species of mixed modes are made by the understanding; yet, I think, it can by no-body be denied, that it

is the mind makes those abstract complex ideas, to which specific names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the mind makes the patterns for sorting and naming of things, I leave it to be considered, who makes the boundaries of the sort or species; since, with me, *species* and *sort* have no other difference than that of a Latin and English idiom.

§ 10. The near relation that there is between *species*, *essences*, and their general names, at least in mixed modes, will farther appear, when we consider, that it is the name that seems to preserve those essences, and give them their lasting duration. For the connection between the loose parts of those complex ideas being made by the mind, this union, which has no particular foundation in nature, would cease again, were there not something that did, as it were, hold it together, and keep the parts from scattering. Though therefore it be the mind that makes the collection, it is the name which is, as it were, the knot that ties them fast together. What a vast variety of different ideas does the word *triumphus* hold together, and deliver to us as one species? Had this name been never made, or quite lost, we might, no doubt, have had descriptions of what passed in that solemnity: but yet, I think, that which holds those different parts together, in the unity of one complex idea, is that very word annexed to it; without which, the several parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other shew, which, having never been made but once, had never been united into one complex idea, under one denomination. How much therefore, in mixed modes, the unity necessary to any essence depends on the mind; and

how much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in common use annexed to it, I leave to be considered by those who look upon essences and species as real established things in nature.

§ 11. Suitable to this, we find, that men, speaking of mixed modes, seldom imagine or take any other for species of them, but such as are set out by name: because they being of man's making only, in order to naming, no such species are taken notice of, or supposed to be, unless a name be joined to it, as the sign of man's having combined into one idea several loose ones; and, by that name, giving a lasting union to the parts, which would otherwise cease to have any, as soon as the mind laid by that abstract idea, and ceased actually to think on it. But when a name is once annexed to it, wherein the parts of that complex idea have a settled and permanent union; then is the essence, as it were, established, and the species looked on as complete. For to what purpose should the memory charge itself with such compositions, unless it were by abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make them general, unless it were that they might have general names, for the convenience of discourse and communication? Thus we see, that killing a man with a sword or a hatchet, are looked on as no distinct species of action: but if the point of the sword first enter the body, it passes for a distinct species, where it has a distinct name, as in England, in whose language it is called *stabbing*: but in another country, where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar name, it passes not for a distinct species. But in the species of corporeal substances, though it be the

mind that makes the nominal essence; yet since those ideas, which are combined in it, are supposed to have an union in nature, whether the mind joins them or no, therefore those are looked on as distinct species, without any operation of the mind, either abstracting, or giving a name to that complex idea.

§ 13. Conformable also to what has been said concerning the essences of the species of mixed modes, that they are the creatures of the understanding, rather than the works of nature; conformable, I say, to this, we find that their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no farther. When we speak of justice or gratitude, we frame to ourselves no imagination of any thing existing, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate in the abstract ideas of those virtues, and look not farther; as they do, when we speak of a *horse* or *iron*, whose specific ideas we consider not as barely in the mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the original patterns of those ideas. But in mixed modes, at least the most considerable parts of them, which are moral beings, we consider the original patterns as being in the mind; and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular beings under names. And hence, I think, it is, that these essences of the species of mixed modes are, by a more particular name, called *notions*; as by a peculiar right appertaining to the understanding.

§ 13. Hence likewise we may learn, why the complex ideas of mixed modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded, than those of natural substances. Because they being the workmanship of the understanding, pursuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expressing in

short those ideas it would make known to another, does with great liberty unite often into one abstract idea things that in their nature have no coherence; and so under one term, bundle together a great variety of compounded and decomposed ideas. Thus the name of *procession*, what a great mixture of independent ideas of persons, habits, tapers, orders, motions, sounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, to express by that one name? Whereas the complex ideas of the sorts of substances are usually made up of only a small number of simple ones; and in the species of animals, these two, *viz.* shape and voice, commonly make the whole nominal essence.

§ 14. Another thing we may observe from what has been said, is, that the names of mixed modes always signify (when they have any determined signification) the real essences of their species. For these abstract ideas being the workmanship of the mind, and not referred to the real existence of things, there is no supposition of any thing more signified by that name, but barely that complex idea the mind itself has formed, which is all it would have expressed by it; and is that on which all the properties of the species depend, and from which alone they all flow: and so in these the real and nominal essence is the same; which of what concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth, we shall see hereafter.

§ 15. This also may shew us the reason, why, for the most part, the names of mixed modes are got, before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known. Because there being no species of these ordinarily taken notice of, but what have names; and those species, or rather their essences, being

abstract complex ideas made arbitrarily by the mind, it is convenient, if not necessary, to know the names, before one endeavour to frame these complex ideas : unless a man will fill his head with a company of abstract complex ideas, which others having no names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by, and forget again. I confess, that in the beginning of languages, it was necessary to have the idea, before one gave it the name : and so it is still, where making a new complex idea, one also, by giving it a new name, makes a new word. But this concerns not languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for ideas, which men have frequent occasion to have, and communicate : and in such, I ask, whether it be not the ordinary method, that children learn the names of mixed modes, before they have their ideas ? What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract ideas of *glory* and *ambition*, before he has heard the names of them ? In simple ideas and substances, I grant it is otherwise ; which being such ideas as have a real existence and union in nature, the ideas, or names, are got one before the other, as it happens.

§ 16. What has been said here of mixed modes, is, with very little difference, applicable also to relations ; which, since every man himself may observe, I may spare myself the pains to enlarge on : especially, since what I have here said concerning words in this third book, will possibly be thought by some to be much more than what so slight a subject required. I allow, it might be brought into a narrower compass : but I was willing to stay my reader on an argument, that appears to me new, and a little out of the way, (I am sure it is one I thought not of, when I began to write),

that by searching it to the bottom, and turning it on every side, some part or other might meet with every one's thoughts, and give occasion to the most averſe, or negligent, to reflect on a general miſcarriage, which, though of great conſequence, is little taken notice of. When it is conſidered, what a pudder is made about eſſences, and how much all ſorts of knowledge, diſcourſe, and converſation, are peſtered and diſordered by the careleſs and confuſed uſe and application of words, it will, perhaps, be thought worth while thoroughly to lay it open. And I ſhall be pardoned if I have dwelt long on an argument which I think therefore needs to be inculcated; becauſe the faults men are uſually guilty of in this kind, are not only the greateſt hindrances of true knowledge; but are ſo well thought of, as to paſs for it. Men would often ſee what a ſmall pittance of reaſon and truth, or poſſibly none at all, is mixed with thoſe huſſing opinions they are ſwelled with; if they would but look beyond fashionable ſounds, and obſerve what ideas are, or are not comprehended under thoſe words, with which they are ſo armed at all points, and with which they ſo confidently lay about them. I ſhall imagine I have done ſome ſervice to truth, peace, and learning, if, by any enlargement on this ſubject, I can make men reflect on their own uſe of language; and give them reaſon to ſuſpect, that ſince it is frequent for others, it may alſo be poſſible for them, to have ſometimes very good and approved words in their mouths and writings, with very uncertain, little, or no ſignification. And therefore it is not unreaſonable for them to be wary herein themſelves, and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others. With this deſign therefore, I ſhall go on with what I have farther to ſay concerning this matter.

C H A P. VI.

Of the NAMES of SUBSTANCES.

- § 1. *The common names of substances stand for sorts.*
 § 2. *The essence of each sort is the abstract idea.*
 § 3. *The nominal and real essence different.*
 § 4—6. *Nothing essential to individuals.* § 7, 8. *The nominal essence bounds the species.* § 9. *Not the real essence, which we know not.* § 10. *Not substantial forms, which we know less.* § 11. *That the nominal essence is that whereby we distinguish species, farther evident from spirits.* § 12. *Whereof there are probably numberless species.*
 § 13. *The nominal essence, that of the species, proved from water and ice.* § 14—17. *Difficulties against a certain number of real essences.*
 § 18—20. *Our nominal essences of substances, not perfect collections of properties.* § 21. *But such a collection as our name stands for.* § 22. *Our abstract ideas are to us the measures of species; instance, in that of man.* § 23. *Species not distinguished by generation.* § 24. *Not by substantial forms.* § 25. *The specific essences are made by the mind.* § 26, 27. *Therefore very various and uncertain.* § 28. *But not so arbitrary as mixed modes.* § 29. *Though very imperfect.*
 § 30. *Which yet serve for common converse.*
 § 31. *Essences of species, under the same name, very different.* § 32. *The more general our ideas are, the more incomplete and partial they are.* § 33. *This all accommodated to the end of speech.* § 34. *Instance, in cassuaries.* § 35. *Men*

determine the sorts. § 36, 37. Nature makes the similitude. § 38. Each abstract idea is an essence. § 39. Genera and species are in order to naming. § 40. Species of artificial things less confused than natural. § 41. Artificial things of distinct species. § 42. Substances alone have proper names. § 43. Difficulty to treat of words. § 44, 45. Instances of mixed modes, in Kinneah and Niouph. § 46, 47. Instance of substances in Zabab. § 48. Their ideas imperfect, and therefore various. § 49. Therefore to fix their species, a real essence is supposed. § 50. Which supposition is of no use. § 51. Conclusion.

§ 1. **T**HE common names of substances, as well as other general terms, stand for sorts: which is nothing else but the being made signs of such complex ideas, wherein several particular substances do, or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception, and signified by one name. I say, do or might agree: for though there be but one sun existing in the world, yet the idea of it being abstracted, so that more substances, if there were several, might each agree in it; it is as much a sort, as if there were as many suns as there are stars. They want not their reasons, who think there are, and that each fixed star would answer the idea the name *sun* stands for, to one who were placed in a due distance; which, by the way, may shew us how much the sorts, or, if you please, *genera* and *species* of things, (for those Latin terms signify to me no more than the English word sort), depend on such collections of ideas as men have made, and not on the real nature of things; since it is not im-

possible, but that, in propriety of speech, that might be a sun to one, which is a star to another.

§ 2. The measure and boundary of each sort, or species, whereby it is constituted that particular sort, and distinguished from others, is that we call its essence, which is nothing but that abstract idea to which the name is annexed: so that every thing contained in that idea is essential to that sort. This, though it be all the *essence* of natural substances that we know, or by which we distinguish them into sorts; yet I call it by a peculiar name, the *nominal essence*, to distinguish it from that real constitution of substances, upon which depends this nominal essence, and all the properties of that sort; which therefore, as has been said, may be called the *real essence*: v. g. the *nominal essence* of gold, is that complex idea the word *gold* stands for; let it be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body, on which those qualities, and all the other properties of gold, depend. How far these two are different, though they are both called *essence*, is obvious, at first sight, to discover.

§ 3. For though, perhaps, voluntary motion, with sense and reason, joined to a body of a certain shape, be the complex idea, to which I, and others, annex the name *man*; and so be the *nominal essence* of the species so called: yet no-body will say, that that complex idea is the *real essence* and source of all those operations, which are to be found in any individual of that sort. The foundation of all those qualities, which are the ingredients of our complex idea, is something quite

different: and had we such a knowledge of that constitution of man, from which his faculties of moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow, and on which his so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is certain his Maker has, we should have a quite other idea of his essence, than what now is contained in our definition of that species, be it what it will: and our idea of any individual man would be as far different from what it now is, as is his who knows all the springs and wheels, and other contrivances within, of the famous clock at Strasburg, from that which a gazing countryman has of it, who barely sees the motion of the hand, and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward appearances.

§ 4. That essence, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to sorts, and that it is considered in particular beings, no farther than as they are ranked into sorts, appears from hence: that take but away the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names; and then the thought of any thing essential to any of them, instantly vanishes: we have no notion of the one, without the other: which plainly shews their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am; GOD and nature has made me so: but there is nothing I have is essential to me. An accident, or disease, may very much alter my colour or shape; a fever, or fall, may take away my reason or memory, or both; and an apoplexy leave neither sense nor understanding, no, nor life. Other creatures of my shape may be made with more, and better, or fewer, and worse faculties, than I have: and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body very different from

mine. None of these are essential to the one or the other, or to any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things; and then presently, according to the abstract idea of that sort, something is found essential. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and he will find, that as soon as he supposes or speaks of *essential*, the consideration of some species, or the complex idea, signified by some general name, comes into his mind: and it is in reference to that, that this or that quality is said to be essential. So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me, or any other particular corporeal being, to have reason? I say no; no more than it is essential to this white thing I write on to have words in it. But if that particular being be to be counted of the sort *man*, and to have the name *man* given it, then reason is essential to it, supposing reason to be a part of the complex idea the name *man* stands for: as it is essential to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it the name *treatise*, and rank it under that species. So that *essential*, and *not essential*, relate only to our abstract ideas, and the names annexed to them; which amounts to no more but this, that whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities which are contained in the abstract idea which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that species, nor be called by that name, since that abstract idea is the very essence of that species.

§ 5. Thus if the idea of *body*, with some people, be bare extension or space, then solidity is not essential to body: if others make the idea, to which they give the name *body*, to be solidity and extension, then solidity is essential to body. That

therefore, and that alone, is considered as essential, which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a sort stands for, without which, no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort, nor be entitled to that name. Should there be found a parcel of matter, that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wanted obedience to the loadstone, and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive direction from it, would any one question, whether it wanted any thing essential? It would be absurd to ask, whether a thing really existing wanted any thing essential to it. Or could it be demanded, whether this made an essential or specific difference, or no; since we have no other measure of essential or specific, but our abstract ideas? And to talk of specific differences in nature, without reference to general ideas and names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, what is sufficient to make an essential difference in nature, between any two particular beings, without any regard had to some abstract idea, which is looked upon as the essence and standard of a species? All such patterns and standards being quite laid aside, particular beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their qualities equally essential; and every thing, in each individual, will be essential to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For, though it may be reasonable to ask, whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron? yet, I think, it is very improper and insignificant to ask, whether it be essential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with, without considering it under the name *iron*, or as being of a certain species? And if, as has been said, our abstract ideas, which have names annexed to them, are the boundaries of

species, nothing can be essential but what is contained in those ideas.

§ 6. It is true, I have often mentioned a real essence, distinct in substances, from those abstract ideas of them, which I call their nominal essence. By this real essence, I mean, the real constitution of any thing, which is the foundation of all those properties that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal essence; that particular constitution which every thing has within itself, without any relation to any thing without it. But essence, even in this sense, relates to a sort, and supposes a species: for, being that real constitution, on which the properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of things, properties belonging only to species, and not to individuals; *v. g.* supposing the nominal essence of *gold* to be a body of such a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fusibility, the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter, on which these qualities, and their union, depend; and is also the foundation of its solubility in *aqua regia*, and other properties accompanying that complex idea. Here are essences and properties, but all upon supposition of a sort, or general abstract idea, which is considered as immutable: but there is no individual parcel of matter, to which any of these qualities are so annexed, as to be essential to it, or inseparable from it. That which is essential, belongs to it as a condition, whereby it is of this or that sort: but take away the consideration of its being ranked under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is nothing necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the real essences of substances, we only suppose their being, without precisely knowing what they are:

but that which annexes them still to the species, is the nominal essence, of which they are the supposed foundation and cause.

§ 7. The next thing to be considered is, by which of those essences it is that substances are determined into *sorts* or *species*; and that, it is evident, is by the *nominal essence*. For it is that alone that the name, which is the mark of the sort, signifies. It is impossible therefore, that any thing should determine the sorts of things which we rank under general names, but that idea which that name is designed as a mark for; which is that, as has been shewn, which we call the *nominal essence*. Why do we say, this is a *horse*, and that a *mule*; this is an *animal*, that an *herb*? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort, but because it has that nominal essence, or, which is all one, agrees to that abstract idea that name is annexed to? And I desire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts, when he hears or speaks any of those, or other names of substances, to know what sort of essences they stand for.

§ 8. And that the species of things to us, are nothing but the ranking them under distinct names, according to the complex ideas in us, and not according to precise, distinct, real essences in them, is plain from hence, that we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of one species, have yet qualities depending on their real constitutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ specifically. This, as it is easy to be observed by all who have to do with natural bodies; so chymists especially are often, by

bad experience, convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur, antimony, or vitriol, which they have found in others. For, though they are bodies of the same species, having the same nominal essence, under the same name; yet do they often, upon severe ways of examination, betray qualities so different one from another, as to frustrate the expectation and labour of very wary chymists. But if things were distinguished into species, according to their real essences, it would be as impossible to find different properties in any two individual substances of the same species, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or two equilateral triangles. That is properly the essence to us, which determines every particular to this or that *classis*; or, which is the same thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be else, but that abstract idea to which that name is annexed? And so has, in truth, a reference, not so much to the being of particular things, as to their general denominations.

§ 9. Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them by their real essences, because we know them not. Our faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and distinction of substances, than a collection of those sensible ideas, which we observe in them; which, however made with the greatest diligence and exactness, we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal constitution, from which those qualities flow, than, as I said, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of that famous clock at Strasburg, whereof he only sees the outward figure and motions. There is not so con-

temptible a plant or animal, that does not confound the most enlarged understanding. Though the familiar use of things about us take off our wonder; yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come to examine the stones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we presently find we know not their make; and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them. It is evident, the internal constitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us. For to go no farther than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, what is that texture of parts, that real essence, that makes lead and antimony fusible; wood and stones not? What makes lead and iron malleable; antimony and stones not? And yet how infinitely these come short of the fine contrivances, and inconceivable real essences of plants or animals, every one knows. The workmanship of the all-wise and powerful GOD, in the great fabric of the universe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the capacity and comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the most ingenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into sorts, and dispose them into certain classes, under names, by their real essences, that are so far from our discovery or comprehension. A blind man may as soon sort things by their colours, and he that has lost his smell, as well distinguish a lily and a rose by their odours, as by those internal constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish sheep and goats by their real essences, that are unknown to him, may be pleased to try his skill in those species, called *cassowary*.

and *querechinchio*; and by their internal real essences determine the boundaries of those species, without knowing the complex idea of sensible qualities that each of those names stand for, in the countries where those animals are to be found.

§ 10. Those therefore who have been taught, that the several species of substances had their distinct internal substantial forms, and that it was those forms which made the distinction of substances into their true *species* and *genera*, were led yet farther out of the way, by having their minds set upon fruitless inquiries after substantial forms, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure or confused conception in general.

§ 11. That our ranking and distinguishing natural substances into species, consists in the nominal essences the mind makes, and not in the real essences to be found in the things themselves, is farther evident from our ideas of spirit. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its own operations, those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits, it hath, or can have no other notion of spirit, but by attributing all those operations it finds in itself, to a sort of beings, without consideration of matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of GOD, is but attributing the same simple ideas which we have got from reflection on what we find in ourselves, and which we conceive to have more perfection in them than would be in their absence; attributing, I say, those simple ideas to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got, from reflecting on ourselves, the idea of existence, knowledge, power and pleasure, each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of each, the better; joining

all these together, with infinity to each of them, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise, and happy being. And though we are told, that there are different species of angels; yet we know not how to frame distinct specific ideas of them; not out of any conceit, that the existence of more species than one of spirits, is impossible: but because having no more simple ideas, nor being able to frame more applicable to such beings, but only those few taken from ourselves, and from the actions of our own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several parts of our bodies, we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions the several species of spirits one from another, but by attributing those operations and powers we find in ourselves, to them in a higher or lower degree; and so have no very distinct specific ideas of spirits, except only of GOD, to whom we attribute both duration, and all those other ideas with infinity; to the other spirits, with limitation: nor, as I humbly conceive, do we between GOD and them, in our ideas, put any difference by any number of simple ideas, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of infinity. All the particular ideas of existence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, &c. being ideas derived from the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts of spirits, with the difference only of degrees, to the utmost we can imagine, even infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an idea of the first Being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote in the real excellency of his nature, from the highest and perfectest of all created beings, than the greatest man, nay, purest seraphim, is

from the most contemptible part of matter ; and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of him.

§ 12. It is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, that there may be many species of spirits, as much separated and diversified one from another, by distinct properties, whereof we have no ideas, as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities, which we know and observe in them. That there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of sensible and material below us, is probable to me from hence, that in all the visible corporeal world, we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down from us, the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fishes that have wings, and are not strangers to the airy region ; and there are some birds that are inhabitants of the water, whose blood is cold as fishes, and their flesh so like in taste, that the scrupulous are allowed them on fish-days. There are animals so near of kin both to birds and beasts, that they are in the middle between both : amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatic together ; seals live at land and at sea, and porpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog, not to mention what is confidently reported of mermaids or sea-men. There are some brutes that seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some that are called men : and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that if you will take the lowest of one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them ; and so on, till we come to the lowest and

the most inorganical parts of matter, we shall find every-where, that the several species are linked together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think, that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the great design and infinite goodness of the Architect, that the species of creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us downwards: which, if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded, that there are far more species of creatures above us, than there are beneath; we being, in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the infinite being of GOD, than we are from the lowest state of being, and that which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet of all those distinct species, for the reasons above said, we have no clear distinct ideas.

§ 13. But to return to the species of corporeal substances. If I should ask any one whether ice and water were two distinct species of things, I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: and it cannot be denied, but he that says they are two distinct species, is in the right. But if an Englishman, bred in Jamaica, who perhaps had never seen nor heard of ice, coming into England in the winter, find the water he put in his basin at night, in a great part frozen in the morning, and not knowing any peculiar name it had, should call it *hardened water*; I ask, whether this would be a new species to him, different from water? And, I think, it would be answered here, it would not be to him a new species, no more than congealed jelly, when it is cold, is a distinct

species from the same jelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold, in the furnace, is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And if this be so, it is plain, that our distinct species are nothing but distinct complex ideas, with distinct names annexed to them. It is true, every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution, whereon depend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it: but the ranking of things into species, which is nothing but sorting them under several titles, is done by us according to the ideas that we have of them: which though sufficient to distinguish them by names, so that we may be able to discourse of them when we have them not present before us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal constitutions, and that things existing are distinguished by nature into species, by real essences, according as we distinguish them into species by names, we shall be liable to great mistakes.

§ 14. To distinguish substantial beings into species, according to the usual supposition that there are certain precise essences or forms of things, whereby all the individuals existing, are, by nature, distinguished into species, these things are necessary:

§ 15. *First*, To be assured that nature, in the production of things, always designs them to partake of certain regulated established essences, which are to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crude sense, it is usually proposed, would need some better explication before it can fully be assented to.

§ 16. *Secondly*, It would be necessary to know, whether nature always attains that essence it designs in the production of things. The irregular

and monstrous births, that in divers sorts of animals have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one, or both of these.

§ 17. *Thirdly*, It ought to be determined, whether those we call *monsters*, be really a distinct species, according to the scholastic notion of the word *species*; since it is certain, that every thing that exists has its particular constitution: and yet we find, that some of these monstrous productions have few or none of those qualities, which are supposed to result from, and accompany the essence of that species from whence they derive their originals, and to which, by their descent, they seem to belong.

§ 18. *Fourthly*, the real essences of those things which we distinguish into species, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; *i. e.* we ought to have ideas of them. But since we are ignorant in these four points, the supposed real essences of things stand us not in stead for the distinguishing substances into species.

§ 19. *Fifthly*, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that having framed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things flowing from their different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into species. But neither can this be done: for, being ignorant of the real essence itself, it is impossible to know all those properties that flow from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that essence is not there, and so the thing is not of that species. We can never know what are the precise number of properties depending on the real essence of gold, any one of which failing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not be there, unless we

knew the real essence of gold itself, and by that determined that species. By the word *gold* here, I must be understood to design a particular piece of matter; *v. g.* the last guinea that was coined. For if it should stand here in its ordinary signification for that complex idea, which I or any one else calls gold; *i. e.* for the nominal essence of gold, it would be jargon: so hard is it to shew the various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing else but words to do it by.

§ 20. By all which it is clear, that our distinguishing substances into species by names, is not at all founded on their real essences; nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into species, according to internal essential differences.

§ 21. But since, as has been remarked, we have need of general words, though we know not the real essences of things; all we can do, is to collect such a number of simple ideas, as, by examination, we find to be united together in things existing, and thereof to make one complex idea. Which though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists, is yet the specific essence, to which our name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at least try the truth of these nominal essences. For example, there be that say, that the essence of body is extension: if it be so, we can never mistake in putting the essence of any thing for the thing itself. Let us then in discourse put extension for body: and when we would say that body moves, let us say that extension moves, and see how it will look. He that should say, that one extension, by impulse, moves another extension, would, by the bare expression, sufficiently shew the absurdity of such a notion. The essence

of any thing, in respect of us, is the whole complex idea, comprehended and marked by that name; and in substances, besides the several distinct simple ideas that make them up, the confused one of substance, or of an unknown support and cause of their union, is always a part: and therefore the essence of body is not bare extension, but an extended solid thing; and so to say, an extended solid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to say *body* moves, or impels. Likewise, to say, that a rational animal is capable of conversation, is all one as to say, a *man*. But no one will say, that *rationality* is capable of conversation, because it makes not the whole essence to which we give the name *man*.

§ 22. There are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us, that have perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them language too. There are creatures, as it is said, (*sic fides penes authorem*, but there appears no contradiction that there should be such), that with language and reason, and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where the females have. If it be asked, whether these be all *men*, or no, all of human species; it is plain, the question refers only to the nominal essence: for those of them to whom the definition of the word *man*, or the complex idea signified by that name, agrees, are *men*, and the other not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed *real essence*; and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into

our specific idea : only we have reason to think, that where the faculties, or outward frame so much differ, the internal constitution is not exactly the same : but what difference in the internal real constitution makes a specific difference, it is in vain to inquire ; whilst our measures of species be, as they are, only our abstract ideas, which we know ; and not that internal constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair only on the skin, be a mark of a different internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in shape, and want of reason and speech ? and shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man ? And so of the rest, if we pretend that the distinction of species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame, and secret constitutions of things.

§ 23. Nor let any one say, that the power of propagation in animals, by the mixture of male and female, and in plants by seeds, keeps the supposed real species distinct and entire. For granting this to be true, it would help us in the distinction of the species of things no farther than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest ? But in those too it is not sufficient : for, if history lie not, women have conceived by drills ; and what real species, by that measure, such a production will be in nature, will be a new question : and we have reason to think this is not impossible, since mules and jumarts, the one from the mixture of an ass and a mare, the other from the mixture of a bull and a mare, are so frequent in the world. I once saw a creature that was the issue of a cat and a rat, and had the

plain marks of both about it; wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which he that shall add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in nature, will find it hard, even in the race of animals, to determine, by the pedigree, of what species every animal's issue is; and be at a loss about the real essence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation, and has alone a right to the specific name. But farther, if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by propagation, must I go to the Indies to see the sire and dame of the one, and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other, to know whether this be a tyger, or that tea?

§ 24. Upon the whole matter, it is evident, that it is their own collections of sensible qualities, that men make the essences of their several sorts of substances; and that their real internal structures are not considered by the greatest part of men, in the sorting them. Much less were any substantial forms ever thought on by any, but those who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the schools; and yet those ignorant men, who pretend not any insight into the real essences, nor trouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their sensible qualities, are often better acquainted with their differences, can more nicely distinguish them from their uses, and better know what they may expect from each, than those learned quick-sighted men, who look so deep into them, and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential.

§ 25. But supposing that the real essences of

substances were discoverable by those that would severely apply themselves to that inquiry; yet we could not reasonably think, that the ranking of things under general names, was regulated by those internal real constitutions, or any thing else but their obvious appearances: since languages, in all countries, have been established long before sciences. So that they have not been philosophers, or logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences, that have made the general names that are in use amongst the several nations of men: but those, more or less comprehensive terms, have, for the most part, in all languages, received their birth and signification from ignorant and illiterate people, who sorted and denominated things by those sensible qualities they found in them, thereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had an occasion to mention a sort, or a particular thing.

§ 26. Since then it is evident, that we sort and name substances by their nominal, and not by their real essences; the next thing to be considered is, how, and by whom these essences come to be made. As to the latter, it is evident they are made by the mind, and not by nature; for, were they nature's workmanship, they could not be so various and different in several men, as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substances, in all men, the same; no not of that, which, of all others, we are the most intimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be, that the abstract idea, to which the name *man* is given, should be different in several men, if it were of nature's making; and that to one it should be *animal rationale*, and to

another, *animal implume bipes latis unguibus*. He that annexes the name *man* to a complex idea, made up of sense and spontaneous motion, joined to a body of such a shape, has thereby one essence of the species *man*: and he that, upon farther examination, adds rationality, has another essence of the species he calls *man*: by which means the same individual will be a true man to the one, which is not so to the other. I think, there is scarce any one will allow this upright figure, so well known, to be the essential difference of the species man; and yet how far men determine of the sorts of animals, rather by their shape than descent, is very visible; since it has been more than once debated, whether several human fœtuses should be preserved, or received to baptism, or no, only because of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of reason as infants cast in another mould: some whereof, though of an approved shape, are never capable of as much appearance of reason, all their lives, as is to be found in an ape or an elephant; and never give any signs of being acted by a rational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which only was found wanting, and not the faculty of reason, which no-body could know would be wanting in its due season, was made essential to the human species. The learned divine and lawyer, must, on such occasions, renounce his sacred definition of *animal rationale*, and substitute some other essence of the human species. Monsieur Menage furnishes us with an example worth the taking notice of on this occasion. *When the abbot of St Martin, says he, was born, he had so little of the figure of a man, that it be-*

*spake him rather a monster. It was for some time under deliberation, whether he should be baptized or no. However, he was baptized, and declared a man provisionally, [till time should shew what he would prove.] Nature had moulded him so untowardly, that he was called all his life the Abbot Malotru, i. e. ill-shaped. He was of Caen †. This child, we see, was very near being excluded out of the species of *man*, barely by his shape. He escaped very narrowly as he was; and, it is certain, a figure a little more oddly turned had cast him, and he had been executed as a thing not to be allowed to pass for a man. And yet there can be no reason given, why, if the lineaments of his face had been a little altered, a rational soul could not have been lodged in him, why a visage somewhat longer, or a nose flatter, or a wider mouth, could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his ill figure, with such a soul, such parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a dignitary in the church.*

§ 27. Wherein then, would I gladly know, consists the precise and unmoveable boundaries of that species? It is plain, if we examine, there is no such thing made by nature, and established by her amongst men. The real essence of that or any other sort of substances, it is evident we know not; and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences, which we make ourselves, that if several men were to be asked, concerning some oddly shaped foetus, as soon as born, whether it were a man, or no, it is past doubt, one should meet with different answers. Which could not

† Menagiana. $\frac{27}{435}$.

happen, if the nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the species of substances, were not made by man, with some liberty; but were exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature, whereby it distinguished all substances into certain species. Who would undertake to resolve, what species that monster was of, which is mentioned by Licetus †, with a man's head and hog's body? Or those other, which, to the bodies of men, had the heads of beasts, as dogs, horses, &c. If any of these creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would have increased the difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of human shape, and all below swine; had it been murder to destroy it? Or must the bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font, or no? As I have been told, it happened in France some years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are the boundaries of species of animals to us, who have no other measures than the complex ideas of our own collecting: and so far are we from certainly knowing what a man is; though, perhaps, it will be judged great ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may say, that the certain boundaries of that species, are so far from being determined, and the precise number of simple ideas, which make the nominal essence, so far from being settled, and perfectly known, that very material doubts may still arise about it: and I imagine, none of the definitions of the word *man* which we yet have, nor descriptions of that sort of animal, are so perfect and exact, as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive per-

† Lib. i. cap. 3.

son; much less to obtain a general consent, and to be that which men would every-where stick by, in the decision of cases, and determining of life and death, baptism or no baptism, in productions that might happen.

§ 28. But though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes. To the making of any nominal essence, it is necessary, 1. That the ideas whereof it consists, have such an union as to make but one idea how compounded soever. 2. That the particular ideas so united, be exactly the same, neither more nor less. For, if two abstract complex ideas differ either in number or sorts of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the same essence. In the first of these, the mind, in making its complex ideas of substances, only follows nature; and puts none together, which are not supposed to have an union in nature. Nobody joins the voice of a sheep, with the shape of a horse; nor the colour of lead, with the weight and fixedness of gold, to be the complex ideas, of any real substances; unless he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras, and his discourse with unintelligible words. Men observing certain qualities always joined and existing together therein copied nature; and of ideas so united, made their complex ones of substances. For though men may make what complex ideas they please, and give what names to them they will; yet, if they will be understood, when they speak of things really existing, they must, in some degree, conform their ideas to the things they would speak of: or else mens language will be like that of Babel; and every man's words being intelligible only to himself, would no long-

er serve to conversation, and the ordinary affairs of life, if the ideas they stand for be not some way answering the common appearances and agreement of substances, as they really exist.

§ 29. *Secondly*, Though the mind of men, in making its complex ideas of substances, never puts any together that do not really, or are not supposed to co-exist; and so it truly borrows that union from nature: yet the number it combines, depends upon the various care, industry, or fancy, of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with some few sensible obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as those that they take. Of sensible substances there are two sorts; one of organized bodies, which are propagated by seed; and in these, the shape is that, which to us is the leading quality, and most characteristical part, that determines the species: and therefore in vegetables and animals, an extended solid substance of such a certain figure usually serves the turn. For however some men seem to prize their definition of *animal rationale*, yet should there a creature be found, that had language and reason, but partook not of the usual shape of a man, I believe it would hardly pass for a *man*, how much soever it were *animal rationale*. And if Balaam's ass had, all his life, discoursed as rationally as he did once with his master, I doubt yet; whether any one would have thought him worthy the name *man*, or allowed him to be of the same species with himself. As in vegetables and animals it is the shape, so in most other bodies, not propagated by seed, it is the colour we most fix on, and are most led by. Thus where we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine

all the other qualities, comprehended in our complex idea, to be there also: and we commonly take these two obvious qualities, *viz.* shape and colour, for so presumptive ideas of several species, that in a good picture, we readily say, this is a lion, and that a rose; this is a gold, and that a silver goblet, only by the different figures and colours, represented to the eye by the pencil.

§ 30. But though this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions, and unaccurate ways of talking and thinking; yet men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple ideas or qualities, belonging to any sort of things, signified by its name. Nor is it a wonder, since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict inquiry, and long examination, to find out what, and how many those simple ideas are, which are constantly and inseparably united in nature, and are always to be found together in the same subject. Most men wanting either time, inclination, or industry, enough for this, even to some tolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious, and outward appearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common affairs of life. And so, without farther examination, give them names, or take up the names already in use. Which, though in common conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious qualities co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a settled signification, a precise number of simple ideas; much less all those which are united in nature. He that shall consider, after so much stir about *genus* and *species*, and such a deal of talk of specific differences, how few words we have yet settled definitions of, may,

with reason, imagine, that those forms, which there hath been so much noise made about, are only chimæras, which give us no light into the specific natures of things. And he that shall consider, how far the names of substances are from having significations, wherein all who use them do agree, will have reason to conclude, that though the nominal essences of substances are all supposed to be copied from nature, yet they are all, or most of them, very imperfect. Since the composition of those complex ideas are, in several men, very different: and therefore, that these boundaries of species, are as men, and not as nature makes them, if at least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds. It is true, that many particular substances are so made by nature, that they have agreement and likeness one with another, and so afford a foundation of being ranked into sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or the making of determinate species; being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that nature sets the boundaries of the species of things: or if it be so, our boundaries of species are not exactly conformable to those in nature. For we having need of general names for present use, stay not for a perfect discovery of all those qualities, which would best shew us their most material differences and agreements; but we ourselves divide them, by certain obvious appearances, into species, that we may the easier, under general names, communicate our thoughts about them. For having no other knowledge of any substance, but of the simple ideas that are united in it; and observing several particular things to agree with others, in several of those simple ideas,

we make that collection our specific idea, and give it a general name; that in recording our thoughts, and in our discourse with others, we may, in one short word, design all the individuals that agree in that complex idea, without enumerating the simple ideas that make it up; and so not waste our time and breath in tedious descriptions; which we see they are fain to do, who would discourse of any new sort of things, they have not yet a name for.

§ 31. But however these species of substances pass well enough in ordinary conversation, it is plain, that this complex idea, wherein they observe several individuals to agree, is by different men, made very differently; by some more, and others less accurately. In some, this complex idea contains a greater, and in others a smaller number of qualities; and so is apparently such as the mind makes it. The yellow shining colour makes gold to children; others add weight, malleableness, and fusibility; and others yet other qualities which they find joined with that yellow colour, as constantly as its weight and fusibility: for in all these, and the like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex idea of that substance, wherein they are all joined, as another. And therefore different men leaving out, or putting in several simple ideas, which others do not, according to their various examination, skill, or observation of that subject, have different essences of gold; which must therefore be of their own, and not of nature's making.

§ 32. If the number of simple ideas that make the nominal essence of the lowest species, or first sorting of individuals, depends on the mind of man, variously collecting them, it is much more evident

that they do so, in the more comprehensive *classis*, which, by the masters of logic are called *genera*. These are complex ideas designedly imperfect: and it is visible at first sight, that several of those qualities, that are to be found in the things themselves, are purposely left out of generical ideas. For as the mind, to make general ideas, comprehending several particulars, leaves out those of time, and place, and such other that make them incommunicable to more than one individual; so to make other yet more general ideas, that may comprehend different sorts, it leaves out those qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new collection, only such ideas as are common to several sorts. The same convenience that made men express several parcels of yellow matter coming from Guinea and Peru, under one name, sets them also upon making of one name, that may comprehend both gold and silver, and some other bodies of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those qualities, which are peculiar to each sort; and retaining a complex idea made up of those that are common to them all. To which the name *metal* being annexed, there is a *genus* constituted; the essence whereof being that abstract idea, containing only malleableness and fusibility, with certain degrees of weight and fixedness wherein some bodies of several kinds agree, leaves out the colour, and other qualities peculiar to gold and silver, and the other sorts comprehended under the name *metal*. Whereby it is plain, that men follow not exactly the patterns set them by nature, when they make their general ideas of substances; since there is no body to be found, which has barely malleableness and fusibility in it, without other qualities as inseparable as those.

But men, in making their general ideas, seeing more the convenience of language and quick dispatch, by short and comprehensive signs, than the true and precise nature of things, as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract ideas, chiefly pursued that end, which was to be furnished with store of general and variously comprehensive names. So that in this whole business of *genera* and *species*, the *genus*, or more comprehensive, is but a partial conception of what is in the *species*, and the *species* but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore any one will think, that a *man* and a *horse*, and an *animal* and a *plant*, &c. are distinguished by real essences made by nature, he must think nature to be very liberal of these real essences, making one for body, another for an animal and another for a horse; and all these essences liberally bestowed upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly consider what is done, in all these *genera* and *species*, or *sorts*, we should find, that there is no new thing made, but only more or less comprehensive signs, whereby we may be enabled to express, in a few syllables, great numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or less general conceptions, which we have framed to that purpose. In all which, we may observe, that the more general term is always the name of a less complex idea; and that each *genus* is but a partial conception of the *species* comprehended under it. So that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete, it can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them and certain names, which are made use of to signify them; and not in respect of any thing existing, as made by nature.

§ 33. This is adjusted to the true end of speech,

which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions. For thus he, that would discourse of things, as they agreed in the complex idea of extension and solidity, needed but use the word *body* to denote all such. He that to these would join others, signified by the words *life*, *sense*, and *spontaneous motion*, needed but use the word *animal*, to signify all which partook of those ideas : and he that had made a complex idea of a body, with *life*, *sense*, and *motion*, with the faculty of reasoning and a certain shape joined to it, needed but use the short monosyllable *man*, to express all particulars that correspond to that complex idea. This is the proper business of *genus* and *species* : and this men do without any consideration of *real essences* or *substantial forms*, which come not within the reach of our knowledge, when we think of those things ; nor within the signification of our words, when we discourse with others.

§ 34. Were I to talk with any one of a sort of birds, I lately saw in St James's Park, about three or four foot high, with a covering of something between feathers and hair, of a dark brown colour, without wings, but in the place thereof, two or three little branches, coming down like sprigs of Spanish broom ; long great legs, with feet only of three claws, and without a tail ; I must make this description of it, and so may make others understand me : but when I am told, that the name of it is *Cassuaris*, I may then use that word to stand in discourse for all my complex idea mentioned in that description ; though by that word, which is now become a specific name, I know no more of the real essence, or constitution of that sort of animals, than I did before ; and

knew probably as much of the nature of that species of birds, before I learned the name, as many Englishmen do of swans, or herons, which are specific names, very well known of sorts of birds common in England.

§ 35. From what has been said, it is evident, that men make sorts of things. For it being different essences alone that make different species, it is plain, that they who make those abstract ideas, which are the nominal essences, do thereby make the species, or sort. Should there be a body found, having all the other qualities of gold, except malleableness, it would, no doubt, be made a question whether it were gold or no; *i. e.* whether it were of that species. This could be determined only by that abstract idea, to which every one annexed the name *gold*; so that it would be true gold to him, and belong to that species, who included not malleableness in his nominal essence, signified by the sound *gold*; and on the other side, it would not be true gold, or of that species, to him, who included malleableness in his specific idea. And who, I pray, is it, that makes these diverse species, even under one and the same name, but men that make two different abstract ideas, consisting not exactly of the same collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere supposition to imagine, that a body may exist, wherein the other obvious qualities of gold may be without malleableness; since it is certain, that gold itself will be sometimes so eager, as artists call it, that it will as little endure the hammer, as glass itself. What we have said of the putting in, or leaving malleableness out of the complex idea, the name *gold* is by any one annexed to, and may be said of its peculiar weight, fixedness, and several other the

like qualities : for whatsoever is left out, or put in, it is still the complex idea, to which that name is annexed, that makes the species ; and as any particular parcel of matter answers that idea, so the name of the sort belongs truly to it ; and it is of that species. And thus any thing is true gold, perfect metal. All which determination of the species, it is plain depends on the understanding of man, making this or that complex idea.

§ 26. This then, in short, is the case: nature makes many particular things which do agree one with another, in many sensible qualities, and probably too, in their internal frame and constitution: but it is not this *real essence* that distinguishes them into species ; it is *men*, who, taking occasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they observe often several individuals to agree, range them into sorts, in order to their naming, for the convenience of comprehensive signs ; under which, individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abstract idea, come to be ranked as under ensigns ; so that this is of the blue, and the red regiment ; this is a man, that a drill : and in this, I think, consists the whole business of *genus* and *species*.

§ 37. I do not deny, but nature, in the constant production of particular beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike, and of kin one to another : but I think it nevertheless true, that the boundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men ; since the essences of the species, distinguished by different names, are, as has been proved, of man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from. So that

we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men.

§ 38. One thing, I doubt not, but will seem very strange in this doctrine ; which is, that from what has been said, it will follow, that each abstract idea, with a name to it, makes a distinct species. But who can help it, if truth will have it so ? For so it must remain till some-body can shew us the species of things, limited and distinguished by something else ; and let us see, that general terms signify not our abstract ideas, but something different from them. I would fain know, why a flock and a hound are not as distinct species as a spaniel and an elephant. We have no other idea of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel, than we have of the different essence of a flock and a hound ; all the essential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from another, consisting only in the different collection of simple ideas, to which we have given those different names.

§ 39. How much the making of *species* and *genera* is in order to general names, and how much general names are necessary, if not to the being, yet at least to the completing of a species, and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above concerning ice and water, in a very familiar example. A silent and a striking watch are but one species to those who have but one name for them : but he that has the name *watch* for one, and *clock* for the other, and distinct complex ideas, to which those names belong, to him they are different species. It will be said, perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution is different between these two, which the watchmaker has a clear idea of. And yet, it is

plain, they are but one species to him, when he has but one name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance, to make a new species? There are some watches that are made with four wheels, others with five: is this a specific difference to the workman? Some have strings and physies, and others none; some have the balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs bristles: are any, or all of these enough to make a specific difference to the workman, that knows each of these and several other different contrivances, in the internal constitutions of watches? It is certain, each of these hath a real difference from the rest: but whether it be an essential, a specific difference or no, relates only to the complex idea, to which the name *watch* is given: as long as they all agree in the idea which that name stands for, and that name does not as a generical name comprehend different species under it, they are not essentially nor specifically different. But if any one will make minuter divisions from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to such precise complex idea give names that shall prevail, they will then be new species to them, who have those ideas with names to them; and can, by those differences, distinguish watches into these several sorts, and then *watch* will be a generical name. But yet they would be no distinct species to men, ignorant of clock-work, and the inward contrivances of watches, who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk, with the marking of the hours by the hand. For to them all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same idea, and signify no more, nor no other thing but a watch. Just thus, I think, it is in natural things. No-

body will doubt, that the wheels, or springs, if I may so say, within, are different in a rational man and a changeling, no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a drill and a changeling. But whether one or both these differences be essential, or specifical, is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreement with the complex idea that the name *man* stands for; for by that alone can it be determined, whether one, or both, or neither of those, be a man, or no.

§ 40. From what has been before said, we may see the reason why, in the species of artificial things, there is generally less confusion and uncertainty, than in natural. Because an artificial thing being a production of man, which the artificer designed, and therefore well knows the idea of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other idea, nor to import any other essence, than what is certainly to be known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the idea, or essence, of the several sorts of artificial things, consisting, for the most part, in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts; and sometimes motion depending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, such as he finds for his turn, it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain idea thereof; and so settle the signification of the names whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished, with less doubt, obscurity, and equivocation, than we can in things natural, whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our discoveries.

§ 41. I must be excused here, if I think artificial things are of distinct species, as well as natu-

ral: since I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into sorts, by different abstract ideas, with general names annexed to them, as distinct one from another as those of natural substances. For why should we not think a watch and pistol, as distinct species one from another as a *horse* and a *dog*, they will be expressed in our minds by distinct ideas, and to others by distinct appellations?

§ 42. This is farther to be observed concerning substances, that they alone of all our several sorts of ideas, have particular or proper names, whereby one only particular thing is signified. Because in simple ideas, modes, and relations, it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention often this or that particular, when it is absent. Besides, the greatest part of mixed modes, being actions which perish in their birth, are not capable of a lasting duration, as substances, which are the actors; and wherein the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name, have a lasting union.

§ 43. I must beg pardon of my reader, for having dwelt so long upon this subject, and, perhaps, with some obscurity. But I desire it may be considered, how difficult it is to lead another by words into the thoughts of things, stripped of those specifical differences we give them: which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some sort or other, and suggest to the mind the usual abstract idea of that species; and so cross my purpose. For to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary signification of the name *man*, which is our complex idea, usually annexed to it; and bid the reader consider man as he is

in himself, and as he is really distinguished from others in his internal constitution, or real essence, that is, by something he knows not what, looks like trifling; and yet thus one must do, who would speak of the supposed real essences and species of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signified by the general names which substances are called by. But because it is difficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavour, by an example, to make the different consideration the mind has of specific names and ideas, a little more clear; and to shew how the complex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings; or, which is the same, to the signification annexed by others to their received names; and sometimes to no archetypes at all. Give me leave also to shew how the mind always refers its ideas of substances, either to the substances themselves, or to the signification of their names, as to the archetypes; and also to make plain the nature of species, or sorting of things, as apprehended, and made use of by us; and of the essences belonging to those species, which is, perhaps, of more moment, to discover the extent and certainty of our knowledge, than we at first imagine.

§ 44. Let us suppose Adam in the state of a grown man, with a good understanding, but in a strange country, with all things new and unknown about him; and no other faculties to attain the knowledge of them, but what one of this age has now. He observes Lamech more melancholy than usual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife Adah, (whom he most

ardently loved), that she had too much kindness for another man. Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve, and desires her to take care that Adah commit not folly: and in these discourses with Eve, he makes use of these two new words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*. In this, Adam's mistake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from having killed a man: but yet the two names, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*, the one standing for *suspicion*, in a husband, of his wife's disloyalty to him, and the other, for the *act of committing disloyalty*, lost not their distinct significations. It is plain then, that here were two distinct complex ideas of mixed modes, with names to them, two distinct species of actions essentially different; I ask, wherein consisted the essences of these two distinct species of actions? And it is plain, it consisted in a precise combination of simple ideas, different in one from the other. I ask, whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, which he called *Kinneah*, were adequate or no? And it is plain, it was; for it being a combination of simple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without respect to any thing as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted and gave the name *Kinneah* to, to express in short to others, by that one sound, all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one; it must necessarily follow, that it was an adequate idea. His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being referred to no other archetype, which it was supposed to represent.

§ 45. These words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*, by degrees grew into common use; and then the case

was somewhat altered. Adam's children had the same faculties, and thereby the same power that he had, to make what complex ideas of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds; to abstract them, and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use of names being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the same sign stands for the same idea in two who would communicate their thoughts, and discourse together. Those therefore of Adam's children that found these two words, *Kinneah* and *Nioup*, in familiar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds; but must needs conclude, they stood for something, for certain ideas, abstract ideas, they being general names, which abstract ideas were the essences of the species distinguished by those names. If therefore they would use these words as names of species already established and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, signified by these names, to the ideas that they stood for in other mens minds, as to their patterns and archetypes; and then indeed their ideas of these complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other mens minds, using the same names: though for this, there be usually a remedy at hand, which is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not, of him that uses it: it being as impossible to know certainly what the words *jealousy* and *adultery* (which, I think, answer קנאה and זנות) stand for in another man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was impossible, in the beginning of language, to know

what *Kinneah* and *Niouph* stood for in another man's mind, without explication, they being voluntary signs in every one.

§ 46. Let us now also consider after the same manner, the names of substances, in their first application. One of Adam's children, roving in the mountains, lights on a glittering substance, which pleases his eye, home he carries it to Adam, who, upon consideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight. These perhaps, at first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it, and abstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance having that peculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives it the name *Zahab*, to denominate and mark all substances that have these sensible qualities in them. It is evident now, that, in this case, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before, in forming those ideas of mixed modes, to which he gave the name *Kinneah* and *Niouph*. For there he puts ideas together only by his own imagination, not taken from the existence of any thing; and to them he gave names to denominate all things, that should happen to agree to those his abstract ideas, without considering whether any such thing did exist, or no; the standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his idea of this new substance he takes the quite contrary course; here he has a standard made by nature; and therefore being to represent that to himself by the idea he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no simple idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of from the thing itself. He takes care that his idea be conformable

to this archetype, and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable.

§ 47. This piece of matter, thus denominated *Zahab* by Adam, being quite different from any he had seen before, no-body, I think, will deny to be a distinct species, and to have its peculiar essence; and that the name *Zahab* is the mark of the species, and a name belonging to all things partaking in that essence. But here it is plain, the essence Adam made the name *Zahab* stand for, was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquisitive mind of man, not content with the knowledge of these, as I may say, superficial qualities, puts Adam on farther examination of this matter. He therefore knocks, and beats it with flints, to see what was discoverable in the inside: he finds it yield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces: he finds it will bend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his former idea, and made part of the essence of the species that name *Zahab* stands for? Farther trials discover fusibility and fixedness. Are not they also, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into the complex idea signified by the name *Zahab*? If not, what reason will there be shewn more for the one than the other? If these must, then all the other properties, which any farther trials shall discover in this matter, ought, by the same reason, to make a part of the ingredients of the complex idea which the name *Zahab* stands for, and so be the essence of the species marked by that name. Which properties, because they are endless, it is plain, that the idea made after this fashion by this archetype, will be always inadequate.

§ 48. But this is not all, it would also follow, that the *names of substances* would not only have, as in truth they have, but would also be supposed to have different significations, as used by different men, which would very much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct quality, that were discovered in any matter by any one, were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex idea, signified by the common name given it, it must follow, that men must suppose the same word to signify different things in different men: since they cannot doubt, but different men may have discovered several qualities in substances of the same denomination, which others know nothing of.

§ 49. To avoid this therefore, they have supposed a real essence belonging to every species, from which these properties all flow, and would have their name of the species stand for that. But they not having any idea of that real essence in substances, and their words signifying nothing but the ideas they have, that which is done by this attempt, is only to put the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that real essence, without knowing what the real essence is; and this is that which men do, when they speak of species of things, as supposing them made by nature, and distinguished by real essences.

§ 50. For let us consider, when we affirm, that all gold is fixed, either it means that fixedness is a part of the definition, part of the nominal essence the word *gold* stands for; and so this affirmation, *all gold is fixed*, contains nothing but the signification of the term *gold*. Or else it means, that fixedness not being a part of the definition of the word *gold*, is a property of that sub-

stance itself: in which case, it is plain, that the word *gold* stands in the place of substance, having the real essence of a species of things, made by nature. In which way of substitution, it has so confused and uncertain a signification, that though this proposition, *gold is fixed*, be in that sense an affirmation of something real; yet it is a truth will always fail us in its particular application, and so is of no real use nor certainty. For let it be never so true, that all gold, *i. e.* all that has the real essence of gold, is fixed, what serves this for, whilst we know not, in this sense, what is, or is not gold? For, if we know not the real essence of gold, it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that essence, and so whether it be true gold or no.

§ 51. To conclude; what liberty Adam had at first to make any complex ideas of mixed modes, by no other pattern but his own thoughts, the same have all men ever since had. And the same necessity of conforming his ideas of substances to things without him, as to archetypes made by nature, that Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the same are all men ever since under too. The same liberty also that Adam had of affixing any new name to any idea, the same has any one still, (especially the beginners of languages, if we can imagine any such), but only with this difference, that in places where men in society have already established a language amongst them, the signification of words are very warily and sparingly to be altered. Because men being furnished already with names for their ideas, and common use having appropriated known names to certain ideas, an affected misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous.

He that hath new notions, will perhaps venture sometimes on the coining of new terms to express them; but men think it a boldness, and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make them pass for current. But in communication with others, it is necessary that we conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language stand for, to their known proper significations, (which I have explained at large already), or else to make known that new signification we apply them to.

CH A P. VII.

Of PARTICLES.

§ 1. *Particles connect parts, or whole sentences together.* § 2. *In them consists the art of well-speaking.* § 3, 4. *They shew what relation the mind gives to its own thoughts.* § 5. *Instance in BUT.* § 6. *This matter but slightly touched here.*

§ 1. **B**ESIDES words, which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great many others that are made use of, to signify the *connection* that the mind gives to ideas, or propositions, one with another. The mind, in communicating its thought to others, does not only need signs of the ideas it has then before it, but others also, to shew or intimate some particular action of its own, at that time, relating to those ideas. This it does several ways; as *is*, and *is not*, are the general marks of the mind affirming or denying. But besides, affirmation or negation, with-

out which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of propositions, but whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse.

§ 2. The words, whereby it signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration, are generally called *PARTICLES*; and it is in the right use of these, that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style. To think well, it is not enough that a man has ideas clear and distinct in his thoughts, nor that he observes the agreement, or disagreement of some of them; but he must think in train, and observe the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings, one upon another: and to express well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words to shew what connection, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis, &c. he gives to each respective part of his discourse. To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing his hearer: and therefore it is, that those words, which are not truly, by themselves, the names of any ideas, are of such constant and indispensable use in language, and do much contribute to mens well expressing themselves.

§ 3. This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write, one after another, of *cases* and *genders*, *moods* and *tenses*, *gerunds* and *supines*: in these, and the like, there has been great diligence used; and particles themselves, in some languages, have been, with great

shew of exactness, ranked into their several orders. But though prepositions and conjunctions, &c. are names well known in grammar, and the *particles* contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions; yet he who would shew the right use of particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.

§ 4. Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them, as is usual in dictionaries, by words of another tongue which comenearest to their signification: for what is meant by them, is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as another language. They are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Of these, there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by; and therefore it is not to be wondered, that most of these particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew tongue, there is a particle consisting of but one single letter, of which there are reckoned up, as I remember, seventy, I am sure above fifty, several significations.

§ 5. BUT is a particle, none more familiar in our language; and he that says it is a discreitive conjunction, and that it answers *sed* in Latin, or *mais* in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But it seems to me to intimate several relations the mind gives to the several propositions

or parts of them, which it joins by this monosyllable.

1. *BUT to say no more*: here it intimates a stop of the mind, in the course it was going, before it came quite to the end of it.

2. *I saw BUT two plants*: here it shews, that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.

3. *You pray; BUT it is not that GOD would bring you to the true religion,*

4. *BUT that he would confirm you in your own*: the first of these BUTS intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shews, that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before it.

5. *All animals have sense; BUT a dog is an animal*: here it signifies little more, but that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as the *minor* of a syllogism.

§ 6. To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other significations of this particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found; which, if one should do, I doubt whether, in all those manners it is made use of, it would deserve the title of *discretive*, which grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs. The instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles, some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them.

C H A P. VIII.

Of ABSTRACT *and* CONCRETE TERMS.

§ 1. *Abstract terms not predicable one of another, and why.* § 2. *They shew the difference of our ideas.*

§ 1. **T**HE ordinary words of language, and our common use of them, would have given us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but considered with attention. The mind, as has been shewn, has a power to abstract its ideas, and so they become essences, general essences, whereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now, each abstract idea being distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in propositions, no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another. This we see in the common use of language, which permits not any two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, to be affirmed one of another. For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how certain soever it is, that man is an animal, or rational, or white; yet every one, at first hearing, perceives the falsehood of these propositions; *Humanity is animality, or rationality, or whiteness*: and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only in-concrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract idea to be another, but one abstract idea to be joined to another; which abstract ideas, in sub-

stances, may be of any sort ; in all the rest, are little else but of relations ; and in substances, the most frequent are of powers ; *v. g. a man is white*, signifies, that the thing that has the essence of a man, has also in it the essence of whiteness, which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one, whose eyes can discover ordinary objects ; or *a man is rational*, signifies, that the same thing that hath the essence of a man hath also in it the essence of rationality, *i. e.* a power of reasoning.

§ 2. This distinction of names shews us also the difference of our ideas : for, if we observe them, we shall find, that our simple ideas have all *abstract* as well as *concrete* names : the one whereof is (to speak the language of grammarians) a substantive, the other an adjective ; as whiteness, white ; sweetness, sweet. The like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations ; as justice, just ; equality, equal ; only with this difference, that some of the concrete names of relations, amongst men chiefly, are substantives ; as *paternitas*, *pater* ; whereof it were easy to render a reason. But as to our ideas of *substances*, we have very few or no abstract names at all. For, though the schools have introduced *animalitas*, *humanitas*, *corporietas*, and some others ; yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of substances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract ones : and those few that the schools forged, and put into the mouths of their scholars, could never yet get admittance into common use, or obtain the license of public approbation. Which seems, to me at least, to intimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no ideas of

the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas ; which, no doubt, they would have had, had not their consciousness to themselves of their ignorance of them, kept them from so idle an attempt. And therefore though they had ideas enough to distinguish gold from a stone, and metal from wood ; yet they but timorously ventured on such terms, as *aurietas* and *saxietas*, *metallietas* and *lignietas*, or the like names, which should pretend to signify the real essences of those substances, whereof they knew they had no ideas. And indeed, it was only the doctrine of substantial forms, and the confidence of mistaken pretenders to acknowledge that they had not, which first coined, and then introduced *animalitas* and *humanitas*, and the like ; which yet went very little farther than their own schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding men. Indeed, *humanitas* was a word familiar amongst the Romans ; but in a far different sense, and stood not for the abstract essence of any substance ; but was the abstracted name of a mode, and its concrete *humanus*, not *homo*.

C H A P. IX.

Of the IMPERFECTION of WORDS.

§ 1. *Words are used for recording and communicating our thoughts.* § 2. *Any words will serve for recording.* § 3. *Communication by words, civil or philosophical.* § 4. *The imperfection of words is the doubtfulness of their signification.* § 5. *Causes of their imperfection.* § 6. *The names of mixed modes doubtful. First, Because the ideas they stand for, are so complex.* § 7. *Secondly, Because they have no standards.* § 8. *Propriety not a sufficient remedy.* § 9. *The way of learning these names contributes also to their doubtfulness.* § 10. *Hence unavoidable obscurity in antient authors.* § 11. *Names of substances, of doubtful signification.* § 12. *Names of substances referred, First, To real essences that cannot be known.* § 13, 14. *Secondly, To co-existing qualities, which are known but imperfectly.* § 15. *With this imperfection they may serve for civil, but not well for philosophical use.* § 16. *Instance, liquor of nerves.* § 17. *Instance, gold.* § 18. *The names of simple ideas the least doubtful.* § 19. *And next to them simple modes.* § 20. *The most doubtful are the names of very compounded mixed modes and substances.* § 21. *Why this imperfection charged upon words.* § 22, 23. *This should teach us moderation, in imposing our own sense of old authors.*

§ 1. **F**ROM what has been said in the foregoing chapters, it is easy to perceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the

very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations. To examine the perfection or imperfection of words, it is necessary first to consider their use and end: for as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so are they more or less perfect. We have, in the former part of this discourse, often, upon occasion, mentioned a double use of words.

First, One for the recording of our own thoughts.

Secondly, The other for the communicating of our thoughts to others.

§ 2. As to the first of these, for the recording our own thoughts for the help of our own memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves, any words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words he pleases, to signify his own ideas to himself; and there will be no imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same sign for the same idea; for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right use and perfection of language.

§ 3. *Secondly*, As to communication of words, that too has a double use.

1st, Civil.

2^{dly}, Philosophical.

1st, By their *civil use*, I mean such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may serve for the upholding common conversation and commerce about the ordinary affairs and conveniencies of civil life, in the societies of men one amongst another.

2^{dly}, By the *philosophical use* of words, I mean such an use of them as may serve to convey the

precise notions of things, and to express, in general propositions, certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with, in its search after true knowledge. These two uses are very distinct; and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one, than in the other, as we shall see in what follows.

§ 4. The chief end of language in communication being to be understood, words serve not well for that end, neither in civil nor philosophical discourse, when any word does not excite in the hearer the same idea which it stands for in the mind of the speaker. Now, since sounds have no natural connection with our ideas, but have all their signification from the arbitrary imposition of men, the doubtfulness and uncertainty of their signification, which is the imperfection we here are speaking of, has its cause more in the ideas they stand for, than in any incapacity there is in one sound, more than in another, to signify any idea: for in that regard they are all equally perfect.

That then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification of some more than other words, is the difference of ideas they stand for.

§ 5. Words having naturally no signification, the idea which each stands for, must be learned and retained by those who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible discourse with others, in any language. But this is hardest to be done, where,

1. The ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of ideas put together.

2. Where the ideas they stand for have no cer-

tain connection in nature ; and so no settled standard any where in nature existing, to rectify and adjust them by.

3. When the signification of the word is referred to a standard, which standard is not easy to be known.

4. Where the signification of the word, and the real essence of the thing, are not exactly the same.

These are difficulties that attend the signification of several words that are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all, such as names standing for any simple ideas, which another has not organs or faculties to attain ; as the names of colours to a blind man, or sounds to a deaf man, need not here be mentioned.

In all these cases, we shall find an imperfection in words, which I shall more at large explain, in their particular application to our several sorts of ideas: for, if we examine them, we shall find, that the names of mixed modes are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection, for the two first of these reasons ; and the names of substances chiefly for the two latter.

§ 6. *First*, The names of *mixed modes* are, many of them, liable to great uncertainty and obscurity in their signification.

1st, Because of that *great composition* these complex ideas are often made up of. To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it is necessary, as has been said, that they excite in the hearer exactly the same idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this, men fill one another's heads with noise and sounds ; but convey not thereby their thoughts, and lay not before one

another their ideas, which is the end of discourse and language. But when a word stands for a very complex idea, that is compounded and decomposed, it is not easy for men to form and retain that idea so exactly, as to make the name in common use stand for the same precise idea, without any the least variation. Hence it comes to pass, that mens names of very compound ideas, such as for the most part are moral words, have seldom, in two different men, the same precise signification, since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own, from that which he had yesterday, or will have to-morrow.

§ 7. 2dly, Because the names of mixed modes, for the most part, *want standards* in nature, whereby men may rectify and adjust their significations; therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are assemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind, pursuing its own ends of discourse, and suited to its own notions, whereby it designs not to copy any thing really existing, but to denominate and rank things as they come to agree with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that first brought the word *sham*, or *wheelde*, or *banter*, in use, put together, as he thought fit, those ideas he made it stand for: and as it is with any new names of modes, that are now brought into any language; so was it with the old ones, when they were first made use of. Names, therefore, that stand for collections of ideas, which the mind makes at pleasure, must needs be of doubtful signification, when such collections are no-where to be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shewn whereby men may adjust them. What the word

murder, or *sacrilege*, &c. signifies, can never be known from things themselves ; there be many of the parts of those complex ideas, which are not visible in the action itself, the intention of the mind, or the relation of holy things, which make a part of *murder* or *sacrilege*, have no necessary connection with the outward and visible action of him that commits either : and the pulling the trigger of the gun, with which the murder is committed, and is all the action that, perhaps, is visible, has no natural connection with those other ideas, that make up the complex one, named *murder*. They have their union and combination only from the understanding, which unites them under one name : but uniting them without any rule, or pattern, it cannot be but that the signification of the name, that stands for such voluntary collections, should be often various in the minds of different men, who have scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notions by, in such arbitrary ideas.

§ 8. It is true, *common use*, that is the rule of propriety, may be supposed here to afford some aid, to settle the signification of language ; and it cannot be denied, but that in some measure it does. Common use regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation ; but no-body having an authority to establish the precise signification of words, nor determine to what ideas any one shall annex them, common use is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical discourses ; there being scarce any name, of any very complex idea, to say nothing of others, which, in common use, has not a great latitude, and which, keeping within the bounds of propriety, may not be made the sign of far different ideas.

Besides, the rule and measure of property itself being no-where established, it is often matter of dispute, whether this or that way of using a word, be propriety of speech, or no. From all which it is evident, that the names of such kind of very complex ideas, are naturally liable to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain signification; and even in men, that have a mind to understand one another, do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer. Though the names *glory* and *gratitude* be the same in every man's mouth, through a whole country, yet the complex collective idea, which every one thinks on, or intends by that name, is apparently very different in men using the same language.

§ 9. The way also wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned, does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification. For, if we will observe how children learn languages, we shall find, that to make them understand what the names of simple ideas, or substances, stand for, people ordinarily shew them the thing whereof they would have them have the idea, and then repeat to them the name that stands for it, as *white*, *sweet*, *milk*, *sugar*, *cat*, *dog*. But as for mixed modes, especially the most material of them, moral words, the sounds are usually learned first; and then to know what complex ideas they stand for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or, which happens for the most part, are left to their own observation and industry; which being little laid out in their search of the true and precise meaning of names, these moral words are, in most men's mouths, little more than bare sounds; or when they have any, it is for the most part but a very

loose and undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused signification. And even those themselves, who have with more attention settled their notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience, to have them stand for complex ideas, different from those which other, even intelligent and studious men, make them the signs of. Where shall one find any, either controversial debate, or familiar discourse, concerning honour, faith, grace, religion, church, &c. wherein it is not easy to observe the different notions men have of them? which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification of those words; nor have in their minds the same complex ideas which they make them stand for: and so all the contests that follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a sound. And hence we see, that in the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end; comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for explications: and of limiting, distinguishing, varying the signification of these moral words, there is no end. These ideas of mens making, are, by men still having the same power, multiplied *in infinitum*. Many a man, who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text of scripture, or clause in the code, at first reading, has, by consulting commentators, quite lost the sense of it, and by these elucidations, given rise or increase to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place. I say not this, that I think commentaries needless; but to shew how uncertain the names of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had both the intention and the faculty of speaking as clearly as language was capable to express their thoughts.

§ 10. What obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men, who have lived in remote ages, and different countries, it will be needless to take notice; since the numerous volumes of learned men, employing their thoughts that way, are proofs, more than enough, to shew what attention, study, sagacity, and reasoning, are required to find out the true meaning of antient authors. But there being no writings we have any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of, but those that contain either truths we are required to believe, or laws we are to obey, and draw inconveniencies on us when we mistake or transgress, we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors, who writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater necessity to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on their decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their notions: and therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use their words with a due clearness and perspicuity, we may lay them aside, and, without any injury done them, resolve thus with ourselves:

Si non vls intelligi, debes negligi.

§ 11. If the signification of the names of mixed modes are uncertain, because there be no real standards existing in nature, to which those ideas are referred, and by which they may be adjusted, the names of substances are of a doubtful signification, for a contrary reason, *viz.* because the ideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things, and are referred to standards made by nature. In our ideas of substances we have not the liberty, as in mixed modes, to frame what combinations we think fit, to be the charac-

teristical notes, to rank and denominate things by. In these we must follow nature, suit our complex ideas to real existences, and regulate the signification of their names by the things themselves, if we will have our names to be the signs of them, and stand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; but patterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain: for names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the ideas they stand for be referred to standards without us, that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.

§. 12. The names of substances have, as has been shewn, a double reference in their ordinary use.

First, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their signification is supposed to agree to the real constitution of things, from which all their properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this real constitution, or (as it is apt to be called) essence, being utterly unknown to us, any sound that is put to stand for it, must be very uncertain in its application; and it will be impossible to know, what things are, or ought to be called an *horse* or *antimony*, when those words are put for real essences, that we have no ideas of at all. And therefore in this supposition, the names of substances being referred to standards that cannot be known, their significations can never be adjusted and established by those standards.

§. 13. *Secondly*, The simple ideas that are found to co-exist in substances, being that which their names immediately signify, these, as united in the several sorts of things, are the proper stan-

dards to which their names are referred, and by which their significations may be best rectified. But neither will these archetypes so well serve to this purpose, as to leave these names, without very various and uncertain significations. Because these simple ideas that co-exist, and are united in the same subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex specific idea, which the specific name is to stand for, men, though they propose to themselves the very same subject to consider, yet frame very different ideas about it; and so the name they use for it unavoidably comes to have, in several men, very different significations. These simple qualities which make up the complex ideas, being most of them powers in relation to changes, which they are apt to make in, or receive from other bodies, are almost infinite. He that shall but observe, what a great variety of alterations any one of the baser metals is apt to receive, from the different application only of fire; and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive in the hands of a chymist, by the application of other bodies, will not think it strange, that I count the properties of any sort of bodies not easy to be collected, and completely known by the ways of inquiry which our faculties are capable of. They being therefore at least so many, that no man can know the precise and definite number, they are differently discovered by different men, according to their various skill, attention, and ways of handling; who therefore cannot chuse but have different ideas of the same substances, and therefore make the signification of its common name very various and uncertain. For the complex ideas of substances, being made up

of such simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in nature, every one has a right to put into his complex idea, those qualities he has found to be united together. For, though in the substance *gold*, one satisfies himself with colour and weight, yet another thinks solubility in *aqua regia* as necessary to be joined with that colour in his idea of gold, as any one does its fusibility; solubility in *aqua regia*, being a quality as constantly joined with its colour and weight, as fusibility or any other: others put in its ductility or fixedness, &c. as they have been taught by tradition, or experience. Who of all these has established the right signification of the word *gold*? or who shall be the judge to determine? Each has his standard in nature, which he appeals to, and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea; signified by the word *gold*, those qualities which, upon trial, he has found united; as another, who has not so well examined, has to leave them out; or a third, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the union in nature of these qualities, being the true ground of their union in one complex idea, who can say, one of them has more reason to be put in, or left out, than another? From hence it will always unavoidably follow, that the complex ideas of substances, in men using the same name for them, will be very various; and so the significations of those names very uncertain.

§ 14. Besides, there is scarce any particular thing existing, which, in some of its simple ideas, does not communicate with a greater, and in others a less number of particular beings: who shall determine in this case, which are those that are to make up the precise collection, that is

to be signified by the specific name; or can, with any just authority, prescribe which obvious or common qualities are to be left out, or which more secret, or more particular, are to be put into the signification of the name of any substance? All which together, seldom or never fail to produce that various and doubtful signification in the names of substances, which causes such uncertainty, disputes, or mistakes, when we come to a philosophical use of them.

§ 15. It is true, as to civil and common conversation, the general names of substances, regulated in their ordinary signification by some obvious qualities, (as by the shape and figure in things of known seminal propagation, and in other substances, for the most part by colour, joined with some other sensible qualities), do well enough to design the things men would be understood to speak of: and so they usually conceive well enough the substances meant by the word *gold* or *apple*, to distinguish the one from the other. But in philosophical inquiries and debates, where general truths are to be established, and consequences drawn from positions laid down, there the precise signification of the names of substances will be found, not only not to be well established, but also very hard to be so. For example, he that shall make malleableness, or a certain degree of fixedness, a part of his complex idea of gold, may make propositions concerning gold, and draw consequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from gold, taken in such a signification; but yet such as another man can never be forced to admit, nor be convinced of their truth, who makes not malleableness, or the same degree of fixedness, part of that com-

plex idea that the name *gold*, in his use of it, stands for.

§ 16. This is a natural, and almost unavoidable imperfection in almost all the names of substances, in all languages whatsoever, which men will easily find, when once passing from confused or loose notions, they come to more strict and close inquiries. For then they will be convinced how doubtful and obscure those words are in their signification, which, in ordinary use, appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a meeting of very learned and ingenious physicians, where, by chance, there arose a question, whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the nerves. The debate having been managed a good while, by variety of arguments on both sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that the greatest part of disputes were more about the signification of words, than a real difference in the conception of things) desired, that before they went any farther on in this dispute, they would first examine, and establish amongst them, what the word *liquor* signified. They at first were a little surprised at the proposal; and had they been persons less ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one: since there was no one there that thought not himself to understand very perfectly, what the word *liquor* stood for; which, I think too, none of the most perplexed names of substances. However, they were pleased to comply with my motion, and upon examination found, that the signification of that word was not so settled and certain, as they had all imagined; but that each of them made it a sign of a different complex idea. This made them perceive, that the main of their dispute was about the

signification of that term; and that they differed very little in their opinions, concerning some fluid and subtle matter, passing through the conduits of the nerves; though it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called *liquor* or no; a thing which, when considered, they thought it not worth the contending about.

§ 17. How much this is the case, in the greatest part of disputes that men are engaged so hotly in, I shall, perhaps, have an occasion in another place to take notice. Let us only here consider a little more exactly the fore-mentioned instance of the word *gold*, and we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its signification. I think all agree to make it stand for a body of a certain yellow shining colour; which being the idea to which children have annexed that name, the shining yellow part of a peacock's tail is properly to them gold. Others finding fusibility joined with that yellow colour in certain parcels of matter, make of that combination a complex idea, to which they give the name *gold*, to denote a sort of substances; and so exclude from being gold all such yellow shining bodies as, by fire, will be reduced to ashes; and admit to be of that species, or to be comprehended under that name *gold*, only such substances as, having that shining yellow colour, will, by fire, be reduced to fusion, and not to ashes. Another, by the same reason, adds the weight, which, being a quality as straitly joined with that colour as its fusibility, he thinks has the same reason to be joined in its idea, and to be signified by its name: and therefore the other made up of body, of such a colour and fusibility, to be imperfect; and so on of all the rest: wherein no one can shew a reason, why some of the inseparable

qualities, that are always united in nature, should be put into the nominal essence, and others left out: or why the word *gold*, signifying that sort of body the ring on his finger is made of, should determine that sort, rather by its colour, weight, and fusibility, than by its colour, weight, and solubility in *aqua regia*: since the dissolving it by that liquor, is as inseparable from it, as the fusion by fire; and they are both of them nothing but the relation which that substance has to two other bodies, which have a power to operate differently upon it. For, by what right is it, that fusibility comes to be a part of the essence signified by the word *gold*, and solubility but a property of it? or why is its colour part of the essence, and its malleableness but a property? That which I mean, is this, that these being all but properties, depending on its real constitution, and nothing but powers, either active or passive, in reference to other bodies, no one has authority to determine the signification of the word *gold* (as referred to such a body existing in nature) more to one collection of ideas to be found in that body, than to another: whereby the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain. Since, as has been said, several people observe several properties in the same substance; and, I think, I may say no-body all. And therefore we have but very imperfect descriptions of things, and words have very uncertain significations.

§ 18. From what has been said, it is easy to observe, what has been before remarked, *viz*: that the names of simple ideas are, of all others, the least liable to mistakes; and that for these reasons. 1. Because the ideas they stand for, being each but one single perception, are much ea-

fier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones, and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those compounded ones of substances and mixed modes, in which the precise number of simple ideas, that make them up, are not easily agreed, and so readily kept in the mind. And, 2. Because they are never referred to any other essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify: which reference is that which renders the signification of the names of substances naturally so perplexed, and gives occasion to so many disputes. Men that do not perversely use their words, or on purpose set themselves to cavil, seldom mistake, in any language which they are acquainted with, the use and signification of the names of simple ideas; *white* and *sweet*, *yellow* and *bitter*, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is ignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what precise collection of simple ideas, *modesty* or *frugality*, stand for in another's use, is not so certainly known. And however, we are apt to think, we well enough know, what is meant by *gold* or *iron*; yet the precise complex idea, others make them the signs of, is not so certain: and, I believe, it is very seldom that, in speaker and hearer, they stand for exactly the same collection. Which must needs produce mistakes and disputes, when they are made use of in discourses, wherein men have to do with universal propositions, and would settle in their minds universal truths, and consider the consequences that follow from them.

§ 19. By the same rule, the names of simple modes are, next to those of simple ideas, least liable to doubt and uncertainty, especially those of

figure and number, of which men have so clear and distinct ideas. Who ever, that had a mind to understand them, mistook the ordinary meaning of *seven*, or a *triangle*; and in general, the least compounded ideas in every kind, have the least dubious names.

§ 20. Mixed modes therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious simple ideas, have usually names of no very uncertain signification. But the names of mixed modes, which comprehend a great number of simple ideas, are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning, as has been shewn. The names of substances, being annexed to ideas, that are neither the real essences, nor exact representations of the patterns they are referred to, are liable yet to greater imperfection and uncertainty, especially when we come to a philosophical use of them.

§ 21. The great disorder that happens in our names of substances, proceeding for the most part from our want of knowledge, and inability to penetrate into their real constitutions, it may probably be wondered, why I charge this as an imperfection, rather upon our words than understandings. This exception has so much appearance of justice, that I think myself obliged to give a reason why I have followed this method. I must confess then, that when I first began this discourse of the understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it. But when having passed over the original and composition of our ideas; I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so near a connection with words, that unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed,

there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between our understandings and the truth, which it would contemplate and apprehend, that like the medium through which visible objects pass, their obscurity and disorder does not seldom cast a mist before our eyes, and impose upon our understandings. If we consider, in the fallacies men put upon themselves, as well as others, and the mistakes in mens disputes and notions, how great a part is owing to words, and their uncertain or mistaken significations, we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle in the way to knowledge, which, I conclude, we are the more carefully to be warned of, because it has been so far from being taken notice of as an inconvenience, that the arts of improving it have been made the business of mens study, and obtained the reputation of learning and subtilty, as we shall see in the following chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfections of language, as the instrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controversies that make such a noise in the world, would of themselves cease; and the way to knowledge, and, perhaps, peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does.

§ 22. Sure I am, that the signification of words, in all languages, depending very much on the thoughts, notions, and ideas of him that uses them, must unavoidably be of great uncertainty

to men of the same language and country. This is so evident in the Greek authors, that he that shall peruse their writings, will find in almost every one of them a distinct language, though the same words. But when, to this natural difficulty in every country, there shall be added different countries, and remote ages, wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions, tempers, customs, ornaments, and figures of speech, &c. every one of which influenced the signification of their words then, though to us now they are lost and unknown, it would become us to be charitable one to another in our interpretations or misunderstanding of those antient writings, which though of great concernment to be understood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech; which (if we except the names of simple ideas, and some very obvious things) is not capable, without a constant defining the terms, of conveying the sense and intention of the speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to the hearer. And in discourses of religion, law, and morality, as they are matters of the highest concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty.

§ 23. The volumes of interpreters, and commentators on the Old and New Testament, are but too manifest proofs of this. Though every thing said in the text be infallibly true, yet the reader may be, nay, cannot chuse but be very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to be wondered, that the will of God, when clothed in words, should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that sort of conveyance; when even his Son, whilst clothed in flesh, was subject to all the frailties and inconveniencies of human nature, sin excepted. And we ought

to magnify his goodness, that he hath spread before all the world such legible characters of his works and providence, and given all mankind so sufficient a light of reason, that they, to whom this written word never came, could not (whensoever they set themselves to search) either doubt of the being of a GOD, or of the obedience due to him. Since then the precepts of natural religion are plain, and very intelligible to all mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; and other revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages, are liable to the common and natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words, methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter.

CHAP. X.

Of the ABUSE of WORDS.

- § 1. *Abuse of words.* § 2, 3. *First, Words without any, or without clear ideas.* § 4. *Occasioned by learning names before the ideas they belong to.* § 5. *Secondly, Unsteady application of them.* § 6. *Thirdly, Affected obscurity by wrong application.* § 7. *Logic and dispute has much contributed to this.* § 8. *Calling it subtilty.* § 9. *This learning very little benefits society.* § 10. *But destroys the instruments of knowledge and communication.* § 11. *As useful as to confound the sound of the letters.* § 12. *This art has perplexed religion and justice.* § 13. *And ought not to pass for learning.* § 14. *Fourthly, Taking them for things.* § 15. *Instance, in matter.* § 16. *This makes errors lasting.* § 17. *Fifthly, Setting them for what they cannot signify.* § 18. *V. g. Putting them for the real essence of substances.* § 19. *Hence we think every change of our idea in substances, not to change the species.* § 20. *The cause of the abuse, a supposition of nature's working always regularly.* § 21. *This abuse contains two false suppositions.* § 22. *Sixthly, A supposition that words have a certain and evident signification.* § 23. *The end of language: First, To convey our ideas.* § 24. *Secondly, To do it with quickness.* § 25. *Thirdly, Therewith to convey the knowledge of things.* § 26—31. *How mens words fail in all these.* § 32. *How in substances.* § 33.

How in modes and relations. § 34. Seventhly, Figurative speech also an abuse of language.

§ 1. **B**ESIDES the imperfection that is naturally in language, and the obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are several wilful faults and neglects which men are guilty of, in this way of communication, whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification, than naturally they need to be.

§ 2. *First*, In this kind, the first and most palpable abuse is, the using of words without clear and distinct ideas; or, which is worse, signs without any thing signified. Of these there are two sorts.

I. One may observe, in all languages, certain words, that, if they be examined, will be found, in their first original, and their appropriated use, not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas. These, for the most part, the several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced. For their authors, or promoters, either affecting something singular, and out of the way of common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions, or cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to coin new words, and such as, when they come to be examined, may justly be called *insignificant terms*. For, having either had no determinate collection of ideas annexed to them, when they were first invented; or at least such as, if well examined, will be found inconsistent, it is no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain empty sounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths, as

the distinguishing characters of their church, or school, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. I shall not need here to heap up instances, every one's reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him : or, if he wants to be better stored, the great mint-masters of these kind of terms, I mean the schoolmen and metaphysicians, (under which I think, the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended), have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

§ 3. II. Others there be, who extend this abuse yet farther, who take so little care to lay by words, which, in their primary notation, have scarce any clear and distinct ideas which they are annexed to, that, by an unpardonable negligence, they familiarly use words, which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas, without any distinct meaning at all. *Wisdom, glory, grace*, &c. are words frequent enough in every man's mouth ; but if a great many of those who use them, should be asked what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer : a plain proof, that though they have learned those sounds, and have them ready at their tongue's end, yet there are no determined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expressed to others by them.

§ 4. Men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words, which are easily got and retained, before they knew, or had framed the complex ideas, to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the things they were thought to stand for, they usually continue to do so all their lives, and without taking the pains necessary to settle in their minds determined ideas,

they use their words for such unsteady and confused notions as they have, contenting themselves with the same words other people use ; as if their very sound necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning. This, though men make a shift with in the ordinary occurrences of life, where they find it necessary to be understood, and therefore they make signs till they are so : yet this insignificancy in their words, when they come to reason concerning either their tenets or interest, manifestly fills their discourse with abundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon, especially in moral matters, where the words, for the most part, standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas, not regularly and permanently united in nature, their bare sounds are often only thought on, or at least very obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbours ; and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning ; whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain this advantage, that as in such discourses they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong ; it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes, who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation, who has no settled abode. This I guess to be so ; and every one may observe in himself and others, whether it be or no.

§ 5. *Secondly*, Another great abuse of words is, *inconstancy* in the use of them. It is hard to find a discourse written of any subject, especially of controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with attention, the same words (and those

commonly the most material in the discourse, and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for one collection of simple ideas, and sometimes for another, which is a perfect abuse of language. Words being intended for signs of my ideas, to make them known to others, not by any natural signification, but by a voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing, and sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater dishonesty. And a man, in his accounts with another, may, with as much fairness, make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another collection of units, (*v. g.* this character 3 stand sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight) as in his discourse, or reasoning, make the same words stand for different collections of simple ideas. If men should do so in their reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus, in the affairs and business of the world, and call 8 sometimes seven, and sometimes nine, as best served his advantage, would presently have clapped upon him one of the two names men constantly are disgusted with. And yet in arguments, and learned contests, the same sort of proceeding passes commonly for wit and learning; but to me it appears a greater dishonesty than the misplacing of counters, in the casting up a debt; and the cheat the greater, by how much truth is of greater concernment and value than money.

§ 6. *Thirdly*, Another abuse of language is, an *affected obscurity*, by either applying old words to new and unusual significations, or introducing

new and ambiguous terms, without defining either; or else putting them so together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Though the Peripatetic philosophy has been most eminent in this way, yet other sects have not been wholly clear of it. There is scarce any of them that are not cumbered with some difficulties, (such is the imperfection of human knowledge), which they have been fain to cover with obscurity of terms, and to confound the signification of words, which, like a mist before peoples eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being discovered. That *body* and *extension*, in common use, stand for two distinct ideas, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For, were their signification precisely the same, it would be proper and as intelligible to say, the *body of an extension*, as the *extension of a body*; and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their signification. To this abuse, and the mischiefs of confounding the signification of words, logic and the liberal sciences, as they have been handled in the schools, have given reputation; and the admired art of disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages, whilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the signification of words, more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things: and he that will look into that sort of learned writings, will find the words there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermined in their meaning, than they are in ordinary conversation.

§ 7. This is unavoidably to be so, where mens parts and learning are estimated by their skill in disputing. And if reputation and reward shall attend these conquests, which depend mostly on the fineness and niceties of words, it is no won-

der if the wit of man, so employed, should perplex, involve, and subtilize the signification of sounds, so as never to want something to say, in opposing or defending any question; the victory being adjudged, not to him who had truth on his side, but the last word in the dispute.

§ 8. This, though a very useless skill, and that which I think the direct opposite to the ways of knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto under the laudable and esteemed names of *subtilty* and *acuteness*; and has had the applause of the schools, and encouragement of one part of the learned men of the world. And no wonder, since the philosophers of old, (the disputing and wrangling philosophers, I mean such as Lucian, wittily, and with reason, taxes), and the schoolmen since, aiming at glory and esteem, for their great and universal knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover their ignorance with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themselves the admiration of others, by unintelligible terms, the apter to produce wonder, because they could not be understood: whilst it appears in all history, that these profound doctors were no wiser, nor more useful than their neighbours, and brought but small advantage to human life, or the societies wherein they lived: unless the coining of new words, wherein they produced no new things to apply them to, or the perplexing or obscuring the signification of old ones, and so bringing all things into question and dispute, were a thing profitable to the life of man, or worthy commendation and reward.

§ 9. For, notwithstanding these learned disputants, these all-knowing doctors, it was to the

unscholastic statesman that the governments of the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned mechanic, a name of disgrace, that they received the improvements of useful arts. Nevertheless, this artificial ignorance, and learned gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last ages, by the interest and artifice of those, who found no easier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amusing the men of business, and ignorant, with hard words, or employing the ingenious and idle in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth. Besides, there is no such way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange and absurd doctrines, as to guard them round about with legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined words: which yet make these retreats more like the dens of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortresses of fair warriors; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the strength that is in them, but the briars and thorns, and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with. For untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man, there is no other defence left for absurdity, but obscurity.

§ 10. Thus learned ignorance, and this art of keeping, even inquisitive men, from true knowledge, hath been propagated in the world, and hath much perplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the understanding. For we see, that other well-meaning and wise men, whose education and parts had not acquired that acuteness, could intelligibly express themselves to one another; and in its plain use, make a benefit of language. But though unlearned men well enough understood the words

white and *black*, &c. and had constant notions of the ideas signified by those words; yet there were philosophers found, who had learning and subtilty enough to prove, that *snow was black*, i. e. to prove, that *white was black*; whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse, conversation, instruction, and society; whilst, with great art and subtilty, they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words, and thereby render language less useful than the real defects of it had made it a gift, which the illiterate had not attained to.

§ 11. These learned men did equally instruct mens understandings, and profit their lives, as he who should alter the signification of known characters, and, by a subtle device of learning, far surpassing the capacity of the illiterate, dull, and vulgar, should, in his writing, shew, that he could put A for B, and D for E, &c. to the no small admiration and benefit of his reader. It being as senseless to put *black*, which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible idea, to put it, I say, for another, or the contrary idea, i. e. to call *snow black*, as to put this mark A, which is a character agreed on to stand for one modification of sound, made by a certain motion of the organs of speech, for B, which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound, made by another certain motion of the organs of speech.

§ 12. Nor hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties, or curious empty speculations; it hath invaded the great concerns of human life and society; obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity; brought confusion, disorder, and uncertainty, into the affairs of mankind; and if not destroyed, yet in great mea-

sure rendered useless those two great rules, religion and justice. What have the greatest part of the comments and disputes upon the laws of God and man served for, but to make the meaning more doubtful, and perplex the sense? What has been the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions, and acute niceties, but obscurity and uncertainty, leaving the words more unintelligible, and the reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass, that princes, speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinary commands, are easily understood; speaking to their people, in their laws, are not so? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen, that a man of an ordinary capacity very well understands a text, or a law, that he reads, till he consults an expounder, or goes to council; who, by that time he hath done explaining them, makes the words signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases.

§ 13. Whether any by-interests of these professions have occasioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be considered, whether it would not be well for mankind, whose concernment it is to know things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to spend their lives in talking about them, or tossing words to and fro; whether it would not be well, I say, that the use of words were made plain and direct; and that language, which was given us for the improvement of knowledge, and bond of society, should not be employed to darken truth, and unsettle peoples rights; to raise mists, and render unintelligible both morality and religion? Or that at least, if this will happen, it should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so?

§ 14. *Fourthly*, Another great abuse of words is, *the taking them for things*. This though it in some degree concerns all names in general, yet more particularly affects those of substances. To this abuse those men are most subject, who most confine their thoughts to any one system, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis; whereby they come to be persuaded, that the terms of that sect are so suited to the nature of things, that they perfectly correspond with their real existence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the Peripatetic philosophy, who does not think the ten names, under which are ranked the ten predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of things? Who is there of that school, that is not persuaded, that *substantial forms, vegetative souls, abhorrence of a vacuum, intentional species, &c.* are something real? These words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them; and therefore they cannot quit the opinion that they are conformable to nature, and are the representations of something that really exists. The Platonists have their *soul of the world*, and the Epicureans their *endeavour towards motion* in their atoms, when at rest. There is scarce any sect in philosophy that has not a distinct set of terms that others understand not. But yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding, serves so well to palliate mens ignorance, and cover their errors, comes, by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe, to seem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most significant: and should *aerial and ætherial vehicles* come once, by the prevalency of that

doctrine, to be generally received any-where, no doubt those terms would make impressions on mens minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as Peripatetic forms and intentional species have heretofore done.

§ 15. How much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding, the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover; and that, perhaps, in words little suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How many intricate disputes have there been about *matter*, as if there were some such thing really in nature, distinct from *body*; as it is evident, the word *matter* stands for an idea distinct from the idea of *body*? For, if the ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all places be put one for another. But we see, that though it be proper to say, there is *one matter of all bodies*, one cannot say, there is *one body of all matters*: we familiarly say, one body is bigger than another; but it sounds harsh (and, I think, is never used) to say, one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? *viz.* from hence, that though matter and body be not really distinct, but wherever there is the one, there is the other; yet matter and body stand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the other. For body stands for a solid extended figured substance, whereof matter is but a partial and more confused conception, it seeming to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body, without taking in its extension and figure: and therefore it is, that, speaking of matter, we speak of it al-

ways as one, because in truth, it expressly contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which is every-where the same, every-where uniform. This being our idea of matter, we no more conceive, or speak of different matters in the world; than we do of different solidities; though we both conceive, and speak of different bodies, because extension and figure are capable of variation. But since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, the taking matter to be the name of something really existing under that precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning *materia prima*; which imperfection or abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general terms, I leave to be considered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what they are, the signs of our ideas only, and not for things themselves. For, when we argue about matter, or any the like term, we truly argue only about the idea we express by that sound, whether that precise idea agree to any thing really existing in nature, or no. And if men would tell what ideas they make their words stand for, there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling in the search or support of truth, that there is.

§ 16. But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am sure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to persuade any one, that the words which his father or schoolmaster, - the parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor, used, signified nothing that really existed in na-

ture; which perhaps is none of the least causes that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions purely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but truth. For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them should not be removed.

§ 17. *Fifthly*, Another abuse of words, is the setting them in the place of things, which they do or can by no means signify. We may observe, that in the general names of substances, whereof the nominal essences are only known to us, when we put them into propositions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose, or intend they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances. For when a man says *gold is malleable*, he means and would insinuate something more than this, that *what I call gold is malleable*, (though truly it amounts to no more), but would have this understood, *viz.* that *gold*, i. e. *what has the real essence of gold, is malleable*: which amounts to thus much, that *malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from the real essence of gold*. But a man not knowing wherein that real essence consists, the connection in his mind of malleableness is not truly with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound *gold* he puts for it. Thus when we say, that *animal rationale*, is, and *animal implume bipes latis unguibus*, is not a good definition of a man; it is plain, we suppose the name *man* in this case to stand for the real essence of a species, and would signify, that a *rational animal* better described that real essence than a *two-legged animal with broad nails, and without feathers*. For else,

why might not Plato as properly make the word *ανθρωπος* or *man*, stand for his complex idea, made up of the ideas of a body, distinguished from others by a certain shape, and other outward appearances, as Aristotle makes the complex idea, to which he gave the name *ανθρωπος* or *man*, of body and the faculty of reasoning joined together; unless the name *ανθρωπος* or *man*, were supposed to stand for something else than what it signifies; and to be put in the place of some other thing than the idea a man professes he would express by it?

§ 18. It is true, the names of substances would be much more usual, and propositions made in them much more certain, were the real essences of substances the ideas in our minds, which those words signified. And it is for want of those real essences, that our words convey so little knowledge or certainty in our discourses about them: and therefore the mind, to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a secret supposition, to stand for a thing having that real essence, as if thereby it made some nearer approaches to it. For, though the word *man* or *gold*, signify nothing truly but a complex idea of properties, united together in one sort of substances; yet there is scarce any body in the use of these words, but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having the real essence, on which these properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that by a plain abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something, which not being in our complex idea, the name we use can no-wise be the sign of.

§ 19. This shews us the reason why in mixed modes any of the ideas that make the composition

of the complex one, being left out or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, *i. e.* to be of another species, as is plain in *chance-medley, manslaughter, murder, parricide, &c.* The reason whereof is, because the complex idea signified by that name, is the real as well as nominal essence; and there is no secret reference of that name to any other essence but that. But in substances it is not so. For, though in that called *gold*, one puts into his complex idea what another leaves out, and *vice versa*; yet men do not usually think that therefore the species is changed: because they secretly in their minds refer that name, and suppose it annexed to a real immutable essence of a thing existing, on which those properties depend. He that adds to his complex idea of gold, that of fixedness and solubility in *aqua regia*, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the species; but only to have a more perfect idea, by adding another simple idea, which is always in fact joined with those other, of which his former complex idea consisted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we had not the idea, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real essence of that species of bodies, the word *gold* (which, by standing for a more or less perfect collection of simple ideas, serves to design that sort of body well enough in civil discourse) comes to have no signification at all, being put for somewhat, whereof we have no idea at all, and so can signify nothing at all, when the body itself is away. For however it may be thought all one; yet, if well considered, it will be found a quite different thing, to argue about gold in name, and about a parcel

of the body itself, *v. g.* a piece of leaf-gold laid before us; though in discourse we are fain to substitute the name for the thing.

§ 20. That which I think very much disposes men to substitute their names for the real essences of species, is the supposition before mentioned, that nature works regularly in the production of things, and sets the boundaries to each of those species, by giving exactly the same real internal constitution to each individual, which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one who observes their different qualities, can hardly doubt, that many of the individuals, called by the same name, are, in their internal constitution, as different one from another, as several of those which are ranked under different specific names. This supposition, however, that the same and precise internal constitution goes always with the same specific name, makes men forward to take those names for the representatives of those real essences, though indeed they signify nothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds when they use them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposed for, or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind of use, cause a great deal of uncertainty in mens discourses; especially in those who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of substantial forms, whereby they firmly imagine the several species of things to be determined and distinguished.

§ 21. But however preposterous and absurd it be, to make our names stand for ideas we have not, or, which is all one, essences that we know not, it being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing; yet it is evident to any one, who ever so little reflects on the use men make of their

words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a man asks whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a drill, or a monstrous fœtus, be a man, or no; it is evident, the question is not, whether that particular thing agree to his complex idea, expressed by the name *man* : but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things, which he supposes his name to *man* stand for. In which way of using the names of substances, there are these false suppositions contained :

1st, That there are certain precise essences, according to which nature makes all particular things, and by which they are distinguished into species. That every thing has a real constitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible qualities depend, is past doubt : but, I think, it has been proved, that this makes not the distinction of species, as we rank them ; nor the boundaries of their names.

2^{dly}, This tacitly also insinuates, as if we had ideas of these proposed essences. For, to what purpose else is it to inquire whether this or that thing have the real essence of the species *man*, if we did not suppose that there were such a specific essence known ? Which yet is utterly false : and therefore such application of names, as would make them stand for ideas which we have not, must needs cause great disorder in discourses and reasonings about them, and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words.

§ 22. *Sixthly*, There remains yet another more general, though perhaps less observed, abuse of words ; and that is, that men having, by a long and familiar use, annexed to them certain ideas, they are apt to imagine so near and necessary a connection between the names and the significa-

tion they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the words delivered, as if it were past doubt, that in the use of those common received sounds, the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise ideas. Whence presuming, that when they have in discourse used any term, they have thereby, as it were, set before others the very thing they talk of. And so likewise taking the words of others, as naturally standing for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, or understand clearly others meaning. From whence commonly proceeds noise and wrangling, without improvement or information; whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas. And yet men think it strange, if in discourse, or (where it is often absolutely necessary) in dispute, one sometimes asks the meaning of their terms: though the arguings one may every day observe in conversation, make it evident, that there are few names of complex ideas, which any two men use for the same just precise collection. It is hard to name a word which will not be a clear instance of this. *Life* is a term, none more familiar. Any one almost would take it for an affront, to be asked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in question, whether a plant, that lies ready formed in the seed, have life; whether the embryo in an egg before incubation, or a man in a swoon without sense or motion, be alive, or no? It is easy to perceive, that a clear distinct settled idea does not always accompany the use of so known a word,

as that of *life* is. Some gross and confused conceptions men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common words of their language, and such a loose use of their words serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or affairs. But this is not sufficient for philosophical inquiries. Knowledge and reasoning require precise determinate ideas. And though men will not be so importunately dull, as not to understand what others say, without demanding an explication of their terms; nor so troublesomely critical, as to correct others in the use of the words they receive from them; yet where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case, I know not what fault it can be to desire the explication of words, whose sense seems dubious; or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance in what sense another man uses his words, since he has no other way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed. This abuse of taking words upon trust, has no-where spread so far, nor with so ill effects, as amongst men of letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes, which has so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of words. For, though it be generally believed, that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted with; yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is, that they speak different languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon things, and know what they think, they think all the same: though perhaps what they would have be different.

§ 23. To conclude this consideration of the imperfection and abuse of language; the ends of language in our discourse with others being chiefly these three: 1. To make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another. 2. To do it with as much ease and quickness as is possible. And, 3. Thereby to convey the knowledge of things. Language is either abused, or deficient, when it fails of any of these three.

First, Words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not open one man's ideas to another's view, 1. When men have names in their mouths without any determinate ideas in their minds, whereof they are the signs: or, 2. When they apply the common received names of any language to ideas, to which the common use of that language does not apply them: or, 3. When they apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by-and-by for another idea.

§ 24. *Secondly*, Men fail of conveying their thoughts, with all the quickness and ease that may be, when they have complex ideas, without having any distinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the language itself, which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification; and sometimes the fault of the man, who has not yet learned the name for that idea he would shew another.

§ 25. *Thirdly*, There is no knowledge of things, conveyed by mens words, when their ideas agree not to the reality of things. Though it be a defect that has its original in our ideas, which are not so conformable to the nature of things, as attention, study, and application, might make them; yet it fails not to extend itself to our words too,

when we use them as signs of real beings, which yet never had any reality or existence.

§ 26. *First*, He that hath words of any language, without distinct ideas in his mind, to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in discourse, only make a noise without any sense or signification; and how learned soever he may seem by the use of hard words, or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge, than he would be in learning, who had nothing in his study but the bare titles of books, without possessing the contents of them. For all such words, however put into discourse, according to the right construction of grammatical rules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds, and nothing else.

§ 27. *Secondly*, He that has complex ideas, without particular names for them, would be in no better a case than a bookseller, who had in his warehouse volumes that lay there unbound, and without titles; which he could therefore make known to others, only by shewing the loose sheets, and communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse for want of words to communicate his complex ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them; and so is fain often to use twenty words to express what another man signifies in one.

§ 28. *Thirdly*, He that puts not constantly the same sign for the same idea, but uses the same words sometimes in one, and sometimes in another signification, ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as fair a man, as he does in the mar-

ket and exchange, who sells several things under the same name.

§ 29. *Fourthly*, He that applies the words of any language to ideas different from those to which the common use of that country applies them, however his own understanding may be filled with truth and light, will not by such words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his terms. For however the sounds are such as are familiarly known, and easily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them; yet standing for other ideas than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the mind of the hearers, they cannot make known the thoughts of him who thus uses them.

§ 30. *Fifthly*, He that imagined to himself substances such as never have been, and filled his head with ideas which have not any correspondence with the real nature of things, to which yet he gives settled and defined names, may fill his discourse, and perhaps another man's head, with the fantastical imaginations of his own brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge.

§ 31. He that hath names without ideas, wants meaning in his words, and speaks only empty sounds. He that hath complex ideas without names for them, wants liberty and dispatch in his expressions, and is necessitated to use periphrases. He that uses his words loosely and unsteadily, will either be not minded, or not understood. He that applies his names to ideas different from their common use, wants propriety in his language, and speaks gibberish. And he that hath the ideas of substances, disagreeing with the real existence of things, so far wants the materials of true know-

ledge in his understanding, and hath instead thereof chimeras.

§ 32. In our notions concerning substances, we are liable to all the former inconveniencies: *v. g.* he that uses the word *tarantula*, without having any imagination or idea of what it stands for, pronounces a good word; but so long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a new discovered country shall see several sorts of animals and vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true ideas of them, as of a horse or a stag; but can speak of them only by a description, till he shall either take the names the natives call them by, or give them names himself. 3. He that uses the word *body* sometimes for pure extension, and sometimes for extension and solidity together, will talk very fallaciously. 4. He that gives the name *horse* to that idea which common usage calls *mule*, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5. He that thinks the name *centaur* stands for some real being, imposes on himself, and mistakes words for things.

§ 33. In modes and relations generally we are liable only to the four first of these inconveniencies, *viz.* 1. I may have in my memory the names of modes, as *gratitude* or *charity*, and yet not have any precise ideas annexed in my thoughts to those names. 2. I may have ideas, and not know the names that belong to them; *v. g.* I may have the idea of a man's drinking, till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips, and his eyes look red, and his feet fail him, and yet not know that it is to be called *drunkenness*. 3. I may have the ideas of *virtues* or *vices*, and names also, but apply them amiss: *v. g.* when I apply the name *frugality* to that idea which others call and

signify by this sound, *covetousness*. 4. I may use any of those names with inconstancy. 5. But in modes and relations, I cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existence of things: for modes being complex ideas, made by the mind at pleasure; and relation being but my way of considering or comparing two things together, and so also an idea of my own making, these ideas can scarce be found to disagree with any thing existing; since they are not in the mind, as the copies of things regularly made by nature, nor as properties inseparably flowing from the internal constitution or essence of any substance; but as it were, patterns lodged in my memory, with names annexed to them, to denominate actions and relations by, as they come to exist. But the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my conceptions; and so using words in a different sense from other people, I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong ideas of them, when I give wrong names to them. Only if I put in my ideas of mixed modes or relations, any inconsistent ideas together, I fill my head also with chimeras; since such ideas, if well examined, cannot so much as exist in the mind, much less any real being ever be denominated from them.

§ 34. Since wit and fancy finds easier entertainment in the world, than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative speeches, and allusion in language, will hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in discourses, where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information and improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from them, can scarce pass for faults. But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow, that all the art of rhetoric, besides

order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgement, and so indeed are perfect cheat: and therefore however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned; cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them. What, and how various they are, will be superfluous here to take notice; the books of rhetoric which abound in the world, will instruct those who want to be informed. Only I cannot but observe, how little the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge, is the care and concern of mankind; since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men love to deceive, and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is publicly taught, and has always been had in great reputation: and, I doubt not, but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality, in me to have said this much against it. Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it, to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.

C H A P. XI.

Of the REMEDIES of the foregoing IMPERFECTIONS and ABUSES.

§ 1. *They are worth seeking.* § 2. *Are not easy.*
 § 3. *But yet necessary to philosophy.* § 4. *Misuse of words the great cause of errors.* § 5. *Obstinacy.* § 6. *And wrangling.* § 7. *Instance, bat and bird.* § 8. *First remedy, To use no word without an idea.* § 9. *Secondly, To have distinct ideas annexed to them in modes.* § 10. *And distinct and conformable in substances.* § 11. *Thirdly, Propriety.* § 12. *Fourthly, To make known their meaning.* § 13. *And that three ways.* § 14. *First, In simple ideas by synonymous terms, or shewing.* § 15. *Secondly; In mixed modes, by definition.* § 16. *Morality capable of demonstration.* § 17. *Definitions can make moral discourses clear.* § 18. *And is the only way.* § 19. *Thirdly, In substances, by shewing and defining.* § 20, 21. *Ideas of the leading qualities of substances, are best got by shewing.* § 22. *The ideas of their powers, best by definition.* § 23. *A reflection on the knowledge of spirits.* § 24. *Fourthly, Ideas also of substances must be conformable to the things.* § 25. *Not easy to be made so.* § 26. *Fifthly, By constancy in their signification.* § 27. *When the variation is to be explained.*

§ 1. **T**HE natural and improved imperfections of languages, we have seen above at large; and speech being the great bond that holds

society together, and the common conduit whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man, and one generation to another, it would well deserve our most serious thoughts, to consider what remedies are to be found for these inconveniencies above mentioned.

§ 2. I am not so vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect reforming the languages of the world, no not so much as of his own country, without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that men should use their words constantly in the same sense, and for none but determined and uniform ideas, would be to think, that all men should have the same notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct ideas of. Which is not to be expected by any one, who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing or very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the world, who thinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a good understanding; or that mens talking much or little, shall hold proportion only to their knowledge.

§ 3. But though the market and exchange must be left to their own ways of talking, and gossipings not to be robbed of their antient privilege; though the schools, and men of argument, would perhaps take it amiss to have any thing offered, to abate the length, or lessen the number of their disputes: yet, methinks those, who pretend seriously to search after or maintain truth, should think themselves obliged to study how they might deliver themselves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or equivocation, to which mens words are naturally liable, if care be not taken.

§ 4. For he that shall well consider the errors

and obscurity, the mistakes and confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, will find some reason to doubt, whether language, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongst mankind. How many are there, that when they would think on things, fix their thoughts only on words, especially when they would apply their minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder, if the result of such contemplations and reasonings, about little more than sounds, whilst the ideas they annexed to them are very confused, and very unsteady, or perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I say, that such thoughts and reasonings end in nothing but obscurity and mistake, without any clear judgment or knowledge?

§ 5. This inconvenience, in an ill-use of words, men suffer in their own private meditations; but much more manifest are the disorders which follow from it in conversation, discourse, and arguings with others. For language being the great conduit whereby men convey their discoveries, reasonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge, which are in things themselves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop the pipes, whereby it is distributed, to the public use and advantage of mankind. He that uses words without any clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder, that all the sciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscure and equivocal terms, and insignificant and doubtful expressions,

capable to make the most attentive or quick-sighted very little or not at all the more knowing or orthodox ; since subtilty in those who make profession to teach or defend truth, hath passed so much for a virtue. A virtue, indeed, which consisting for the most part, in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance, and more obstinate in their errors.

§ 6. Let us look into the books of controversy of any kind, there we shall see, that the effect of obscure, unsteady, or equivocal, terms, is nothing but noise and wrangling about sounds, without convincing or bettering a man's understanding. For, if the idea be not agreed on, betwixt the speaker and hearer, for which the words stand, the argument is not about things, but names. As often as such a word, whose signification is not ascertained betwixt them, comes in use, their understandings have no other object wherein they agree, but barely the sound, the things that they think on at that time, as expressed by that word, being quite different.

§ 7. Whether a bat be a bird or no, is not a question ; whether a bat be another thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed it has, for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of ; but the question is, 1. Either between those that acknowledged themselves to have but imperfect ideas of one or both of those sorts of things, for which those names are supposed to stand ; and then it is a real inquiry concerning the nature of a bird or a bat, to make their yet imperfect ideas of it more complete, by examining, whether all the simple ideas, to which, combined together, they both give the name *bird*, be all

to be found in a *bat* : but this is a question only of inquirers, not disputers, who neither affirm nor deny, but examine : or, 2. It is a question between disputants, whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a bat is a bird. And then the question is barely about the signification of one or both these words ; in that they not having both the same complex ideas, to which they give these two names ; one holds, and the other denies, that these two names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the signification of these two names, it were impossible they should dispute about them. For they would presently and clearly see, were that adjusted between them, whether all the simple ideas, of the more general name *bird*, were found in the complex idea of a *bat*, or no ; and so there could be no doubt, whether a bat were a bird or no. And here I desire it may be considered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the disputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the signification of words ; and whether, if the terms they are made in were defined, and reduced in their signification (as they must be, where they signify any thing) to determined collections of the simple ideas they do or should stand for, those disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish. I leave it then to be considered, what the learning of disputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of themselves or others, whose business is only the vain ostentation of sounds, *i. e.* those who spend their lives in disputes and controversies. When I shall see any of those combatants strip all his terms of ambiguity and obscurity, (which every one may do in the words he uses himself), I shall think him a cham-

pion for knowledge, truth, and peace, and not the slave of vain-glory, ambition, or a party.

§ 8. To remedy the defects of speech before mentioned, to some degree, and to prevent the inconveniencies that follow from them, I imagine the observation of these following rules may be of use, till some-body better able shall judge it worth his while to think more maturely on this matter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it.

First, A man should take care to use no word without a signification, no name without an idea for which he makes it stand. This rule will not seem altogether needless, to any one who shall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words; as instinct, sympathy, and antipathy, &c. in the discourse of others, so made use of, as he might easily conclude, that those that used them had no ideas in their minds to which they applied them: but spoke them only as sounds, which usually served instead of reasons, on the like occasions. Not but that these words, and the like, have very proper significations in which they may be used; but there being no natural connection between any words, and any ideas, these, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men who have no ideas in their minds, to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary they should, if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone.

§ 9. *Secondly*, It is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some ideas, those he annexes them to, if they be simple, must be clear and distinct; if complex, must be determinate, *i. e.* the precise collection of simple ideas settled in the mind, with that sound annexed to it, as

the sign of that precise determined collection, and no other. This is very necessary in names of modes, and especially moral words; which having no settled objects in nature, from whence their ideas are taken, as from their original, are apt to be very confused. *Justice* is a word in every man's mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined loose signification: which will always be so, unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts, that complex idea consists of; and if it be compounded, must be able to resolve it still on, till he at last comes to the simple ideas that make it up: and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be *justice*, for example, or any other. I do not say, a man need stand to recollect, and make this analysis at large every time the word *justice* comes in his way: but this, at least, is necessary, that he have so examined the signification of that name, and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind, that he can do it when he pleases. If one who makes his complex idea of justice, to be such a treatment of the person or goods of another, as is according to law, hath not a clear and distinct idea what law is, which makes a part of his complex idea of justice, it is plain, his idea of justice itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will, perhaps, be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men will think they may be excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their minds. But yet I must say, till this be done; it must not be wondered, that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discourses with others.

§ 10. In the names of substances, for a right use of them, something more is required than barely determined ideas: in these the names must also be conformable to things, as they exist: but of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large by-and-bye. This exactness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philosophical knowledge, and in controversies about truth. And though it would be well too, if it extended itself to common conversation, and the ordinary affairs of life; yet, I think, that is scarce to be expected. Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses; and both, though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market, and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks, and tailors, have words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary affairs; and so, I think, might philosophers and disputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to be clearly understood.

§ 11. *Thirdly*, It is not enough that men have ideas, determined ideas, for which they make these signs stand; but they must also take care to apply their words, as near as may be, to such ideas as common use has annexed them to. For words, especially of languages already framed, being no man's private possession, but the common measure of commerce and communication, it is not for any one, at pleasure, to change the stamp they are current in; nor alter the ideas they are affixed to; or at least, when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it. Men's intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be understood; which cannot be without frequent explanations, demands, and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow common use. Propriety of speech is that

which gives our thoughts entrance into other mens minds with the greatest ease and advantage: and therefore deserves some part of our care and study, especially in the names of moral words. The proper signification and use of terms is best to be learned from those, who, in their writings and discourses, appear to have had the clearest notions, and apply to them their terms with the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a man's words, according to the propriety of the language, though it have not always the good fortune to be understood; yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is so unskilful in the language he speaks as not to understand it, when made use of as it ought to be.

§ 12 *Fourthly*, But because common use has not so visibly annexed any signification to words, as to make men know always certainly what they precisely stand for: and because men, in the improvement of their knowledge, come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they must either make new words, (which men seldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of affectation or novelty,) or else must use old ones, in a new signification; therefore after the observation of the foregoing rules, it is sometimes necessary for the ascertaining the signification of words, to declare their meaning; where either common use has left it uncertain and loose, (as it has in most names of very complex ideas), or where the term, being very material in the discourse, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake.

§ 13. As the ideas, mens words stand for, are of different sorts; so the way of making known the

ideas, they stand for, when there is occasion, is also different. For though defining be thought the proper way to make known the proper signification of words; yet there are some words, that will not be defined, as there are others, whose precise meaning cannot be made known, but by definition; and, perhaps, a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, as we shall see in the names of simple ideas, modes and substances.

§ 14. *First*, When a man makes use of the name of any simple idea, which he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he is obliged, by the laws of ingenuity, and the end of speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what idea he makes it stand for. This, as has been shewn, cannot be done by definition; and therefore, when a synonymous word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. 1. Sometimes the naming the subject, wherein that simple idea is to be found, will make its name be understood by those who are acquainted with that subject, and know it by that name. So to make a countryman understand what *fueillemorte* colour signifies, it may suffice to tell him, it is the colour of withered leaves falling in autumn. 2. But the only sure way of making known the signification of the name of any simple idea, is by presenting to his senses that subject, which may produce it in his mind, and make him actually have the idea that word stands for.

§ 15. *Secondly*, Mixed modes, especially those belonging to morality, being most of them such combinations of ideas as the mind puts together of its own choice; and whereof there are not always standing patterns to be found existing, the signification of their names cannot be made known, as those of simple ideas, by any shewing; but in

recompence thereof, may be perfectly and exactly defined. For they being combinations of several ideas that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any archetypes, men may, if they please, exactly know the ideas that go to each composition, and so both use these words in a certain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare, when there is occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay great blame on those, who make not their discourses about moral things very clear and distinct. For since the precise signification of the names of mixed modes, or, which is all one, the real essence of each species, is to be known, they being not of nature's, but man's making, it is a great negligence and perverseness, to discourse of moral things with uncertainty and obscurity, which is more pardonable in treating of natural substances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary reason, as we shall see by-and-bye.

§ 16. Upon this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that morality is capable of demonstration, as well as mathematics: since the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for, may be perfectly known; and so the congruity, and incongruity of the things themselves be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor let any one object, that the names of substances are often to be made use of in morality, as well as those of modes, from which will arise obscurity. For as to substances, when concerned in moral discourses, their divers natures are not so much inquired into, as supposed: *v. g.* when we say that man is subject to law; we mean nothing by man, but a corporeal rational creature:

what the real essence or other qualities of that creature are in this case, is no way considered. And therefore, whether a child or changeling be a man in a physical sense, may, amongst the naturalists, be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral man, as I may call him, which is this immoveable unchangeable idea, a corporeal rational being. For, were there a monkey, or any other creature to be found, that has the use of reason, to such a degree, as to be able to understand general signs, and to deduce consequences about general ideas, he would no doubt be subject to law, and in that sense, be a man, how much soever he differed in shape from others of that name. The names of substances, if they be used in them, as they should, can no more disturb moral, than they do mathematical discourses: where, if the mathematician speaks of a cube or globe of gold, or any other body, he has his clear settled idea which varies not, though it may by mistake be applied to a particular body to which it belongs not.

§ 17. This I have here mentioned by-the-bye, to shew of what consequence it is for men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequently in all their moral discourses, to define their words when there is occasion: since thereby moral knowledge may be brought to so great clearness and certainty. And it must be great want of ingenuity, to say no worse of it, to refuse to do it: since a definition is the only way, whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known; and yet a way, whereby their meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for any contest about it. And therefore the negligence or perverseness of mankind cannot be excused, if their discourses

in morality be not much more clear, than those in natural philosophy : since they are about ideas in the mind, which are none of them false or disproportionate ; they having no external beings for the archetypes which they are referred to, and must correspond with. It is far easier for men to frame in their minds an idea, which shall be the standard to which they will give the name *justice*, with which pattern so made, all actions that agree shall pass under that denomination, than, having seen Aristides, to frame an idea that shall, in all things, be exactly like him, who is as he is, let men make what idea they please of him. For the one, they need but know the combination of ideas that are put together in their own minds ; for the other, they must inquire into the whole nature, and abstruse hidden constitution, and various qualities of a thing existing without them.

§ 18. Another reason that makes the defining of mixed modes so necessary, especially of moral words, is what I mentioned a little before, *viz.* that it is the only way whereby the signification of the most of them can be known with certainty. For the ideas they stand for, being for the most part such, whose component parts no-where exist together, but scattered and mingled with others, it is the mind alone that collects them, and gives them the union of one idea: and it is only by words, enumerating the several simple ideas which the mind has united, that we can make known to others what their names stand for ; the assistance of the senses in this case not helping us, by the proposal of sensible objects, to shew the ideas, which our names of this kind stand for, as it does often in the names of sensible simple ideas, and also to some degree in those of substances.

§ 19. *Thirdly*, For the explaining the signification of the names of substances as they stand for the ideas we have of their distinct species, both the fore-mentioned ways, *viz.* of shewing and defining, are requisite, in many cases, to be made use of. For there being ordinarily in each sort some leading qualities, to which we suppose the other ideas, which make up our complex idea of that species, annexed, we forwardly give the specific name to that thing, wherein that characteristical mark is found, which we take to be the most distinguishing idea of that species. These leading or characteristical (as I may call them) ideas, in the sorts of animals and vegetables, is, as has been before remarked *, mostly figure, and in inanimate bodies colour, and in some both together. Now,

§ 20. These leading sensible qualities are those which make the chief ingredients of our specific ideas, and consequently the most observable and unvariable part in the definitions of our specific names, as attributed to sorts of substances coming under our knowledge. For though the sound man, in its own nature, be as apt to signify a complex idea made up of animality and rationality, united in the same subject, as to signify any other combination, yet used as a mark to stand for a sort of creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex idea, signified by the word *man*, as any other we find in it; and therefore why Plato's *animal implume bipes latis unguibus*, should not be a good definition of the name *man*, standing for that sort of creatures, will not be easy to shew:

* Chap. vi. § 29. and chap. ix. § 15.

for it is the shape, as the leading quality, that seems more to determine that species, than a faculty of reasoning, which appears not at first, and in some never. And if this be not allowed to be so, I do not know how they can be excused from murder, who kill monstrous births, as we call them, because of an unordinary shape, without knowing whether they have a rational soul, or no; which can be no more discerned in a well-formed, than ill-shaped infant, as soon as born. And who is it has informed us, that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement, unless it has just such a sort of frontispiece, or can join itself to, and inform no sort of body but one that is just of such an outward structure?

§ 21. Now these leading qualities are best made known by shewing, and can hardly be made known otherwise. For the shape of an horse, or cassuary, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words, the sight of the animals doth it a thousand times better: and the idea of the particular colour of gold is not to be got by any description of it, but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about it, as is evident in those who are used to this metal, who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the sight, where others (who have as good eyes,* but yet, by use, have not got the precise nice idea of that peculiar yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said of those other simple ideas peculiar in their kind to any substance; for which precise ideas, there are no peculiar names. The particular ringing sound there is in gold, distinct from the sound of other bodies, has no particular name annexed to it, no

more than the particular yellow that belongs to that metal.

§ 22. But because many of the simple ideas, that make up our specific ideas of substances, are powers which lie not obvious to our senses in things as they ordinarily appear; therefore, in the signification of our names of substances, some part of the signification will be better made known by enumerating those simple ideas, than by shewing the substance itself. For he that, to the yellow shining colour of gold got by sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the ideas of great ductility, fusibility, fixedness, and solubility in *aqua regia*, will have a perfecter idea of gold, than he can have by seeing a piece of gold, and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities. But if the formal constitution of this shining heavy, ductil thing, (from whence all these its properties flow) lay open to our senses, as the formal constitution, or essence of a triangle does, the signification of the word *gold* might as easily be ascertained as that of a *triangle*.

§ 23. Hence we may take notice, how much the foundation of all our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our senses. For how spirits, separate from bodies, (whose knowledge and ideas of these things are certainly much more perfect than ours) know them, we have no notion, no idea at all. The whole extent of our knowledge, or imagination, reaches not beyond our own ideas, limited to our ways of perception. Though yet it be not to be doubted, that spirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh, may have as clear ideas of the radical constitution of substances, as we have of a triangle, and so perceive how all their properties and operations flow from thence: but the

manner how they come by that knowledge, exceeds our conceptions.

§ 24. But though definitions will serve to explain the names of substances, as they stand for our ideas; yet they leave them not without great imperfection, as they stand for things. For our names of substances being not put barely for our ideas, but being made use of ultimately to represent things, and so are put in their place, their signification must agree with the truth of things, as well as with mens ideas. And therefore in substances, we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex idea, commonly received as the signification of that word, but must go a little farther, and inquire into the nature and properties of the things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our ideas of their distinct species; or else learn them from such as are used to that sort of things, and are experienced in them. For, since it is intended their names should stand for such collections of simple ideas as do really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex idea in other mens minds, which in their ordinary acceptance they stand for: therefore to define their names right, natural history is to be inquired into; and their properties are, with care and examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniencies in discourses and arguings about natural bodies and substantial things, to have learned from the propriety of the language, the common but confused, or very imperfect idea, to which each word is applied, and to keep them to that idea in our use of them: but we must, by acquainting ourselves with the history of that sort of things rectify and settle our complex idea, belonging to each specific name;

and in discourse with others, (if we find them mistake us), we ought to tell what the complex idea is that we make such a name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done by all those who search after knowledge, and philosophical verity, in that children being taught words whilst they have but imperfect notions of things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and seldom frame determined ideas to be signified by them. Which custom, (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and conversation) they are apt to continue, when they are men: and so begin at the wrong end, learning words first, and perfectly, but make the notions to which they apply those words afterwards, very overtly. By this means it comes to pass, that men speaking the proper language of their country, *i. e.* according to grammar-rules of that language, do yet speak very improperly of things themselves; and by their arguing one with another, make but small progress in the discoveries of useful truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much, for the improvement of our knowledge, how they are called.

§ 25. It were therefore to be wished, that men, versed in physical inquiries, and acquainted with the several sorts of natural bodies, would set down those simple ideas, wherein they observe the individuals of each sort constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confusion which comes from several persons applying the same name to a collection of a smaller or greater number of sensible qualities, proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with, or

accurate in examining the qualities of any sort of things, which come under one denomination. But a dictionary of this sort, containing, as it were, a natural history, requires too many hands, as well as too much time, cost, pains, and sagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must content ourselves with such definitions of the names of substances, as explain the sense men use them in. And it would be well, where there is occasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done; but men talk to one another, and dispute in words, whose meaning is not agreed between them, out of a mistake, that the signification of common words are certainly established, and the precise ideas they stand for, perfectly known; and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Both which suppositions are false: no names of complex ideas having so settled determined significations, that they are constantly used for the same precise ideas. Nor is it a shame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of any thing, but by the necessary ways of attaining it; and so it is no discredit not to know what precise idea any sound stands for in another man's mind, without he declare it to me by some other way than barely using that sound, there being no other way, without such a declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed, the necessity of communication by language, brings men to an agreement in the signification of common words, within some tolerable latitude, that may serve for ordinary conversation: and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the ideas which are annexed to words by common use, in a language familiar to him. But common use being but a very uncertain rule, which reduces itself at last to

the ideas of particular men, proves often but a very variable standard. But though such a dictionary, as I have above mentioned, will require too much time, cost and pains, to be hoped for in this age; yet, methinks, it is not unreasonable to propose, that words standing for things, which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes, should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them. A vocabulary made after this fashion, would, perhaps with more ease, and in less time, teach the true signification of many terms, especially in languages of remote countries or ages, and settle truer ideas in mens minds of several things, whereof we read the names in antient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics. Naturalists, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of this way: and he that has had occasion to consult them, will have reason to confess, that he has a clearer idea of *opium* or *ibex*, from a little print of that herb, or beast, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them. And so no doubt, he would have of *strigil* and *sistrum*, if instead of a *curry-comb* and *cymbal*, which are the English names dictionaries render them by, he could see stamped in the margin, small pictures of these instruments, as they were in use amongst the antients. *Toga*, *tunica*, *pallium*, are words easily translated by *gown*, *coat*, and *cloak*; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of those habits amongst the Romans, than we have of the faces of the taylor who made them. Such things as these, which the eye distinguishes by their shapes, would be best let into the mind by draughts made of them, and more determine the signification of such words, than any other

words set for them, or made use of to define them. But this only by the bye.

§ 26. *Fifthly*, If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words, and definitions of their terms are not to be had; yet this is the least that can be expected, that in all discourses wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should use the same word constantly in the same sense: if this were done, (which nobody can refuse without great dissingenuity) many of the books extant might be spared, many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end, several of those great volumes, swollen with ambiguous words, now used in one sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow compass; and many of the philosophers, to mention no other, as well as poets works, might be contained in a nut-shell.

§ 27. But after all, the provision of words is so scanty in respect of that infinite variety of thoughts, that men, wanting terms to suit their precise notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be forced often to use the same word in somewhat different senses. And though in the continuation of a discourse, or the pursuit of an argument, there be hardly room to digress into a particular definition, as often as a man varies the signification of any term; yet the import of the discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it: but where that is not sufficient to guide the reader, there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and shew in what sense he there uses that term.

The END of the SECOND VOLUME.











